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mechanisms to adjust the level of security service “on-the-fly” to respond to changing 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
Current implementations of IPsec and KeyNote do not provide the granularity or 
flexibility to adjust security controls to reflect real-world threat, information security 
levels and priority requirements for data delivery. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze,  
design and implement an interface that interacts with a Trust Management System 
(KeyNote) to dynamically modify the protection of  IPsec communications in response to 
changing security threats, conditions and situations.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Information assurance and security have grown in concern and importance along 
with our dependence on network communications and our connectivity across the 
Internet. The DOD requires the ability to communicate securely within computer 
networks via the Internet. Unfortunately the key Internet protocols were not designed to 
provide security.  As our dependence on the Internet has grown and its security 
vulnerabilities have become apparent.  
Typically a “penetrate-and-patch” technique is used to attempt to locate and fix all 
system vulnerabilities when security is applied after development and implementation. 
The weakness in this approach is that to be 100% successful, you have to find all 
vulnerabilities and patch each one. This is very costly in man-hours and not guaranteed to 
be 100% effective. It is better to build security into a system from the ground up, 
incorporating secure methodology into the design and implementation phase. For 
example, formal methods may be used to mathematically determine the system’s 
assurance level. 
One of the first successful attempts to secure network communication across an 
insecure medium (Internet), was the Virtual Private Network (VPN). This involved the 
establishment of a static secure connection between two peers, gateways or a 
combination of both. The limitation of a simple VPN is tha t it is not capable of applying a 
complex security policy in which different applications and different users would require 
different levels of security. 
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IPsec was developed to provide further granularity for the Internet Protocol (IP). 
IPsec extends the IP Protocol to enable security for TCP/IP communications. IPsec 
provides both secrecy and integrity services. A wide variety of choices are available 
when establishing protected communications across the network.  The appropriate choice 
and combination of secrecy and integrity mechanisms will depend upon the “trust 
relationships” between the communicating entities.  Those relationships are constrained 
by the policy of each entity. Negotiation of policy and mechanisms takes place in the 
context of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) framework and the Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP).  However, IKE and ISAKMPD 
do not provide a general mechanism for managing and incorporating security policy. In 
order to ensure that IPSEC consistent ly meets local security policy needs of the user, a 
Trust Management System is used to encode policy and support communications security 
negotiation and management. (Thayer, R., Doraswamy,N., and Glenn, R , 1998) 
A trust management system unifies the elements of security policy, credentials, 
access control, and authorization. Applications can use the Keynote trust management 
system to verify, through the compliance checker, whether a requested action is 
authorized. (Matt Blaze, John Ioannidis, and Angelos D. Keromytis, Feb 2000) 
The concept of Quality of Security Service (QoSS) provides the foundation for 
implementation of security mechanisms, such as IPsec, that utilize a trust management 
system to manage security according to policy.  QoSS provides a means  to manage 
security services based on the requirements set by the user‘s requests, the system’s 
security policy, the availability of system resources and the network environment. (Irvine, 
C.E. and Levin, T, September 2000)  
Currently, IPSEC and Keynote do not have the flexibility to adjust security 
controls to adapt to changes in threat conditions, critical time transmissions, and network 
congestion/traffic.  By providing more granularity through parameterization in IPsec, 
these and other dynamic security requirements can be represented and accurately trigger 
adjustments in security services.  
C. EXPECTED BENFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
By providing dynamic parameterization to IPsec, government and military 
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security systems will be able to automate security service adjustments according to 
dynamic environmental parameter settings, such as INFOCON and THREATCON. 
Currently, when a dynamic environmental value changes, security systems must be 
stopped, reconfigured and executed to incorporate policy changes appropriately. With 
dynamic parameterization, the security services will adjust  “on-the-fly” in accordance 
with local security policy. This research will provide a foundation for allowing IPsec 
mechanisms to be managed under dynamically changing network conditions.  The 
additional granularity intended for the IPsec mechanism will allow it to reflect both 
Quality of Security Service requirements and highly granular security policies. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are three fold:  
- Thoroughly study the current implementation of IPsec, specifically 
OpenBSD 2.8, to gain an understanding of the security mechanism and its 
components. 
- Design and develop a dynamic parameterization module, providing an 
interface that will enable users to select values for “dynamic parameters,” 
and ultimately result in an IPsec reconfiguration according to established 
security policy. 
- Design and develop a method of demonstrating the results of this research, 
specifically to users with limited knowledge of the OpenBSD operating 
environment.   
E. THE ROAD TO DYNAMIC PARAMETERIZATION 
The following chapters will be provided to describe the work required to achieve 
the objectives listed above: background, analysis, design, implementation, testing and 
demonstration. 
- Chapter II  Quality of Security Service(QoSS) – a brief introduction to 
QoSS. 
- Chapter III  IPsec Architecture  – a  review IPsec and its implementation 
in  OpenBSD 2.8. 
- Chapter IV  Design and Process – an outline and description of the design 
and process phase of  dynamic parameterization.  
- Chapter V  Implementation – a  description of the methodology, and 
actual implementation used to achieve the objectives, including pseudo 
algorithms and source code. 
- Chapter VI  Graphical User Interface Demonstration – a  description of 
the design and implementation of the GUI demonstration module. 
4 
- Chapter VII  Research Summary and Future Work – a summary of the  
completed research and a discussion of future related work. 
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II. QUALITY OF SECURITY SERVICE (QOSS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The challenge of providing users with consistent and reliable access to resources 
in a distributed networking environment, such as across the Internet, has become a real 
and troublesome problem for System Administrators and Resource Managers.  The 
former linear solution  of providing resources by calculating and controlling the number 
of users and types of terminals cannot be used outside the local network environment.  
The Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism was developed to handle this management  
problem.  It provides a metric to measure and manage computational resources in an 
effort to provide requested levels of  service to customers. (Aurrecoechohea, C., 
Campbell, A., and Hauw, L. A., 1996) (Chatterjee, S., Sabata, B., Sydir, J., May 1998) 
A similar challenge exists within the realm of network computer security.  Here 
the objective is to be able to fulfill user security requests and adapt and adjust 
accordingly to environment security changes. This chapter discusses Quality of Security 
Service (QoSS), the foundation and methodology of Quality of Service, its importance, 
and costing mechanisms. The concept of dynamic parameters, Network Mode and 
Security Level, is introduced. These parameters allow environmental conditions to be 
mapped accordingly to security policy and  ultimately determining the  security 
parameters used by the system.  To support security system management, a costing 
framework that will allow system administrators to properly orchestrate security 
resources is also discussed. (Spyropoulou, E., Levin, T., and Irvine, C.E., December 
2000) 
B. QUALITY OF SECURITY SERVICE (QOS) 
The Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism, see Figure 2.1, provides the ability to 
manage network and computational resources in accordance with the user’s service 
requests, availability of system resources, and the network environment.  QoS in simple 
terms, is a mechanism that establishes a contract between users and resource managers. 
The service requests are based on the following abstract attributes: performance, accuracy 
and precision.  A user will typically request a certain level of service and the resource 
manager will either approve the request or deny it, possibly offering another available 
6 
level of service.  (Aurrecoechohea, C., Campbell, A., and Hauw, L.  A., 1996)(Chatterjee, 
S., Sabata, B., Sydir, J., May 1998)  
The QoS mechanism may also be required to adjust negotiated levels of service as 
the availability of resources increases or decreases.  This will require the Quality of 
Service (QoS) mechanism to govern all services provided to all users according to overall 
system policy requirements.  This allows the management system to control resources 
and services as a whole in the event of a shift of prioritization or a loss or gain of 
resources. Resource usage policies may vary, for example to allocate resources and 
services equally or perhaps to provide a prioritized range of security services.  
Ultimately, a user’s level of service may be modulated to accommodate the system’s 
policy and availability of resources. Of course, system policy level requirements will  
dominate individual level requirement of services and resources. (Aurrecoechohea, C., 
Campbell, A., and Hauw, L. A., 1996)(Chatterjee, S., Sabata, B., Sydir, J., May 1998)  
A further level of granularity to service level negotiations can be provided by 
utilizing hard and soft requirements. Hard requirements must be met in order for the QoS 
mechanism to accept the user’s request. Soft requirements permit requests to be satisfied 
by a range of acceptable services. The soft variables may be adjusted during service to 
accommodate other users or network environmental factors.  (Aurrecoechohea, C., 
Campbell, A., and Hauw, L. A., 1996)(Chatterjee, S., Sabata, B., Sydir, J., May 1998)  
Providing different ranges and levels of potential service enables a system 
manager to effectively orchestrate system resources dependent upon requests, network 
environment and available resources. 
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Quality of Service (QoS) 






Figure 2.1. Quality of Service (QoS). 
 
C.  QUALITY OF SECURITY OF SERVICE (QOSS) 
With the increased interest and implementation of computer security systems, 
specifically their effectiveness and impact on operational functionality, mechanisms to 
monitor and mediate security controls are required. In the QoS model, resource allocation 
is adjusted to meet user requests under changing network environment and resource 
availability conditions. Similarly, Quality of Security Service (QoSS), see Figure 2.2 
provides a mechanism to manage security services to meet requirements set by the user‘s 
requests, system’s security policy, availability of system resources and network 
environment. (Irvine, C.E. and Levin, T., September 2000) 
Similar to the modulation of resources to support  QoS, security services can be 
defined in terms of user and system requirements, network environment factors and 
available resources.  Without a range of security services, a user is faced with the rigid 
and limited choice of “all or nothing”: security or no security.  Historically, security 
services have been provided in such a static manner. (Spryropoulou, Evdoxia, Agar, 
Chris, Levin, Timthoy, Irvine, Cynthia, January 2002) Quality of Security Service 
(QoSS) provides a more flexible solution to the provision of security services. The 
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security resource manager and/or the security system can adjust security service to meet 
user requirements, system security policy and network environment constraints.  (Irvine, 
C.E. and Levin, T., September 2000) 
Security systems and managers can maintain overall control of the security 
mechanism through QoSS  “system security policies.”  These policies dominate the 
individual “user security requirements.” Specifically, they define all authorized 
operations per user, system, application , etc.   
QoSS has several mechanisms to handle security variances. A security variance 
exists when security policies may be enforced utilizing a specific range of attributes. 
Therefore, based on the policy parameters, the attributes used to enforce the security 
policy may differ according to selection criteria. Fixed requirements are used to set 
minimum level acceptable security standards.  A range of security settings meeting or 
exceeding this minimum level can be provided.  For example a system may utilize SHA 
as a minimum leve l authentication algorithm for all message handling. Further 
granularity in support of confidentiality could be applied to messages by users or 
applications by selecting an encryption algorithm from a provided range.  Other examples 
of security attributes that may be used are:  assurance level, key length or security 
attribute expiration date stamp.  (Irvine, C.E. and Levin, T., September  2000) 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) 







Figure 2.2. Quality of Security Service (QoSS). 
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1. Managing Quality of Security Service (QoSS) 
Inevitably, security mechanisms result in a cost to the user, system and resources. 
Whether in the form bandwidth, algorithm processing time, overhead, or funds, the cost 
of security is a challenging concern to resource managers.  A costing framework is 
required to map security service resource consumption to available resources, ultimately 
enabling a management system to efficiently and effectively handle security service 
costs. 
Security services, as previously described, may utilize high level services and 
consume lower level resources in a system. High level services include, for example, 
non-repudiation, auditing, authentication, encryption, or intrusion detection. Low level 
resources include memory, bandwidth, or processor time. Further, each security service 
will require a governing policy, consisting of specific rules that determine how and when 
to use the service. Therefore each network task associated with QoSS can be mapped to a 
vector of security requirements directly associated with the security services the task 
requires. (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
1.1 Dynamic Parameters  
Government and DOD organizations utilize a variety of dynamic parameters to 
define a predefined response of specific actions according to policy. Examples include 
INFOCON and THREATCON levels.  In order for a security mechanism to be fully 
functional within the DOD and Government infrastructure, it has to be able to incorporate 
the dynamic parameters into the security setting decision making process.  A change in 
an INFOCON or THREATCON level should have an immediate effect on attributes and 
settings in a security mechanism. By introducing a dynamic mechanism, a system can 
modulate its security settings in response to these dynamic parameters. Security level and 
network mode, defined in the next section, have been chosen as two abstract dynamic 
parameters that govern changes to security attributes as defined in the an organization’s 
security policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002)  
By developing and implementing a security mechanism that can dynamically 
adjust in accordance with a change to network modes and/or security levels, the users and 
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managers do not have to be concerned with the fine granularity and low-level complexity 
involved in adjusting and selecting appropriate security attributes. 
1.1.1 User Choices for Security Levels 
Security levels are a common metric used in the government and DOD to 
distinguish authorization for classified information. Common levels include Top Secret, 
Secret, Classified and Unclassified.  Each of this levels correspond to different governing 
policies and requirements associated with the threat to national security by the disclosure 
of information to adversaries. Likewise, security levels, as defined here for proof of 
concept, represent an inc reasing requirement for stronger security (e.g. encryption and 
authentication algorithms).  
Network security policies will require a range of maximum and minimum 
security levels. Minimum security levels set  the lowest acceptable security attributes and 
maximum security levels establish a ceiling on the use of available security resources. 
Intersections of policies require further granularity in security settings to satisfy all 
governing users and systems. A user may also desire to selected a higher level of security 
than the predefined minimum. (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002)  
A user or application, however, may quickly become overwhelmed with 
the security setting details, potentially resulting in degraded security or performance.  By 
developing security definitions that encompass detailed security settings required by 
users or applications, the complexity of the selection process for the security settings can 
be simplified to a reasonable level. One approach would involve the use of the following 
Network Security levels:  high, medium and low.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002)  High 
security level would utilize strong levels of security attributes,  medium level, moderate 
level of security attributes, and low level, low to no security attributes.  
By implementing this approach the system security resource manager or 
security engineer is responsible for presetting security variables and ranges in accordance 
with choices offered to users or applications. A mapping of allowable security settings to 
security levels providing a range of selection or specific values will be required to 
properly enforce the system security policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
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1.1.2 The Notion of Network Modes 
Networks exist in a variety of states, providing users and systems with  
varying levels of service.  On one occasion the network may experience  heavy levels of 
traffic resulting in a poor performance.  At other times the network may be limited in the 
availability of resources due to maintenance, and at other times the network may be 
performing at its optimum level. To fully incorporate the performance and reliability of 
the network into a security mechanism, the notion of network modes is introduced.  
There are numerous situations  in which a network security policy will be 
required to dynamically change to properly address the current operational threats and 
needs, as well as the availability of resources  and network performance.  In the midst of 
a highly sensitive intelligence operation, a transmitted report will require the highest 
possible security to ensure the information and the source remain protected. In another 
scenario, a unit confronted with serious emergency will require the fastest possible 
transmission, and may not be concerned with transmission protection.  (NPS-CS-02-001, 
January 2002)  Therefore a requirement exists for a dynamic security mechanism that can 
appropriately adjust to meet the needs of the system, users or applications. One approach 
is to use the following network modes: normal, impacted, and crisis. Normal mode is 
defined as ordinary operating conditions with normal traffic load and no heightened 
threat conditions. Impacted mode may be defined when the network/system is 
experiencing high levels of traffic and therefore certain security selection may not be 
available due to efficiency constraints.  Emergency mode may be defined as a situation 
that requires the highest level of security or the lowest level dependent on the situation 
and policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
1.2 Mapping Abstract Parameters to Security Mechanism 
A mapping of abstract dynamic parameters to resident security mechanisms is 
required to properly enforce policy decisions.  For example, network modes may be 
mapped to security level ranges and ultimately to security attributes and settings. The 
security resource manager and security engineer would define the network modes and 
security levels to provide the users and applications with appropriate security service as 
translated into QoSS choices.  Once defined, the complexity of the security mechanism 
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and security attribute selection  is transparent to the user. (See Figure 2.3)  
 


































Figure 2.3. Mapping Security Attributes to Security Policy. 
 
1.3 Costing for QoSS 
As mentioned earlier, use of security services has a direct impact on systems, 
users and/or applications.  The cost may differ depending upon  the actual service 
provided in relation to funding, bandwidth, processing time, packet overhead, or memory 
requirements.  Providing resource managers, users, or applications with a costing 
framework for security services will enable them to make appropriate security selection 
according to their needs and the availability of resources. In some cases a user may 
decide to forego a certain level of security as a result of the impact it may have on 
bandwidth availability.  Likewise a user may decide to increase security after consulting 
the costing framework.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
A costing framework as described above, see Figure 2.4, will require a matrix of 
cost expressions relative to security services and security attributes.  Further granularity 
will be required to incorporate  system resources including existing loads on the 
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processor, memory and network, as well as any limitations pre-established by security 
levels  and network modes. (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002)  A costing framework model 
can provide the user with general information about the impact of certain security settings 
(network modes/security levels). The complexity of the costing calculation and reference 
mapping would remain transparent to the user. 
The development of a detailed costing framework is beyond the scope of this 
























Figure 2.4. Costing Framework Model. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) stems from the origins of Quality of Service 
(QoS), providing a mechanism to access security services in accordance with the user and 
the system requirements and the network environment.  Security services can be defined 
in via various levels of granularity of integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, 
authentication, etc.  To provide further integration of security mechanisms into the 
surrounding environment, dynamic parameters, i.e. environmental related variables with 
a defined range of values, can be mapped to adjustable levels of security protection in 
14 
accordance with policy.  In order to manage the security mechanism’s impact on 
resources and services, a costing framework is required to provide system and security 
managers with a tool for monitoring and adjusting security services. 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), a security mechanism utilized to provide a 
range of security protection per packet at the network layer, is an ideal proof of concept 
platform to demonstrate how a specific security mechanism can be modulated to provide 
different levels of security response in accordance with QoSS. The following chapter will 
explain in detail the IPsec system architecture to provide the reader an understanding of 
the security mechanism. 
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III.  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will discuss the origins and architecture of IPsec. The roots of 
IPsec spawned from the growth in popularity and dependency on network 
communications. It became quickly evident that all information sent across the Internet 
was susceptible to theft and modification. A means of protecting network packets soon 
became critical to most business and government organizations. The first attempt 
involved a simple “protect-all” approach to network security, Virtual Private Networks 
(VPN). However, with the added resource cost of network security on resources, this was 
not always the most efficient solution. IPsec introduced the ability to provide a range of 
security services through predefined set of security attributes ultimately defined by a 
security policy. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF IPSEC 
The Internet Protocol (IP) has become the norm for network electronic 
communication in business, government and private life. However, the very definition of 
IP is fraught with vulnerabilities.  IP packets have no inherent security. (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 41-55)  Therefore, it is quite a trivial matter to spoof, 
modify and inspect an IP packet without authorization from the sender.  IPsec was 
developed to address these problems by defining a security mechanism for sending data 
across an insecure medium.   
Initial attempts at developing IP Security such as Virtual Private Networks 
(VPN), see Figure 3.1 resulted in very rigid security systems and a binary security choice: 
security or no security. There were no intermediate security choices.  IPsec can provide 
users and systems with multiple selections of security attributes, which can enable, for 
example, the security mechanism to adapt to changing needs, all in accordance with the 
security policy.  
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IPsec VPN




















Figure 3.1. IPsec vs. VPN Security Mechanisms. 
 
IPsec was designed to provide an efficient and effective cryptographic security 
mechanism for IP version 4 and IP version 6.  Refer to Figure 3.2. The mechanism 
provides the following services: access control, connectionless integrity, data origin 
authentication, protection against replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), 
confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow confidentiality.  These services are 
applied at the IP layer, providing security for IP and/or upper layer protocols. (Kent, S 
and Atkinson, R, 1998) The cryptographic algorithms are applied in accordance with 
system security policies that are defined within IPsec. 
The IPsec implementation in OpenBSD version 2.8, researched in this thesis, 
consists of the following components (see Figure 3.2): Security Policy Database (SPD), 
Security Association Database (SAD), Internet Security Association and Key 
Management Protocol (ISAKMP), KeyNote, and Internet Key Exchange (IKE). A 
Security Association is defined as negotiated security terms for communications between 
two or more peers.  The Security Policy Database (SPD) defines the authorized security 
associations.  Security Association Database defines the security associations that have 
been established. The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
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(ISAKMP) define a framework for security association management and key negotiation.  
KeyNote is the trust management component that handles the mapping of policy to 
security attributes. Internet Key Exchange is the mechanism used to negotiate security 
associations with peers.   
The IPsec as present in this research exists independent of ISAKMP, KeyNote 
and IKE (all described later) in our operating systems and environments.  For the sake of 
consistency and relevancy to the research provided, I will cover only the IPsec version 
specific to OpenBSD version 2.8.  
Changes to IPsec security variables and rules can be managed via Keynote. Local 
rules and policy are stored initially in the ISAKMP database (isakmpd.conf). During 
IPsec initialization, the information stored  in isakmpd.conf is loaded into memory and 
cached in the SPD.  Peer and service security associations and rules are stored initially in 
the Keynote Database and cached in the Security Association Database (SAD) as security 
associations (SA) once established through a successful peer negotiation (discussed 
later). (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-79)    
The IPsec process consists of two phases. Phase One involves the authentication 
among the peers and the negotiation of security parameters for Phase Two 
communications. The process of dynamically authenticating peers is managed according 
to the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. Phase Two is the actual authenticated and 
protect communication between peers.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 
57-79)    
IPsec can be used on a variety of system architecture models: host-to-host, 
gateway-to-gateway and gateway-to-host/host-to-gateway.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and 
Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-79)    
OpenBSD IPsec incorporates the concept of trust and security policy management 
by implementing KeyNote. The research performed in this thesis utilizes the OpenBSD 

























Figure 3.2. IPsec Architecture. 
(After: Blaze, Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Kermoytis, Angelos D., February 2001) 
C.  IPSEC ARCHITECTURE 
1.  Security Services Provided by IPsec   
The overall challenge of IPsec is to provide confidential, integrity, nonrepudiation 
and availability to network communications.  IPsec provides the following security 
services that may be combined to meet these requirements: origin authentication, data 
integrity, data confidentiality, anti-replay protection and limited traffic confidentiality. It 
utilizes two methods to protect IP packets: Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
providing data integrity, confidentiality and anti-replay protection; and Authentication 
Header (AH) providing only data integrity and anti-replay protection. In addition, IPsec 
can provide packet protection using transport or tunnel mode. Transport mode is used to 
protect upper level protocols. Tunneling mode is used to protect the entire packet 
(Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-79)  Each mode  can be used with 
either ESP or AH, so there are four possible IPsec packet formats, each of which will be 
explained in further detail below. 
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1.1 Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP) 
ESP provides data packets with confidentiality, integrity, source authentication 
and protection against replay attacks.  This protection is accomplished by: (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 81-89)    
- Inserting a new header after the IP Header but before the data of the 
packet,  
- Appending a trailer to the packet  
- Inserting IP protocol 50 to identify ESP.  This protocol is used to enable 
Firewalls and routers to distinguish IPsec packets for processing and 
forwarding purposes. 
Confidentiality and authentication are provided cryptographically.  Encryption 
involves the conversion of data into unreadable form by using a reversible transformation  
(encryption algorithm i.e. DES, AES, IDE, etc.)  Authentication is the process of 
cryptographic identity and integrity verification of transmitted data (authentication 
algorithms SHA MD5 and RIPEMD).  [Cryptography and Network Security Principles 
and Practice] ESP can use any combination of encryption and authentication algorithms, 
as long as they are supported by the security mechanism. ESP can also be used without 
an encryption algorithm, or without an authentication algorithm. ESP without both  
encryption (NULL cipher) and authentication (NULL authenticator) algorithms, provides 
no security and results in a pointless drain of system resources, and therefore, typically is 
not supported. (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 81-89)    
The ESP packet, ESP header, original packet, and ESP trailer are encrypted in the 
following manner:  (see Figure 3.3) (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan,  1999, 
81-89)    
-  The ESP header is not encrypted. This is done to allow for recipients and 
gateways (types of IPsec configurations discussed later) to process the 
packet according to IP Address (part of the Security Parameter Index, 
SPI). 
- The original Data is encrypted 
- The ESP Trailer is partially encrypted to allowing for data processing. The 
unencrypted portion on the trailer includes the Security Parameter Index 
(SPI) and destination IP address to enable SA identification, and the 
sequence number, authentication data and padding (if required). The 









ESP- Protected IP Packet
 
Figure 3.3. ESP- Protected IP Packet. 
(After: Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 49) 
The order of processing for an ESP-protected packet on receipt is: 
- Verify the sequence number  
- Verify integrity 
- Decrypt the data 
ESP uses Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) and Initialization Vectors (IV) to 
strength its provided security.  CBC is used to mask patterns of identical blocks within 
the same datagram.  An Initialization Vector (IV) is a non-secret binary vector, which is 
different for every datagram, used as initialization input for encryption algorithms and to 
synchronize cryptographic equipment. By using CBC and IV, identical plaintext payloads 
will be encrypted to different cipher text payloads.  The cipher text output is also random 
in appearance, a characteristic of a good cipher, and embeds the plaintext with the 
previous cipher ultimately strengthening the entropy of the following plaintext input to 
the cipher. See Figure 3.4.  (Simpson, W. A., March 1999) 
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Figure 3.4. Encrypting and Decrypting using CBC and IV. 
(After: Simpson, WA, March 1999) 
A quick review of the CBC/IV encrypting and decrypting process follows.   
The process of encrypting using CBC and IV is: (Simpson, W A, 1999, 1-3) 
- An IV is used in an XOR operation with the first block of plaintext. 
- The encryption key is used to encrypt the result of the XOR operation and 
generates a cipher text block. 
- For the next successive blocks of plaintext, the previous ciphertext is 
XOR’d with the plaintext 
Conversely, the process of decrypting using CBC and IV is simply the reverse: 
(Simpson, W A, 1999, 1-3) 
- The encryption key is used to decrypt the cipher text block. -  An IV is 
used in an XOR operation with the first decrypt block of text. 
- For the next successive blocks of cipher text, the previous cipher text is 
XOR’d with the decrypted block. 
In transport mode, ESP protects the upper layer protocol by inserting an ESP 
header between the IP Header and the upper –layer protocol. The upper-layer protocol 
and data are then encrypted.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 81-89)  In 
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tunneling mode, ESP protects the entire data packet by embedding the packet in between 
the ESP header and trailer. A new IP header is then generated and added to the packet 
(Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 81-89)    
1.2 Authentication Header (AH) 
The Authentication Header (AH) is utilized to maintain integrity of data, 
authenticated the sender, and provide (optionally) non-replay protection.  However, it 
does not provide confidentiality. Structurally AH is simpler than ESP packets. It adds a 
header but no trailer to the data packet, and all information in the AH packet is 
unencrypted.  There is no need for padding, a pad length indicator or an initialization 
vector. AH can be used alone within an SA or in conjunction with ESP in a separate SA.  
AH packets are composed of the following: (see Figure 3.5) (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 91-98)    
- Original IP Header 
- AH Header. This contains the SPI which is used to locate the SA in the 
SADB during receipt processing, protocol field number 51, sequence 
number which is used to defend against replay attacks, and authentication 





AH- Protected IP Packet
 
Figure 3.5. AH-Protected IP Packet. 
(After: Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 51) 
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In transport mode, AH protects end-to-end communications by inserting the AH 
header immediately following the IP Header and then authenticating the entire packet. By 
authenticating the entire packet, the recipient can be ensured that it came from the actual 
sender and was not captured, modified and resent.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, 
Dan, 1999, 91-98)    
In tunneling mode, the AH encapsulates the protected datagram and adds an 
additional IP Header before the AH Header.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 
1999, 91-98)    
1.3 IPsec Configurations  
The material in this section is referenced from the following: (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 49-80)    
IPsec can be utilized to support three network configurations as shown in Figure 
3.6. 
The peer-to-peer configuration is used to support secure communication between 
two IPsec end systems.  In this situation, end systems would need a locally managed 
IPsec mechanism to manage the security mechanism and policy.   
The peer-to-gateway configuration is used to support an IPsec standalone user 
communicating securely to an IPsec gateway or router.  An IPsec gateway or router is an 
IPsec mechanism that supports multiple users or an internal network. 
The gateway-to-gateway configuration is used to support secure communication 










Figure 3.6. IPsec Configurations. 
 
1.4 Use of Transport and Tunnel Modes 
The material in this section is referenced for the following: (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 49-80)    
As mentioned earlier, IPsec utilizes two modes for transport and tunneling. Refer 
to Figure 3.7.  
Transport mode is used typically in the peer-to-peer configurations. There is no 
attempt to protect the identity of the sender and / or receiver when using this mode. The 
security emphasis is on the upper level protocols.   
Tunnel mode is typically used with peer-to-gateway, gateway-to-peer, and 
gateway-to-gateway configurations. The security emphasis is on protecting 
(confidentiality and/or integrity) the entire packet including the sender/receiver identity.  
The original packet source and destination IP addresses are protected via encryption 
and/or authentication (by means of insuring integrity). An additional IP 
source/destination header is provided to the appropriate IPsec tunnel recipient.  At the 














Transport Mode Tunnel Mode
IPsec Transport and Tunnel Modes
 
Figure 3.7. IPsec Transport and Tunnel Modes. 
(After: Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-80) 
1.5 Security Associations (SA) 
A Security Association (SA) can be referred to as a “simplex” connection path 
established to provide security services to IP packets. The “simplex” path requires the SA 
to represent either an AH or an ESP but not both, and only for one communication 
direction. If additional services are desired another SA will be required. Likewise other 
communications paths (such as a return path to the originator) will require a separate SA. 
As a result, SA’s are uniquely identified by the security parameter index (SPI), ESP or 
AH security protocol and the destination IP address. (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November 
1998) A secure communications path may require multiple SA’s to ensure all 
requirements are met.  
IPsec requires that: (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November1998) 
- A host or end system MUST support both transport and tunnel mode. 
- A security gateway is required to support only tunnel mode. 
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1.6  Combining Security Associations  
It is important to note that the IPsec mechanism only allows one security protocol, 
AH or ESP to be used with an SA.  However, there may be times when a security policy 
calls for a combination of security services for a specific communications path that 
requires more security attributes than is possible with only one SA.  Therefore multiple 
SAs are required to properly achieve the desired level of security as mandated by the 
security policy.  The use of multiple SAs is referred as a security association bundle or 
SA bundle. The order of SA implementation sequence (ESP or AH first) is important and 
is defined by the security policy. (Leiseboer, John, 2001)  
There are two ways to implement an SA bundle: transport adjacency and iterated 
tunneling. 
Transport adjacency is the process of using more than one security protocol on the 
same IP datagram without utilizing tunneling.  Only one level of combination is allowed.  
Additional nesting will not result in further security since all the IPsec processing will be 
performed at the same instance at the destination.  Figure 3.8 provides an example of 
transport adjacency where first ESP provides confidentiality of IP data using encryption. 
Then AH is used to add authentication to the datagram. When using transport adjacency, 
the ordering of the applied SA bundle is important. As with the provided example, if AH 
and ESP are used in conjunction, AH should be used as the first header after IP after ESP 
security has been applied. This is justified by the fact that data integrity should be 
performed on as much packet data as possible to achieve the desired security effect of 
packet authentication. (Leiseboer, John, 2001) 
Iterated tunneling is the process of applying multiple layers of security protocols 
through IP tunneling. This enables multiple levels of nesting. With each tunnel being able 
to originate or terminate at a different IPsec sites along the secure communications path.  
Figure 3.9 show an example of iterated tunneling, both security end points are different.  
This AH SA protects all traffic flowing between the two gateways. Host A and Host B 
are provided security via an ESP SA. With iterated tunneling, various orderings of AH 



















Figure 3.8. Transport Adjacency. 




















Figure 3.9. Iterated Tunneling. 
(After: Leiseboer, John, 2001) 
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1.7  Security Policy 
A security policy defines the rules and regulations of a system. Specifically what 
users are allowed to access to systems, applications, and data, what times during the day 
are they allowed access (security system administrator may define only working hours 
access to users), and what actions are users authorized to perform on the data 
(permissions: read, write and/or execute). The challenge is to present a seamless approach 
to controlling each user’s actions, in regards to the  security policy. The system security 
policy, for the purposes of this thesis, can be defined in terms of IPsec security 
parameters. (Blaze, Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D, February 2001)  
Security Policy is represented in IPSec via the fo llowing: (see Figure 3.10) 
- Application Layer: (Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, 
Angelos D, February 2001) 
- <ISAKMPD.CONF> – initial peer security policy configuration 
used in IKE Phase I IKE  & initial Phase II SA negotiation 
  - < KeyNote/ISAKMPD.Policy > – Local security policy 
defined in Keynote semantics – queried during IPSec negotiation. 
–  Kernel Layer: 
-  Security Policy Database (SPD)– cached security policy  
-  Security Association Database (SAD) – cached valid 















Figure 3.10. IPsec Security Policy. 
(After Blaze, Matt, Ioannidis, John and Keromytis, Angelos D., February 2001) 
1.8 Security Policy Database (SPD) 
The IPsec mechanism manages security policy efficiently by implementing a 
Security Policy Database (SPD) in the Kernel to allow for quick reference by input and 
output processing modules (discussed later). The Security Policy Database (SPD) is 
implemented and maintained by a user or system administrator, or by an application 
constrained by pre-defined rules or policy. In general, packets are either afforded IPsec 
security services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec, based on the applicable security 
policies found in the SPD. (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November 1998)  SPD is 













IPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) Populating Mechanisms
 
Figure 3.11. IPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) Populating Mechanisms. 
(From: NPS-CS-02-003, January 2002) 
Using one of these methods, the system’s security policy is translated into 
database entries. The entries define the data traffic to be protected, what security 
mechanism should be used, and with whom the system is authorized to speak.  For each 
packet entering or leaving the system, the SPD is queried to ensure the proper security 
parameters and measures are applied.  (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 
57-79)    
An SPD entry specifies one of three possible actions regarding all traffic that 
matches that entry: 
· Discard, implying that that the packet should not be allowed in or out. 
· Bypass, implying that no security services should be applied nor should 
any security services be expected. 
· Protect, implying security services are required for outbound and inbound  
packets. 
IPsec policy is mapped to IP traffic via “selectors”. Information stored in SPD 
may be located  by any of the following search selectors: (see figure 3.12) source IP 
address, destination IP address, Name (specific user or system), Protocol, and upper layer 
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ports. (Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-79)  Selectors can be either 
specific values, ranges of allowed values or wild cards. (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, 
November 1998)  
The following are the in the SPD: 
- Source IP – the source IP address in accordance with the security policy. 
- Source Port – the source port to which the security policy applies. 
- Destination IP – the destination IP address in accordance with the security 
policy. 
- Destination Port – the destination port to which security policy applies. 
- Name – used to bind a policy to a specific user or system. 
- SA IP – pointer to active SAs 
- Protocol Type – TCP/UDP 
- Policy Action:  
- Require – Strict condition. If no SA exists, drop the packet. 
- Acquire – Set-up SA and continue communications without 
protection until IPSEC SA takes effect. 
- Permit – Bypass IPSEC process– exception for specific packet 
characteristics. 
- Deny – Drop the packet without further processing. 
In general, the first qualifying SPD entry found will be used to determine the 
disposition of the current packet. The ability to use different selectors in the SPD allows 
































Security Policy Database (SPD)
Figure 
3.12. Security Policy Database (SPD). 
(From: NPS-CS-02-003, January 2002) 
1.9 Security Association Database (SAD) 
After an SA is established for communication with a remote host, the SA is 
“cached” in the SAD.  Each entry in the SAD represents one SA. Refer to Figure 3.13. 
The SAD is first consulted for both inbound and outbound traffic to determine processing 
requirements for the packets. If no SA is found (e.g. expired or non-existing SA in the 
SAD) Phase II IKE negotiations are initiated with the remote host.  (Kent, S and 
Atkinson, R, November 1998) 
Inbound packets are processed by indexing SA’s in the SAD with each of the 
following packet fields:  (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November 1998) 
- Outer Header's Destination IP address: the IPv4 or IPv6 
Destination address. 
-  IPsec Protocol: AH or ESP, specifies the IPsec protocol to be 
applied to the traffic on this SA. 
         -  SPI: the 32-bit value used to distinguish among 
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           SAs terminating at the same destination and using the same 
           IPsec protocol. 
Outbound packets are processed by using security parameter indexes (SPI), to 
index SA’s in the SAD and the SPD.  This is done in order to allow SA bundles, in which 
a policy entry in the SPD involves multiple SAs in a specific order. (Kent, S and 
Atkinson, R, November 1998) 
An entry in the SAD will contain the value or values, which were created during 
peer negotiations.  These fields can have the form of specific values, ranges, wildcards, or 
an "OPAQUE" (inaccessible due to fragmentation or encryption).  The ESP and AH 
Protocol fields form an entry may contain NULL for one or the other but not for both.  
These values are used by the sending peer to determine the SA’s required for packet 
processing. The receiving peer uses these values to check that the inbound packet adheres 
to the receiver’s security policy. (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November 1998) 
The following SAD fields are used in IPsec processing: 
- Sequence Number Counter: a 32-bit value used to generate the 
Sequence Number field in the AH or ESP headers. 
- Sequence Counter Overflow: a flag indicating whether overflow 
of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable 
event and prevent transmission of additional packets on the 
SA. 
- Anti-Replay Window: a 32-bit counter and a bit-map used to determine 
whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is a replay. 
- AH Authentication algorithm, keys, etc. 
- ESP Encryption algorithm, keys, IV mode, IV, etc. 
- ESP authentication algorithm, keys, etc. If the authentication service is 
not selected, this field will be null. 
- Lifetime of this Security Association: a time interval after which an SA 
must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or terminated, plus an 
indication of which of these actions should occur. 
- IPsec protocol mode: tunnel, transport or wildcard. 
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- Path MTU: any observed path MTU and aging variables. 
SAD: Security Association Database
Implemented as 




































































Figure 3.13. SAD: Security Association Database. 
(From: NPS-CS-02-003, January 2002) 
1.10 Selectors  
“Selectors” are parameters that are used to locate or select a SA or SA bundle in 
the SPD and SAD.  A selected SA (or SA bundle) may be very detailed or general, 
depending on the selectors used.  Traffic between two peers/gateways may only require a 
single SA in each direction for a uniform set of services. Or traffic between 
peers/gateways may utilize a series of SA’s to handle different security services for 
different supported applications.  The following are the IPsec selector parameters. (Kent, 
S and Atkinson, R, 1998) 
- Source Address – can be an address range, network prefix, wild 
card or a specific address. 
- Destination Address – can be an address range, network prefix, 
wild card or a specific address. 
- Name – used to identify a policy associated with an authorized 
user or system. 
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- Protocol – the transport protocol.   
- Upper-Layer Ports – may use individual UDP or TCP ports or wild 
cards 
- Data Sensitivity Level 
The following table describes the possible selector expression combinations in 
SAD and SPD: (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, November 1998) 
Field Traffic Value SAD Entry SPD Entry 
src addr       single IPaddr   single range,wild single range, wild 
dst addr       single IPaddr   single range,wild single range,wild 
xpt protocol Xpt  protocol single range,wild Single, wildcard 
src port Single src port single range,wild Single, wildcard 
dst port Single dest port single range,wild Single, wildcard 
user id Single user id single range,wild Single, wildcard 
sec. labels    Single value single range,wild Single, wildcard 
 
Table 3.1. Possible Selector Combination. 
(After: Kent, S and Atkinson, R, 1998) 
1.11 IPsec Processing Modules 
The IPsec mechanism uses input and output modules, a processing module 
and a SA set-up module to receive, send, and process IPsec packets, and setup SA as 
required, respectively.  The following sections will describe modules. 
1.11.1 IPsec Input Module 
IPsec’s input routine provides an interface and buffer to all 
incoming message traffic.  The packets are filtered accordingly and are either (1) passed 
to the appropriate upper level process or internal user, (2) used to generate an IPsec 
negotiation with a peer or, (3) discarded. See Figure 3.14. 
 
The following is a pseudo code representation of the IPsec input 
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routine module: (Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D., February  
2001) 
- Receives IP packets are received from external source. 
- Queries Security Policy Database to determine whether to 
forward the packet or discard: Query SPD(Packet’s source IP, 
source port, destination IP, destination port, Protocol, IPSEC 
Protocol type): 
- If “Require” then set “Require” Flags and forward packet 
to IPSEC Processing module. 
- If “Acquire” then set Acquire flags and forward to IPSEC 
processing module. 
- If “Permit” (non-IPSEC packet) then forward to 
appropriate higher- layer protocol. 
- If “Deny” then discard packet. 
- If Null (no entry in SPD) and IPSEC Packet then discard. 
- If Null (no entry in SPD) and non-IPSEC Packet forward 



















Figure 3.14. IPsec Input Module. 
1.11.2 IPsec Output Routine  
IPsec’s output routine provides an interface and buffer for all 
outgoing message traffic.  The packets are filtered and processed in one of three ways: 
provide IPsec protection, provide no protection, or discard.  See Figure 3.15. 
The following is a pseudo code representation of the IPsec input 
routine module:  (Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D., February 
2001) 
  - Packets are received from Higher/Upper Layer Applications. 
- Queries Security Policy Database to determine whether IPsec packet 
protection required for packet - Query SPD(Packet’s source IP, source 
port, destination IP,  destination port, Protocol): 
- If “Require” then set “Require” Flags and forward packet to 
IPsec Processing module. 
- If “Acquire” then set Acquire flags and forward to IPsec 
processing module. 
- If “Permit” (non-IPsec packet) then forward to network for 
transmission. 
- If “Deny” then discard packet. 
- If Null (no entry in SPD) then forward to network for 
transmission.    


















Permit & Null 
For non IPsec 
packet
  
Figure 3.15. IPsec Output Module. 
 
1.11.3  IPsec Processing Module 
The IPsec processing module provides an interface for the 
input/output modules, the SAD and the SA set-up module. After IPsec packets are 
verified and approved by the SPD, they are forwarded to the IPsec processing module for 
further processing. For incoming packets, the SAD is queried to determine whether or not 
an SA exists in the SAD. If not, the IPsec peer negotiation phase is queued. If an SA 
exists the IPsec processing module utilizes the information provided by the existing SA 
to remove the IPsec protection from the packet for further processing. Similarly for 
outgoing packets, the SAD is queried, possibly triggering IPsec peer negotiation and 
finally using existing SAs to encapsulate the packet with the appropriate IPsec protection. 
(Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D, February 2001) 
The following is pseudo code of the IPsec processing module:  
- Receives IP packets from the Input/Output module. 
- Query SAD (Packet’s source/destination IP, Security Parameter Index 
(SPI), incoming/outgoing). 
- If “SA Exists” and “incoming” then process IPsec packet resulting in a 
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de-capsulated IP Packet.  Forward packet back to the IPsec Input 
module for further processing.    
- If “SA Exists” and the packet is “outgoing” then process the IP packet 
resulting in an encapsulated/IPsec protected IP Packet. Forward IPsec 
packet to external network for routing.   
- If “No SA Exists” then forward packet to SA set-up  
1.11.4  SA SetUp Module 
The IPsec SA set-up module provides an interface between the 
SAD, SPD, KeyNote DB, and IKE processing module. The SA set-up module is involved 
in the IPsec SA generation process.  The SA setup module is triggered when it receives 
an IP packet from the IPsec processing module. (Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and 
Keromytis, Angelos D, February 2001) 
The following pseudo code represents the SA set-up module:  
- If packet is “Incoming” then 
 - Performs a double check routine and if SA exists for 
packet then packet is dropped (should have been 
determined earlier in process suspect situation) 
- Otherwise: IKE Daemon triggered. 
- Awaits completion of IKE process. 
- Updates SPD and SAD with peer communications security 
associations and policies. 
-  Discards original unprotected packet.  
- If packet “Outgoing” then 
-  Queries SPD for relevant policy: 
-  If policy is found then trigger the IKE Daemon. 
 - Otherwise drop the packet 
- Awaits completion of the IKE process. 
- Updates the SPD and SAD with peer 
communications security associations and policies. 
- Discards the original unprotected packet.  
1.12   Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
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The Internet Key Exchange provides IPsec with a means of performing 
automated SA creation for network peer communication. Specifically, IKE is an 
automated protocol fo r generating, negotiating, and creating Security Associations (SA) 
between network peers. (Savolainen, Sampo, 1999) 
IKE is a hybrid protocol developed from the following protocols:  
(Savolainen, Sampo, 1999) 
- Oakley key exchange and 
- Skeme key exchange  
- Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) framework.  
Without IKE, IPsec would require costly manual SA generation seriously 
limiting the system ability to function at a dynamic level. (Savolainen, Sampo, 1999) 
IKE can be triggered by the following specific events (See figure 3.16)  
(Savolainen, Sampo, 1999) 
- Remote peer negotiation initiation 
- Timer scheduled events 
- Kernel – PF_Key upcalls for new SA/ expired Sas. A PF_Key is key 
management kernel interface used to trigger an IKE/ISAKMP daemon. 




















Controlling events for IKE
 
Figure 3.16. Controlling Events for IKE. 
(From: NPS-CS-02-003, January 2002) 
1.13  Internet Security Association And Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMPD) 
The following section is references ( Maughan, D., Schertler, M., 
Schneider M., Turner J, November 1998 ). 
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) defines the required payload for exchanging key generation and 
authentication data between negotiating IPsec peers The ISAKMP daemon, ISAKMPD, 
defines the mechanics of implementing a key exchange protocol, and the negotiation of a 
security association.  
ISAKMPD defines how peers: 
- Communicate 
- Construct their messages 
- Establish state transitions required for secure communications. 
In order for peers to communicate within the confines of the IPsec, they 
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must first negotiate on a Security Associations (SA).  This negotiation is performed via 
the Internet Key Exchange (IKE).  ISAKMPD defines the specifics and the syntax 
required to complete the negotiation. 
There are two parts to IPSec’s security processing as defined by 
ISAKMPD (See figure 3.17)  
- Security Association Negotiations. Peers negotiate to agree on the 
security association that will define their secure communication.  
- Security Association Processing. SAs are utilized for secure 
communication until they are deleted, modified, or expire. 
 

















Figure 3.17. IPsec Security Association Process Defined by ISAKMPD. 
Security association negotiations utilizes a two phases for security 
negotiations: 
- Phase I – peers negotiate for IKE security associations (SA) (where 
none currently exists). There are two choices for Phase I: Main-Mode 
and Aggressive-Mode 
 
- Main-Mode  – protects the identity of peers by sending a sequence of 
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authentication information. (Refer to figure 3.18) 
- Utilizes 6 messages: 
- Messages1-2: used for negotiating the security 
policy for the exchange. Sent in the clear. 
- Messages 3-4:  used for Diffie-Hellman 
keying material exchange. 
- Messages 5-6: used for authenticating the 
peers with signatures or hashes and optional 
certificates. Sent encrypted. 
IKE Phase I - Main Mode
Peer A -Initiator Peer B - Responder
ISAKMP Header & IKE SA
ISAKMP Header & IKE SA
ISAKMP Header, Key Exchange Payload, Nouce
ISAKMP Header, Key Exchange Payload, Nouce
ISAKMP Header, Encrypted [Identity Payload, Authenticator]








Figure 3.18. IKE Phase I – Main Mode. 
(After: Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider M., Turner J, November1998) - 
Aggressive Mode- does not protect the identity of peers and 
sends all authentication information at the same time.  This mode 
is used when bandwidth is a concern. (Refer to Figure 3.19)- It 
utilizes three messages: 
- Message 1: proposes the policy, and passes data for key-
exchange, a nonce and some information for identification. 
Sent unencrypted.  
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- Message 2: a response, which authenticates the responder and 
concludes the policy and key-exchange. Sent in the clear. 
- Message 3: used for authenticating the initiator and provides 
a proof of participation in the exchange. Encrypted.   
- Note: The identity of the responder cannot be protected, but 
by encrypting the last message the identity of the initiator is 
protected. 
IKE Phase I - Aggressive Mode
Peer A -Initiator Peer B - Responder
ISAKMP Header, IKE SA, Key Exchange Payload, Identity Payload
ISAKMP Header, Encrypted [Identity Payload, Authenticator]





Figure 3.19. IKE Phase I Aggressive Mode. 
(After: Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider M., Turner J, November 1998)  
- Phase II – peers negotiate for IPsec security associations (SA) or 
new keying material using the previously established IKE SA’s for 
protection. There is only one mode for phase two: Quick Mode.  
 
- Quick Mode is bound to Phase I in that it relies on Phase I to 
establish a valid IKE SA to protect IPsec SA negotiation.  Quick 
mode is used to derive keying material and negotiate shared policy 
for non-ISAKMP SAs between peers. No peer authentication is 
required since Phase I establishes peer identities bound to security 
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associations. Exchange of keys to determine how the data between 
peers will be encrypted – establishing IPSec SAs.  All the payloads 
except ISAKMP header are encrypted. A Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange may be done to achieve perfect forward secrecy (PFS). 
PFS means that an IPSec SA's key was not derived from any other 
secret.  This ultimately strengthens the overall security of the 
exchange.  Many SAs can be negotiated during one Quick Mode 
exchange.  Either one of the parties might initiate the quick mode 
exchange regardless of who initiated the first phase.  
- Quick Mode uses three messages: 
- Message 1: Contains the ISAKMP header 
(unencrypted) and then includes proposed SA(s), 
identification & authentication information (for both 
sender and receiver) and nonce information (all 
encrypted) 
- Message 2: Contains the ISAKMP header 
(unencrypted) and then includes responding proposed 
SA(s), identification & authentication information (for 
both sender and receiver) and nonce information (all 
encrypted) 
- Message 3: Contains the ISAKMPD header 
(unencrypted) and a verifying Hash (encrypted). 
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IKE Phase II - Quick Mode
Peer A -Initiator Peer B - Responder
ISAKMP Header, encrypted[Hash(1) Payload, SA, Nouce Payload, 




ISAKMP Header, encrypted[Hash(2) Payload, SA, Nouce Payload, 
Identity Payload of A, Identity Payload of B]
ISAKMP Header, encrypted[Hash(3) Payload
 
Figure 3.20. IKE Phase II – Quick Mode. 
(After: Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider M., Turner J, 1998)  
1.14 isakmpd.conf 
 The following section contains information referenced from 
(ISAKMP.CON(5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual, October 1998). isakmpd.conf  is 
the configuration file for the isakmpd daemon.  It provides the initial security 
associations and keys used for IPsec peer negotiations.  
Once the IPsec process determines that Phase I negotiations are required, 
isakmpd.conf is queried to establish a secure communication channel to perform 
communication negotiations for Phase II.  Isakmpd.conf provides the IKE Daemon with 
both Phase I and Phase II security proposals that are cached in memory until the IPsec 
process is restarted or reinitialized.   
Isakmpd.conf utilizes the traditional .ini style file construct. The file is 
broken down into sections indicated by “[   ]”. Within each section parameters are 
defined using the <tag> = <tag value or range value>“.  Tag values may consist of other 
section names.  This results in a tree-like recursive structure.  Unless a tag and tag value 
is a reserved isakmpd.conf word, it is defined by declaring the tag or tag value as a 
section later in the file. This continues until all tags and tag values have been defined in 
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terms of reserved words or values.   
 Many of the Tag fields have default values that are loaded from default 
structures in the iskampd.conf  code in the event that no value is present.  However for 
completeness and portability it is recommended that implementers provide specific 
definitions to ensure functionality and policy enforcement. 
1.14.1. isakmpd.conf Parameters  
The following section contains information referenced from 
(ISAKMP.CON(5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual, October 1998). 
The following is a description of typical parameters found in the 
isakmpd.conf file- General Section 
This section contains the global configuration parameters. The 
typical ones used are:  
                    - Policy-file: Keynote policy file. Default is  "/etc/isakm- 
                      pd/isakmpd.policy".  
- Default-Phase-2-Suites  - A list of Phase 2 suites that will be used 
when establishing dynamic SAs.  Default is : QM-ESP-3DES-
SHA-PFS-SUITE. 
- Retransmits:    Number of times a negotiation is retransmitted.  
- Check-interval:   Interval between “watchdog” checks of 
connections required to be up at all times. 
- Exchange-max-time:  Maximum time in seconds for an exchange 
to setup before aborting. 
                    - Listen-on:  IP-addresses to listen on.   
- Shared-SAD   Defined if multiple instances can be executed on 
top of one SAD  
- Pubkey-directory: Path to directory holding public keys.  The 
default directory is: "/etc/isakmpd/pubkeys". 
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- Phase I Section 
This section is used to establish ISAKMP negotiation SAs 
.  The following are typical tags used in this section: 
- IP-address:   The name of the ISAKMP peers at the given IP-
address. 
- Default:  The name of the default ISAKMP peer.  
Note: The name defined here will be used as a section name later 
on in the isakmpd.conf file. 
- Phase II Section 
This section is used to define the IPsec negotiation SAs.. The 
following are typical tags used in this section: 
- Connections:   List of IPsec "connection" names that should be 
established automatically during daemon startup.  
Note: These names are section names where further parameter 
information is defined.  See Section <IPsec-connection> below. 
- Passive-connections: The list of IPsec "connection" names 
recognized and initialized.   
- Keynote Section 
This section is used to establish Keynote dependency parameters. 
The following are typical tags used in this section: 
- Credential-directory: Directory, which contains directories for 
Ids. This in turn contains the files named ``credentials'' and 
``private_key''. 
- X509-Certificate Section 
This section is used to establish Certificate dependency 
parameters. The following are typical tags used in this section: 
         - CA-directory: Directory for PEM certificates of                     
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   certification authorities which are trusted to sign other certificates.   
- Cert-directory: Directory for PEM certificates that 
                     are trusted to be valid.   
- Accept-self-signed:  Defines certificates not originating from a 
trusted CA that will be accepted. 
                    - Private-key:   Private key match for certificate public key.  
    - Referred-to sections  
       -_ISAKMP-peer_:  Negotiation parameters for ISAKMP peer 
                    - Phase:  The constant 1. 
                    - Transport: Name of the transport protocol. The default is 
                     UDP. 
- Port:  Optional. If UDP used, the UDP port number.  The default 
value is 500, which is the IANA-registered number for ISAKMP. 
                   - Local-address:  The local IP-address.  
                - Address: IP-address of the peer. 
    - Configuration: The name of the ISAKMP-configuration section.  See        
   <ISAKMP-configuration>. 
- Authentication: If available, authentication data for this specific peer.  - 
ID:  If available, the name of the section that describes the local client ID.  
If not available, the default value is the address of the local interface 
where packets are being sent to at the remote daemon.  See <Phase1-ID>. 
- Remote-ID: If available, section name that describes the remote client 
ID.  If not available, it defaults to the address of the remote daemon. See 
<Phase1-ID>. 
- Flags: List of flags specific to further handling of ISAKMP SA. 
Currently no specific ISAKMP SA flags are defined.  
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     - _PhaseI-ID_ 
 - ID-type:  The ID type as defined by the RFCs.  For Phase I: 
IPV4_ADDR, IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, FQDN, USER_FQDN, or 
KEY_ID. 
- Address :If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR, then this tag should exist with 
an IP address. 
- Network: If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET this tag should exist 
with a network address. 
- Netmask:  If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET this tag should exist 
with a network subnet mask. 
- Name: If the ID-type is FQDN, USER_FQDN, or KEY_ID, this tag 
should exist with domain name, user@domain, or other identifying string. 
     _ISAKMP-configuration_ 
DOI:  The domain of interpretation as defined by the RFCs.  Default is  
IPSEC. 
EXCHANGE_TYPE:  The exchange type as defined by the RFCs.  
ID_PROT is used for main mode and AGGRESSIVE is used for 
aggressive mode 
Transforms: A list of proposed transforms to use for protecting the 
ISAKMP traffic.   
     _ISAKMP-transform_ 
- ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:  The encryption algorithm defined by 
RFCs or ANY to indicate that any encryption algorithm proposed will be 
accepted. 
-KEY_LENGTH: Used for encryption algorithms with variable key 
length.  
             - HASH_ALGORITHM:  The hash algorithm as defined by RFCs, or 
51 
              ANY. 
- AUTHENTICATION_METHOD:  The authentication method as defined 
by  RFCs, or ANY. 
- GROUP_DESCRIPTION: Symbolic group names used for Diffie-
Hellman exponentiations, or ANY.  The names include: 
              MODP_768, MODP_1024, EC_155 and EC_185. 
- PRF: The algorithm for the keyed pseudo-random, or ANY. 
              - Life:  A list of lifetime descriptions, or ANY. 
     _Lifetime_ 
               - LIFE_TYPE: SECONDS or KILOBYTES depending on the type of 
               the duration.  This field may NOT be set to ANY. 
- LIFE_DURATION: An offer value, a minimum acceptable value, and a 
maximum acceptable value. Can also be set to ANY. 
     IPsec-connection_ 
- Phase: The constant 2. 
- ISAKMP-peer: ISAKMP-peer name used to establish a connection.  The 
value is the name of an <ISAKMP-peer> section. 
- Configuration:  IPsec-configuration section name. 
  See <IPsec-configuration>. 
- Local-ID: If present, the name of the section that describes the optional 
local client ID.  See <IPsec-ID>. 
- Remote-ID:  If present, this is the name of the section that describes the 
optional remote client ID presented to the peer. See 
                     <IPsec-ID>. 
- Flags:  A list of flags controlling the further handling of the IPsec SA.  
Currently only one flag is defined: 
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- Active-only   If this flag is present and the <IPsec-connection> is part of 
the phase 2 connections, it will not automatically be used for accepting 
connections from the peer. 
_IPsec-configuration_ 
- DOI :  The domain of interpretation as defined by the RFCs.  Normally 
IPSEC. If unspecified, defaults to IPSEC. 
- EXCHANGE_TYPE:  The exchange type as defined by the RFCs.  For 
quick mode this is QUICK_MODE. 
- Suites:   A list of protection suites (bundles of protocols) available for 
protecting the IP traffic. Each of the list elements is a name of an 
             <IPsec-suite> section. 
_IPsec-suite_ 
- Protocols: List of the protocols included in the protection suite.  Each of 
the list elements is a name of an <IPsec-protocol> section. 
_IPsec-protocol_ 
- PROTOCOL_ID: The protocol as defined by the RFCs.   Acceptable 
values include: IPSEC_AH and IPSEC_ESP. 
- Transforms:    List of transforms usable for implementing the protocol.  
Each of the elements is a name of an <IPsec-transform> section.   
- ReplayWindow:  The window size used for replay protection.  Normally 
not adjusted. 
_IPsec-transform_ 
- TRANSFORM_ID:  The transform ID as defined by the RFCs. 
- ENCAPSULATION_MODE:  The encapsulation mode as defined by the 
RFCs. Normal values include: TRANSPORT or TUNNEL. 
- AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM:  The optional authentication 
algorithm for the ESP transform. 
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- GROUP_DESCRIPTION:  An optional (provides PFS if present) Diffie-
Hellman group description.  The values are 
             the same as GROUP_DESCRIPTION's in <ISAKMP- 
            transform> sections described  above. 
- Life: List of lifetimes, each element is a <Life-time> section name. 
_IPsec-ID_ 
- ID-type:  The ID type as defined by the RFCs.  The current value for 
IPsec is IPV4_ADDR or IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET. 
- Address: If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR, then an IP address should be 
listed.                   
- Network: If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, then an IP address 
should be listed.  
- Netmask: If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, then a network 
subnet mask should be listed. 
- Protocol: If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR or  IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, 
then this tag indicates which transport protocol should be transmitted over 
the SA.  If left unspecified, all transport protocols between the two address 
(ranges) will be sent (or permitted) over that SA. 
- Port:  If the ID-type is IPV4_ADDR or IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, then 
this tag indicates which source or destination port is allowed to be 
transported over the SA (depending on whether this is a local or remote 
ID).  If left unspecified, all ports of the given transport protocol will be 
transmitted (or permitted) over the SA.  The Protocol tag must be 
specified in conjunction with this tag. 
 
 
1.14.2. isakmpd.conf Example 
The following section contains information referenced from 
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(ISAKMPD.CONF (5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual, October 1998)  
The following is an example isakmpd.conf file. The file provides 
for communication between two peers using both the ESP and AH protocols. Specifically 
it loads two security proposals. One for ESP using AES for an encryption algorithm, 
SHA for encryption authentication, and Tunnel mode, and enforcing Perfect Forward 
Security. The other for AH, using SHA for an authentication algorithm, tunnel for the 
transport mode and perfect forward security (PFS). Notice how after the required sections 
of [General] and [Phase 1], the rest are dependent on previous entries in the mandatory 
sections. Such as [Peer-131.120.8.95/131.120.8.91] 
# A configuration sample for the isakmpd ISAKMP/Oakley (aka IKE) daemon. 
 
     [General] 
     Listen-on= 10.1.0.2 
     Policy-file=            /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy 
     Retransmits= 3 
     Exchange-max-time= 120 
 
     [Phase 1] 
     10.1.0.1= ISAKMP-peer-west 
 
     [Phase 2] 
     Connections= IPsec-east-west 
 
     [ISAKMP-peer-west] 
     Phase= 1 
     Local-address= 10.1.0.2 
     Address= 10.1.0.1 
     Configuration= Default-main-mode 
     Authentication= mekmitasdigoat 
 
     [IPsec-east-west] 
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     Phase= 2 
     ISAKMP-peer= ISAKMP-peer-west 
     Configuration= Default-quick-mode 
     Local-ID= Net-east 
     Remote-ID= Net-west 
 
     [Net-west] 
     ID-type= IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET 
     Network= 192.168.1.0 
     Netmask= 255.255.255.0 
 
     [Net-east] 
     ID-type= IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET 
     Network= 192.168.2.0 
     Netmask= 255.255.255.0 
 
     # Main mode descriptions 
 
     [Default-main-mode] 
     EXCHANGE_TYPE= ID_PROT 
     Transforms=  3DES-SHA 
 
     # Quick mode descriptions 
 
     [Default-quick-mode] 
     EXCHANGE_TYPE=  QUICK_MODE 
     Suites=  QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS-SUITE,QM-AH-SHA-PFS-SUITE 
 
     # KeyNote credential storage 
     [KeyNote] 
     Credential-directory=   /etc/isakmpd/keynote/ 
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     # Certificates stored in PEM format 
     [X509-certificates] 
     CA-directory=           /etc/isakmpd/ca/ 
     Cert-directory=         /etc/isakmpd/certs/ 
     Private-key=            /etc/isakmpd/private/local.key 
 
     # Main mode transforms 
     ###################### 
 
  [3DES-SHA] 
  ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM= 3DES_CBC 
  HASH_ALGORITHM= SHA 
  AUTHENTICATION_METHOD=  PRE_SHARED 
  GROUP_DESCRIPTION= MODP_1024 
  Life= LIFE_3600_SECS 
 
# Quick mode protection suites 
 ############################## 
    # AES 
 
     [QM-ESP-AES-SHA-SUITE] 
     Protocols= QM-ESP-AES-SHA 
 
     # AH 
     [QM-AH-SHA-PFS-SUITE] 
     Protocols= QM-AH-SHA-PFS 
 
    # Quick mode protocols 
 
     # AES 
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     [QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS] 
     PROTOCOL_ID= IPSEC_ESP 
     Transforms= QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS-XF 
 
     # SHA 
 
     [QM-AH-SHA-PFS] 
     PROTOCOL_ID=            IPSEC_AH 
     Transforms=             QM-AH-SHA-PFS-XF 
 
     # Quick mode transforms 
     # AES 
     [QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS-XF] 
     TRANSFORM_ID=   AES 
     ENCAPSULATION_MODE=     TUNNEL 
     AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM=       HMAC_SHA 
     GROUP_DESCRIPTION=      MODP_1024 
     Life= LIFE_3600_SECS 
 
     # AH 
 
     [QM-AH-MD5-PFS-XF] 
     TRANSFORM_ID=           SHA 
     ENCAPSULATION_MODE=     TUNNEL 
     GROUP_DESCRIPTION=      MODP_768 
     Life=   LIFE_3600_SECS 
 
     [LIFE_3600_SECS] 
     LIFE_TYPE=              SECONDS 
     LIFE_DURATION=          3600,1800:7200 
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1.14.3 isakmpd.conf Process 
  The IKE daemon reads the isakmpd.conf during IPsec 
initialization to load Phase I and Phase II security proposals, representing the local 
security policy, in memory. The IKE daemon is initialized during system start or when a 
“reinitialized” system call is executed (by either the kernel, upper- level process or a 
user). Once the security proposals are loaded in memory, the IPsec process can initialize 








When prompted, use security 
proposals in memory to negotiate









Figure 3.21. isakmpd.conf Process. 
 
1.15 Security Policy – KeyNote 
The following section contains information referenced from (Blaze, Matt, 
Feigenbaum, Joan and Keromytis, Angelos D., April 1998) 
A security mechanism requires a policy to define the security requirements and 
establish rules and parameters. Security policies may have a variety of levels of 
interpretation, from human language descriptions to the fine granular specifications 
59 
describing encryption and authentication methods and key lengths.  Of course, accurate 
mapping is required throughout the layers of the interpretation to ensure specific 
requirements are not inadvertently modified or disregarded during translation. 
Previous versions of IPsec utilized static security policies. This implied that a 
security policy is invoked on the security mechanism prior to system initialization and 
then remains unchanged until system is taken off- line to make appropriate policy 
adjustments.   
The OpenBSD version of IPsec utilizes a “trust management” infrastructure – 
Keynote. Specifically, KeyNote provides a mechanism for defining local policies used by 
IPsec in negotiating SA’s between peers.  Keynote provides a straightforward syntax for 
defining both security credentials and local security policies. Credentials are a means of 
identifying specific network “principals” (users, hosts, etc.). The policies and credentials  
are combined to form “assertions”. The assertions define actions authorized by or for 
specified key holders. By signing the assertions, they may be safely transmitted across 
“untrusted” networks. The assertions are divided into three sections: 
- Authorizer identity – may involve local policy or signed key for 
credentials. 
- Key predicate – key(s) being authorized 
- Action predicate – action being authorized 
A respondent IPsec node having received a security proposal from an initiator 
IPsec node, would first perform a query on its local KeyNote using the syntax of an 
assertion to find out if the initiator’s proposed security proposal is allowed. KeyNote 
would compare the proposal to its stored policy assertions and credentials to determine 
whether the proposed actions are valid in accordance with the local policy.  KeyNote 
would reply to the respondent IPsec node with a Boolean response. The respondent IPsec 
node would either establish a secure communications path with the initiator (Boolean 












KeyNote is queried using 
assertion syntax to determine 




Figure 3.22. KeyNote Process. 
 
1.15.1. isakmpd.policy 
The following section contains information referenced from 
(KEYNOTE(5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual Pages, October 1999) 
KeyNote policy assertions in OpenBSD IPsec are defined in 
isakmpd.policy.   
The assertions are divided into field sections using the tag: value 
syntax. The following are authorized field sections for KeyNote:   
- Authorizer – only mandatory field. Identifies authorizer 
- Comment 





- Conditions – contains the action/policy predicates in 
accordance with the security policy. 
1.15.2   Condition Attributes  
The following section contains information referenced from 
(KEYNOTE(5), OpenBSD Programer’s Manual Pages, October 1999) 
The following attributes are currently defined in the condition 
assertion section: (Note that in KeyNote/iskampd.policy all values are in lowercase) 
- app_domain:  Always requires IPsec policy. 
- Domain of Interpretation (Doi) : Always defined as ipsec. 
- Initiator: yes if the local daemon is initiating the Phase II SA, no 
otherwise. 
- phase_1:  aggressive or main dependent on Phase I  mode 
requirement. 
- PFS:  yes if a Diffie-Hellman exchange will be performed during 
phaseII/ Quick Mode, no otherwise. 
- ah_present, esp_present, comp_present: yes if an AH, ESP, or 
compression proposal was received respectively, no otherwise. 
- ah_hash_alg:  md5, sha, ripemd, or des, based on the hash 
algorithm. Defines the generic transform to be used in the AH 
authentication.  
- esp_enc_alg: des, des-iv64, 3des, rc4, idea, cast, blowfish, 
3idea,-iv32, rc4, null, or aes, based on the encryption algorithm 
specified in the ESP proposal. 
- comp_alg: oui, deflate, lzs, or v42bis, based on the compression 
algorithm specified in the compression proposal. 
- ah_auth_alg: hmac-md5, hmac-sha, des-mac, kpdk, or hmac-
ripemd. Based on the authentication method specified in the AH 
proposal. 
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- esp_auth_alg: hmac-md5, hmac-sha, des-mac, kpdk, or hmac-
ripemd.  Based on the authentication method specified in the ESP 
proposal. 
- ah_life_seconds, esp_life_seconds, comp_life_seconds : 
Lifetime of the AH, ESP, and compression proposal, in seconds.  If 
none listed the corresponding attribute will be set to zero. 
- ah_life_kbytes, esp_life_kbytes, comp_life_Kbytes: Lifetime of 
the AH, ESP, and compression proposal, in kbytes of traffic.  If 
none listed  the corresponding attribute will be set to zero. 
- ah_encapsulation, esp_encapsulation, comp_encapsulation:  
tunnel or transport. 
- comp_dict_size : log2 maximum size of the dictionary, according 
to the compression proposal. 
- comp_private_alg: Integer specifying the private algorithm in 
use, according to the compression proposal. 
- ah_key_length, esp_key_length: Number of key bits to be used 
by the authentication and encryption algorithms respectively 
- ah_key_rounds, esp_key length: Number of rounds of the 
authentication and encryption algorithms respectively (for variable 
round algorithms). 
- ah_group_desc, esp_group_desc, comp_group_desc: The 
Diffie-Hellman group identifier from the AH, ESP, and 
compression proposal, used for PFS during Quick Mode. Valid 
values are 1 (768-bit MODP), 2 (1024-bit MODP), 3 (155-bit EC), 
4 (185-bit EC), and 5 (1536-bit MODP). 
- phase1_group_desc: The Diffie-Hellman group identifier used 
in IKE Phase I. 
- remote_filter_type, local_filter_type, remote_id_type : 
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               IPv4 address, IPv4 range, IPv4 subnet, IPv6 address, IPv6 
range, IPv6 subnet, FQDN, User FQDN, ASN1 DN, ASN1 GN, or 
Key  ID, based on the Quick Mode Initiator ID, Quick Mode 
Responder ID, and Main Mode peer ID respectively    
- remote_filter_addr_upper, local_filter_addr_upper, 
remote_id_addr_upper:  For filter_type IPv4 address or IPv6 
address, they contain the respective Ipv4 or Ipv6 address.  For 
IPv4 range or IPv6 range, these contain the upper end of the 
address range. For IPv4 subnet or IPv6 subnet, they contain the 
highest address in the specified subnet  
- remote_filter_addr_lower, local_filter_addr_lower, 
remote_id_addr_lower: For filter_type is IPv4 address or IPv6 
address, these contain the respective address.  For IPv4 range or 
IPv6 range, these contain the lower end of the address range. For 
IPv4 subnet or IPv6 subnet, these contain the lowest address in the 
specified subnet. 
- remote_filter, local_filter, remote_id: For filter_type of an 
address range or subnet, these are set to the upper and lower part of 
the address space separated by a dash ('-') character (if the type 
specifies a single address, they are set to that address). For FQDN 
and User FQDN types, these are set to the respective string. If the 
Key ID payload contains non-printable characters then the 
hexadecimal representation of the associated byte string (lower-
case letters) is used.  Otherwise, they are set to the respective 
string.  For ASN1 DN, these are set to the text encoding of the 
Distinguished Name in the payload sent or received.  The format is 
the same as that used in the Licensees field. 
- remote_filter_port, local_filter_port, remote_id_port: 
Transport protocol port. 
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- remote_filter_proto, local_filter_proto, remote_id_proto: 
etherip, tcp, udp, or the transport protocol number, depending on 
the transport protocol set in the IDci, IDcr, and Main Mode peer ID 
respectively. 
- remote_negotiation_address: IPv4 address of the remote IKE 
daemon. 
-local_negotiation_address: IPv4 address of the local interface 
used by the local  IKE daemon for this exchange. 
- GMTTimeOfDay: UTC date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS 
format. 
- LocalTimeOfDay: local date/time, in YYYYMMDDHHmmSS 
format. 
1.15.3 Condition Predicate Syntax 
  The condition section utilizes a form of predicate logic to state 
assertions for evaluating the security proposal. The following are specific syntax rules: 
(ISAKMPD.POLICY(5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual, October 1998) ( Blaze, Matt 
Ioannidis, J and Keromytis, Angelos, February 2001) 
- No blank lines are allowed 
- Assignment operator is “==” 
- Logical And operator is “&&” 
- Logical Or operator is “||” 
- Parenthesis may be used to provide further granularity to statements. 
- Assertion must be terminated with “=> true” 
1.15.4  Example isakmpd.policy 
   The following is an example KeyNote isakmpd.policy file. Notice 
that the following operations are authorized: 
- Telnet (port 23) using AES as the encryption algorithm, SHA as the 
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encryption authentication algorithm and “tunnel” as the transportation 
mode. 
- Finger (port 79) using AH as the protection protocol, SHA as the 




Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&    
 ((esp_present == "yes") && (esp_encapsulation == “tunnel”) && 
       ((local_filter_port == "23") ||  
         (remote_filter_port == "23")) &&  
        (esp_enc_alg == "aes")) ||  
  ((ah_present == "yes") && (ah_encapsulation == “tunnel”) && 
       ((local_filter_port == "79") ||  
         (remote_filter_port == "79")) &&  
        (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) 
 -> "true";  
D.  ANALYSIS 
The following is a consolidated description of the IPsec processes presented in 
section B . 
1. IPsec (Re)Initialization 
As mentioned earlier in the isakmpd.conf section, only during IPsec startup and 
re-initialization is the isakmpd.conf read and are security proposals loaded into memory. 
2. IPsec Output Processing 
The following is the step-by-step processing of an outbound packet through an 
IPsec mechanism: (Blaze, Matt, Ioannidis, J and Angelos D. Keromytis, February 2001) 
Refer to Figure 3.23. 
-  1) A packet arrives from a high- level protocol.  
-  2) The SPD is consulted to determine if the packet requires IPSec protection.  
-  3a) If protection is not required, the packet is forwarded to the external network.  
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-  3b) If IPSec protection is required the packet is forwarded to IPSec processing 
module where  
-  4) The SAD is consulted for SA specifics for the packet.  
- 5a) If an SA exists for the packet, the appropriate security transformation are 
applied to the packet and it is forwarded to the external network.  
-  5b) If no SA exists the SA management module is triggered.  
-  6) The SA set-up module consults the SAD to verify that no SA exists.  
-  7a)  If one does, the packet is dropped.  
- 7b) The KeyNote Database is consulted using packet information via the 
KeyNote interpreter to determine if the packet should be accepted, dropped or 
needs IPSec protection.  Note: This step does not occur in the OpenBSD version 
2.8 of IPsec. 
- 8) In the event of the requirement for IPSec protection, the IKE daemon is 
initiated.  
-  9) IKE then negotiates security parameters with the distant peer. The distant 
peer will reply with a proposed setting of secure communication parameters.  
- 10) The Keynote database will be consulted to ensure that distant peer 
parameters comply with local policy.  
-  11)  If all is compliant, SA may be created updating the SAD and SPD.  






































Figure 3.23. IPsec Architecture. 
(After: Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John , and Keromytis, Angelos D, 2001 
3. IPsec Input Processing 
The following is a step-by-step process of outbound packet through an IPsec 
mechanism:  (Blaze, Matt, Ioannidis, J and Angelos D. Keromytis, February 2001) [Refer 
to Figure 3.24 
-  1) A packet arrives from an external network.  
-  2) The SPD is consulted.   
-  3a) If packet is an IPsec packet, forwarded to IPsec processing module 
-  3b) If packet is an IPsec packet and SPD says to process packet, the packet is 
forwarded to internal system or upper- layer protocol/application.  
-  3c) If SPD says to discard, the packet is discarded with no further processing. 
-  4) The SAD is consulted for SA specifics for the packet.  
-  5a) If an SA exists, the packet is dencapsulated and sent back to the IPsec input 
process module. 
-  5b) If an SA does not exist,  the SA SetUp module is triggered 
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-  6) The SPD is consulted.   
- 7a)  If  the packet is authorized/valid, it is forwarded to internal system or upper-
layer protocol/application.  
-  7b)  If SPD says to discard, the packet is discarded with no further processing. 
-  8) The SA set-up module consults the SAD to verify that no SA exists.  
-  9a)  If one does, the packet is dropped.  
- 9b) The KeyNote Database is consulted using packet information via the 
KeyNote interpreter to determine if the packet should be accepted, dropped or 
needs IPSec protection.  Note: This step does not occur in OpenBSD version of 
IPsec. 
- 10) In the event of the requirement for IPSec protection, IKE daemon is 
initiated.  
-  11) IKE then negotiates security parameters with the distant peer. The distant 
peer will consult its own KeyNote Policy and reply with a proposed setting of 
secure communication parameters.  
-  12) The Keynote database will be consulted to ensure distant peer parameters 
comply with local policy.  
-  13)  If all is compliant, SA may be created updating the SAD and SPD.  









































Figure 3.24. IPsec Architecture. 
(After: Blaze. Matt, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D, February 2001) 
E.  CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter I reviewed the IPsec architecture, describing each of the 
components and the “incoming” and “outgoing” IP packet process. I introduced 
OpenBSD’s security policy implementation, KeyNote, explaining how it interfaces with 
the IPsec mechanism. I then concluded by providing a detailed step-by-step outline of 
IPsec’s input and output processing. 
The next chapter, Design and Process, will detail the methodology involved in the 
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IV.  DESIGN AND PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will outline and discuss the design and process for 
parameterizing IPsec. Specifically I will discuss two design goals: providing granularity 
to KeyNote, and parameterizing and improving the isakmpd.conf / isakmpd.policy 
(KeyNote) security proposal loading process. The goal of parameterizing IPsec is to 
enable IPsec to assume a dynamic func tionality. This dynamism is based on new, 
external, environment parameters that can appropriately cause IPsec security attribute 
adjustments for protected communications. 
In order to incorporate the environment/dynamic parameters into the IPsec 
mechanism, the security policy found in KeyNote must be extended appropriately.  By 
adding dynamic parameters to KeyNote, the security mechanism can accurately perform 
Boolean assertion operations incorporating the specified value of the dynamic 
parameters. The dynamic parameters will also have to be properly loaded into the 
assertion query mechanism. 
IPsec mechanisms negotiate security attributes between peers in the form of 
security proposals. A security proposal consists of a set of authorized security attributes 
that can be associated with a particular communication connection to meet with the local 
security policy.  A security proposal set can be made up of one or more security 
proposals each with a set of security attributes. 
Currently the IKE loading process retrieves security proposal ranges from 
isakmpd.conf. However, during peer negotiations, security proposals, which are loaded 
during (re)initialization from isakmpd.conf, are verified via iskampd.policy. This 
requires security policy to be defined in multiple areas; namely isakmpd.conf and 
isakmpd.policy. For efficiency and ease of management, this process will be modified so 
that security proposal ranges are loaded directly from KeyNote/isakmpd.policy. In 




Another modification is required to properly incorporate the dynamic parameter 
values into the proposal set loaded from isakmpd.policy.  This will provide dynamic 
parameterization to the IPsec ensuring that only appropriate security proposals are loaded 
during (re)initialization. 
Implementing these modifications to the IPsec mechanism will ultimately 
parameterize the IPsec (re)initialization  and security proposal negotiation process. 
B. PROVIDING GRANULARITY TO KEYNOTE 
1. Goal 
The process of providing granularity to KeyNote involves adding more attributes, 
both security- and non-security-related to KeyNote. This will result in a more complex 
security policy, increasing the overall potential parameter combinations possible in 
KeyNote/isakmpd.policy.  To reflect dynamic, environmental parameters in IPsec, the 
security policy mechanism, KeyNote, will require modification. These modifications will 
enable the local security policy to change according to changes in the new dynamic 
external parameters. 
The earlier examples of Network Mode and Security Level will be used as 
external parameters and will   be added to KeyNote’s condition assertion. The extended 
semantics of the security policy assertions will allow any dynamic external parameter and 
any number of security-related parameters to be represented. The KeyNote Query 
mechanism will then require the ability to import the current value of the dynamic 
external parameters to perform a query based on the new dynamic parameters.   
2. Process Review 
The following is a brief review of the current KeyNote structure and KeyNote 
query mechanism, and a description of the required modifications.  
2.1  Current Keynote Process Review 
Currently, KeyNote’s structure is composed of IPsec specific parameters. 
Dynamic parameters will need to be added to the structure. Likewise the KeyNote query 
structure utilizes only IPsec specific parameters. 
2.1.1  Keynote Structure  
KeyNote’s structure is made up of IPsec security parameters and 
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related application parameters that describe allowed interactions between different 
network peers. IPsec security parameters include encryption algorithms, authentication 
algorithms, transportation modes, key length, key lifetimes, identification and 
authentication certificates, and other security related variables. Related application 
parameters include local and remote ports utilized by applications. 
2.1.2 Current Keynote Query Mechanism 
The KeyNote query mechanism is handled by the KeyNote 
interface. To summarize the peer negotiation process, a brief description follows. The 
initiating IPsec peer prompts the IPsec mechanism by launching a security supported 
application (i.e. telnet or finger).  The initiator’s IPsec mechanism sends a security 
proposal to the responder peer to establish communication in support of the specified 
application. The responder peer uses the proposal received to perform a query on its 
KeyNote. If a security proposal is accepted, the responder returns the accepted security 
proposal. The initiator then performs a query on the local KeyNote to ensure that security 
proposal is authorized. If the query returns TRUE, the initiator returns a final message to 
the responder completing the negotiation handshake. The query performed on KeyNote 
verifies the security proposal’s compliance with locally defined policy.  The query 
mechanism loads the security proposals and performs the query on KeyNote receiving a 
Boolean response reflecting whether or not the security proposal is consistent with the 
local KeyNote policy.  
2.1.3 Current KeyNote Process Flow 
The following is a step-by-step review of the current KeyNote 














-esp_presen==“yes” && esp_enc_alg==“des” &&
local_filter_port== “80” && remote_filter_port==“80”
-ah_presen==“yes” && ah_auth_alg==“sha” &&


















Figure 4.1. Current KeyNote Process. 
 
-  1a - Upper Layer Application triggers Initiator’s IKE 
Daemon and starts peer negotiation with responder peer. 
-  1ai – Security proposal ranges are retrieved from 
initiator’s memory 
-  1b –. Initiator security proposal set is send to responder. 
-  2 - Responder receives initiator’s security proposal, 
processes the proposal and replies by sending an acceptable 
security proposal to the initiator peer. (Note: specifics on 
the responder’s security mechanism are purposely obscure 
to demonstrate the importance of independent system 
architecture).  
-  3 – Initiator peer receives the responder’s security 
proposal.    
-  4 – Responder Peer’s proposal is submitted to the 
Initiator’s KeyNote interface.  
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-  5 – Initiator’s KeyNote interface loads query mechanism 
and submits the query to KeyNote, receiving a Boolean 
response. 
-  6 – Return to Initiator IKE Daemon. 
-  7  – If a proposal is accepted then security associations 
are   constructed and loaded into Initiator’s SAD and SPD.  
-  8 – If the proposal is accepted, then the initiator sends an 
acknowledgement to the responder peer. Otherwise, the 
initiator notifies the responder peer of the refusal and the 
proposal is discarded. 
 
2.2 Modified Keynote Structure and Query Mechanism 
In order to incorporate dynamic parameters into the KeyNote structure and 
query mechanism, the following modifications will be required. 
2.2.1 Modifications to Keynote Structure  
The dynamic/environment parameters, Network Mode and 
Security Level, and their authorized local ranges, need to be represented in the condition 
section of the KeyNote structure. This will add further levels of granularity and 
complexity to KeyNote. 
For example, the condition statement in KeyNote, shown in figure 
4.2, authorizing telnet communication between two peers using 3DES as the encryption 
algorithm will have to be further defined for all ranges of network mode and security 
levels. At this point, the security policy can provide different levels of security attributes 
to the peer connection associa tion by varying the encryption algorithm used in 







Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&   
((esp_present == "yes") &&
((local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "aes")) || 
((ah_present == "yes") &&
((local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79")) && 
(ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha"))
-> "true"; 
esp_present == "yes“ – ESP encapsulated packet
local_filter_port == "23- outgoing Telnet communications
remote_filter_port == "23“- incoming Telnet communications
esp_enc_alg == “3des“ – encryption algorithm is 3DES  
t  "yes“ –  e s l t  
local_filter_port  "23- outgoing elnet co unications
  i  l t i ati s
sp_e  es“ – e cr ti  l rit  i    
An Example of a Condition Statement in KeyNote
 
Figure 4.2. An Example of a Condition Statement inKeyNote. 
 
It is important to ensure that the dynamic parameter modifications 
to KeyNote do not depend upon on IPsec peers having identical dynamic parameters. It is 
essential for compatibility that KeyNote incorporates the local dynamic parameters for 
local use only and that the query process remain independent of peer dynamic 
parameters. 
2.2.2 Modifications to the KeyNote Query Mechanism. 
The KeyNote query mechanism will require modification to allow 
for dynamic parameter value injection. This will enable the query to properly evaluate 
security proposals with respect to the current value of the dynamic parameters.  The 
modifications will provide assurance that changes to dynamic parameters that might 
occur during the negotiation are reflected accordingly in KeyNote decisions. 
2.2.3 Modified KeyNote Process Flow 
The following is a step-by-step review of the modified KeyNote 


















-network mode == “normal” && security_level == “high” 
&& esp_present==“yes” && esp_enc_alg==“des” &&
local_filter_port== “80” && remote_filter_port==“80”
-network mode == “normal” && security_level == “low” 
ah_present==“yes” && ah_auth_alg==“sha” &&


















Figure 4.3. Modified KeyNote Process. 
-  1a - Upper Layer Application triggers initiator’s IKE 
Daemon and starts peer negotiation with responder peer. 
-  1ai – Security proposal ranges are retrieved from 
initiator’s memory 
-  1b - Initiator security proposal is sent to responder. 
-  2 - Responder receives initiator’s security proposal, 
processes the proposal and replies by sending an acceptable 
security proposal to the initiator peer. (Note: specifics on 
the responders security mechanism are purposely obscure 
to demonstrate the importance of independent system 
architecture). 
-  3 – Initiator peer receives the responder’s security 
proposal. 
-  4 – Responder’s proposal is submitted to the initiator’s 
KeyNote interface. 
-  5 - Initiator’s KeyNote injects current dynamic parameter 
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values into the query structure. 
-  6 – Initiator’s KeyNote interface loads the query 
mechanism and submits the query to KeyNote, receiving a 
Boolean response. 
-  7 – Return to initiator’s IKE Daemon. 
-  8 – If the proposal is accepted then security associations 
are constructed and loaded into initiator’s SAD and SPD.  
-  9 - If the proposal is accepted, the initiator sends an 
acknowledgement to the responder peer. Otherwise, the 
initiator peer notifies the responder of the refusal and the 
proposal is discarded.  
3. Modification Phases 
The modification of the KeyNote Structure and Query Mechanism will be 
performed in the following phases:  
3.1 Add Dynamic Parameters to KeyNote 
The first step in the process of adding granularity to KeyNote, is 
development of a method to add dynamic parameters and their ranges to KeyNote. It is 
essential that the parameters be added properly to the current security policy. This implies 
ensuring that all authorized values of the newly inserted parameters are correctly matched 
with other corresponding values reflecting the security policy. For example, if Security 
Level, with values High and Low, are added to KeyNote, the assertion would have to be 
rewritten to account for all security attributes authorized when security level is Low and 
High, respectively. This will add to the depth of the logical assertion as well as increases 
its complexity.  The importance of understanding KeyNote’s structure and syntax is 
critical in performing the required modifications in achieving dynamic parameterization.   
3. 2  Develop a Method to Inject Dynamic Parameters into the 
KeyNote Query Mechanism. 
The next step is to design and develop a method to inject the current 
values of the dynamic parameters into the KeyNote query mechanism.  This process will 
involve understanding the current KeyNote query mechanism to determine how the 
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dynamic parameters values can be injected. 
3.3  Develop a Console or Interface to Receive Dynamic Parameter 
Selection/Adjustment. 
 A method will be required to allow a system or a user to make changes to 
dynamic parameters used to select security attributes in accordance with the security 
policy.  This mechanism must have the capability to effect immediate change on the 
dynamic parameters and may trigger adjustments to IPsec mechanism. 
3.4 Testing Modifications  
Once all modifications have been performed, a thorough testing phase will 
be required.  Testing should involve at least two dynamic parameters (i.e. Network Mode 
and Security Level) with at least two ranges for each. The query mechanism should be 
tested to ensure that it is consistent and resistant to logical errors. All errors should be 
documented and corrected if possible. Any uncorrected errors should be listed in the 
Future Work Chapter Seven. 
C. PARAMETERIZING AND IMPROVING ISAKMPD.CONF – KEYNOTE 
PROPOSAL LOADING PROCESS 
1. Goal 
The (re)initialalization phase will require modification to incorporate the dynamic 
IPsec parameters. The value of these parameters will have a direct effect on which 
security proposals are loaded into memory for peer negotiations.  Currently, local security 
policy is represented in two areas: KeyNote/isakmpd.policy and isakmp.conf.  This 
causes a problem in the area of security policy management. To provide for coherent 
policy management, the configuration process needs to be modified to utilize only 
KeyNote/isakmpd.policy.  Ultimately, the security policy will be managed in only one 
database and will incorporate the granular dynamic parameters. 
2. Process Review 
The following is  a brief review of the current configuration process of loading 
security proposal ranges from isakmpd.conf.  It is followed by a description of a 
modified configuration process for loading security proposals from isakmpd.policy. This 
modified process includes dynamic parameterization.  
 
80 
 2.1 Current Process Review 
Currently, during the initialization phase, isakmpd.conf is read to retrieve 
valid security proposal ranges. The data stays in memory, unmodified, until needed or a 
re-initialization is triggered. 















Figure 4.4. Current (Re)Initialization Process. 
 
- 1 – (Re)Initialization triggers the IPsec configuration 
process. 
- 2 – Read the isakmpd.conf for mechanism initialization 
parameters and valid security proposal ranges. 




  2.2 Modified Process Review 
  To effectively parameterize the configuration phase by 
incorporating dynamic parameters, two modifications to the existing process are 
required. First, the current value of dynamic parameters must be retrieved.  Second, 
valid security proposal ranges in accordance with the Network Mode and Security 
Level values must be retrieved from KeyNote/isakmpd.policy instead of 
isakmpd.conf. 
  The following is a step-by-step description of the modified 

















Figure 4.5  
Figure 4.5. Modified (Re)Initialization Process 
 
- 1a – (Re)Initialization triggers the IPsec configuration 
process, or 
- 1b – Dynamic Parameter console triggers the IPsec 
configuration process. 
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- 2 – The Configuration Process retrieves the current values 
of the Dynamic Parameters. 
- 3 The Modified Configuration Process retrieves valid 
security proposal parameters from KeyNote. Note that a 
reduced iskampd.conf  will still be required to store non-
security related mechanism initialization parameters. 
- 4 – The Configuration Process loads valid security 
proposals into memory for later use. 
3. Modifications Phases 
The modification of KeyNote Structure and Query Mechanism will be performed 
in the following phases:  
 3.1  Determine Security Proposal Range Syntax 
In order to retrieve valid security proposal ranges from KeyNote instead of 
insakmpd.conf, the proper loading syntax will need to be identified. If the KeyNote 
utilizes a different syntax for security proposals, a parsing method will be required to 
translate the KeyNote syntax into the syntax required by configuration process.  
Initial review indicates that the syntaxes differ and that parsing will be 
required. After the valid security proposals are retrieved from KeyNote, they need to be 
translated into a form that is expected by the configuration process. Another potential 
solution would be to change the expected security proposal range syntax in the 
configuration process to one similar to that of KeyNote.  (See Future Work Chapter 
Seven) 
3.2  Develop a Method to Retrieve Current Dynamic Parameter 
Values 
A method to determine the current dynamic environment variables will be 
required prior to retrieving the valid security proposals from KeyNote. The configuration 
process should be able to easily access the parameters values for these parameters 
3.3  Develop Method to Retrieve Valid Security Proposal Ranges 
from KeyNote/isakmpd.policy 
Once the values of the dynamic parameters have been determined, a 
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method for retrieving the corresponding security proposals from KeyNote is required. 
This method will have to be able to traverse the KeyNote Condition assertion structure 
and retrieve the proposal ranges efficiently. 
It is important to note that non-security related mechanism initialization 
parameters will remain in isakmpd.conf. For further discussion, refer to Future Work 
Chapter Seven. 
4.  Testing 
Once all modifications have been performed, a thorough testing phase will be 
required.  Testing should involve at least two dynamic parameters (ie Network Mode and 
Security Level) with at least two ranges for each. The query mechanism should be tested 
to ensure that it is consistent and free of logical errors. All errors should be documented 
and corrected if possible. Any uncorrected errors should be listed in the Future Work 
Chapter. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The design and method for parameterizing IPsec was outlined and discussed in 
this chapter. The design phase identified two specific modifications that will be required: 
providing granularity to KeyNote, and parameterizing and improving isakmpd.conf / 
isakmpd.policy (KeyNote) security proposal range loading process. Providing 
granularity to KeyNote will require an in-depth review of the KeyNote structure 
including the Boolean query mechanism. The goal will be to logically insert the dynamic 
parameter values according to policy definition, therefore, providing finer granularity to 
the Boolean query mechanism. Modifications to the configuration process to enable 
security proposal ranges to be retrieved from KeyNote, will require a syntax review of 
KeyNote and security proposal ranges expected by the configuration process. There is 
potential for a parsing requirement to translate proposals into the appropriate form. 
Using the design and process provided, the implementation phase will follow with 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
V.   IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this research is to modify the  current implementation of OpenBSD 
IPsec to incorporate parameterization of dynamic parameters. After a thorough review of 
the current system architecture and  an in-depth design phase, I was able to implement the 
modifications.  
The modifications were performed in two phases: providing granularity to 
KeyNote, and stream-lining and incorporating parameterization to the isakmpd.conf / 
isakmpd.policy (KeyNote) security proposal set-loading process.  
For each phase, I will discuss the implemented design and methodology, 
processing description, and pseudo code, including specific algorithms and code 
structure, assumptions, challenges, workarounds, and potential problems. Any 
implementation issues that could not be solved will be mentioned and further discussed in 
the Future Work Chapter Seven. 
B. PROVIDING GRANULARITY TO KEYNOTE 
1. Parameterization of KeyNote. 
Keynote previously used static parameters set by the system administrator, 
defining system security information and authorized security associations.  However, the 
challenge was to enable  Keynote to handle dynamic parameters  such as security level 
and network mode. These parameters would be set via an external module or device. 
Incorporating these changes enabled dynamic parameters to control security attribute 
setting adjustments in accordance with security policy.  
The first step was to integrate dynamic parameter tag and value statements into 
the current condition assertion structure of KeyNote/isakmpd.policy. The next step was 
to analyze the current KeyNote query mechanism, specifically, the KeyNote query 
routine used with static security proposal sets had to be located.  Modifications could 




1.1 Inserting Dynamic Parameters into KeyNote’s Condition 
Assertion Structure. 
Keynote as defined in Chapter III  is made up of various sections. Security 
attributes reside in the condition section and are expressed  in the form of  logical 
assertions.   
The condition section’s syntax is in the form of a logical statement, 
similar to a condition that might be found in an “if statement”. The section is usually 
broken into sub statements  by using &&, ||, and parentheses to construct logical 
conditions. For example the following phrase describes two security proposals supporting 
telnet services (service_port= 23) using ESP with 3DES for encryption and finger 
services (service_port=79) using AH with SHA for authentication: 
 (local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" && 
   esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
 (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
   ah_auth_alg == "sha") -> “true”; 
1.2 Inserting Dynamic Parameters into Keynote 
Using the above example, the dynamic parameters, network mode and 
security level, are added to the condition statement. To properly insert the parameters, it 
was essential that the existing logical structure be maintained. This required the 
parameters to be added (and properly defined according to policy) to all the existing 
conditional expression combinations.  Using the previous example with security levels 
“high” and “low” and network modes “normal” and “impacted”, the condition phrase is 
expanded.  Notice that further granularity results in the use of different encryption and 
authentication algorithms for each network mode and security level. 
(network_mode = “normal” &&  
((security_level = “high” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
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esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha"))) || 
((security_level = “low” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "des-mac")))) || 
(network_mode = “impacted” &&  
((security_level = “high” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "aes") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha"))) || 
((security_level = “low” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha-md5")))) -> “true”; 
 It becomes obvious that adding parameters to the keynote condition 
assertion greatly increases the complexity of each expression. In order to implement and 
manage a detailed and complex security policy, a policy editor would be required to 
translate the assertion’s syntax into a representation that is easier for operators to manage. 
Otherwise, the potential for mistakes as a result of the complexity could be very high. See 
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Future Work Chapter Seven for more details on a security policy editor.  
Variable precedence should also be considered.  Which variable should be 
listed first and where is the precedence defined? Fortunately, we have proper logical 
expressions and the order and precedence does not matter so long as the combination is 
properly constructed and represents  all authorized security associations. For example, the 
order of nested dynamic parameters, ne twork mode and security level, is not relevant to 
the logical outcome of a Boolean query on the condition assertion. 
1.3  KeyNote Query Functionality 
The next step was to locate the existing KeyNote query calls. By 
reviewing the OPenBSD IPsec documentation, I was able to determine the following 
KeyNote interface mechanism: 
 [ike_quick_mode.c] 
- check_policy()  
-  LK(kn_add_action()) – loads a tag and its value into the 
KeyNote query mechanism. If the same tag is loaded more 
than once, only the last instance will be used. Can be used 
to overwrite preloaded default values. If the process is 
successful it returns a ‘1’. Otherwise it returns a ‘0’. 
(LK(kn_add_action()), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual 
Pages, 2000) 
-  LK(kn_do_query()) – performs the Boolean query on 
KeyNote on the information loaded into the query 
mechanism. If the proposal is accepted, (valid according to 
existing assertions in the condition section of KeyNote) a 
true value (‘1’) is returned. Otherwise a false value (‘0’) is 
returned. LK(kn_do_query()), OpenBSD Programmer’s 






















Figure 5.1. Current KeyNote Query Process. 
 
1.4 Dynamic Parameter Input Module 
The dynamic input module retrieves the current values of the dynamic 
parameters. 
1.4.1  Design Approach  
To provide for system parameter inputs, I implemented a file 
input/output (I/O) approach to incorporate the external parameter input simulation. The 
file I/O approach method is utilized throughout the current OpenBSD architecture 
allowing different processes to communicate with each other. Basically the file approach 
involves an interface component writing data or messages to a file and another 
component continually polling the file and responding accordingly.  The following is the 
file location and an example of the syntax  used to write and read the dynamic 
parameters: 
[/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters ] 
network_mode = normal 
security_level = high 
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  1.4.2  Processing Description  
The following describes the algorithm utilized to develop my code: 
-  Declare file variables used to open and read from the file 
- Define and declare a structure that can be used to hold the 
dynamic parameters. The structure should have the capability to 
grow dynamically as required to hold a variable amount of 
parameters. 
- Read-in dynamic parameters from a file and load them into the 
structure accordingly. 
  1.4.3  Pseudo  Code 
The following code was inserted into ipsec_quick_mode.c:  
- Structure : dynamic_packet. Contains the following variables: 
- char* title – character string used to hold the dynamic 
       parameter title. 
- char* symbol – character string used to hold the symbol 
       “=” “>” “<” “!=”. 
- char* value -  character string used to hold the dynamic 
    parameter value. 
- Function: struct dynamic_packet package_dynamic_parameters(int * 
package_counter) - added to ipsec_quick_mode.c to retrieve the 
dynamic parameters from a file and load them into an array of 
dynamic_packet structure (defined above). 
 - Input:  
- int * package_counter - pointer to integer variable used for the 
number of dynamic parameters added to the structure. Pointer used 
to be able to return the value to the calling function. 
 - Output:  
- struct dynamic_packet - pointer to array of structures. 
 - Process: 
   - Initialize the pointer to an array size of 10 
   - Open file to read in dynamic parameters  
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      - Check for errors in opening the file 
-Do-while loop used to read in data until EOF reached or file 
reading error occurs. 
- Read in from the file expecting the following syntax: 
                         - title <string> symbol <string> value <string> 
- Create exactly enough new structure space for the 
dynamic parameters and copy values from temp variables 
to the structure variables. 
- Increment the package counter array of the structure. 
- Check to see if the array of dynamic parameters has 
reached max size. If so, resize array accordingly. 
   - Close file. 
   - Free temporary memory. 
   - Return array of structures. 
 - Code added to check_policy(): 
  - Initialize dynamic parameter array structure 
- Call package_dynamic_parameters() function to read in the dynamic 
parameters and store them in an array of structures. 
1.5 Inserting Dynamic Parameters Into The Keynote Query 
Functionality 
Once dynamic parameters have been retrieved, they can be used in the 
KeyNote query process. 
  1.5.1  Design Approach  
The current implementation of IPSEC in OPENBSD utilizes a 
policy_callback structure for loading the IPSec parameters into Keynote for a query. 
This enables fewer lines of code. I attempted to utilize this functionality for inserting 
security level and network mode. But I was unable to successfully load all dynamic 
parameters into KeyNote query mechanism at once. Instead, I proceed by loading each 
system variable individually into the KeyNote query structure. This is an area that will 
require future work to streamline the process. (See Chapter VII). 
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1.5.2.  Processing Description  and  Pseudo Code   
The following is the code  added to check_policy(): 
- Loop through the array of structures. 
- Load dynamic parameters individually using 
LK(kn_add_action()) & LK(kn_close()) 
-  Check for loading errors. 
The following (see figure 5.2) is a step-by-step review of the 





























Figure 5.2. Modified KeyNote Query Process. 
 
1 – Peer sends a security proposal to recipient peer during the 
security association negotiation phase. 
2 – IKE Daemon forwards proposal to KeyNote interface. 
3 – KeyNote interface retrieves the current values of the dynamic 
parameters. 
4 – Mechanism prepares for the security proposal loading. 
5 – Dynamic parameter values and security proposal are loaded 
into KeyNote query mechanism. 
93 
6 – Boolean query is performed on KeyNote. 
C. REPLACING ISAKMPD.CONF WITH KEYNOTE 
To incorporate a complete dynamic functionality into the IPsec mechanism, the 
loading process for a valid set of security proposals must be modified to allow for the 
injection of the dynamic parameter values. This will ultimately provide further 
granularity to the selection of security proposals. To further streamline the management 
of the security policy, all security proposals should be derived from 
isakmpd.policy/KeyNote. This will require the modification of the existing process of 
retrieving the valid set of security proposals from isakmpd.conf. 
1. Current isakmpd.conf  
isakmpd.conf is used as a configuration file for the isakmpd daemon during 
(re)initialization phase of the IPsec mechanism.  It provides the initial security 
associations and keys used for Phase I of the ISAKMP daemon, and a set of valid 
security proposals used in Phase II for IPsec peer negotiation communication. 
(ISAKMPD.CONF(5), OpenBSD Programmer’s Manual, October 1998) When the IPsec 
mechanism is (re)initialized, isakmpd.conf is read and all the information is loaded into 
memory 
As previously discussed in Chapter III, IPsec Architecture, isakmpd.conf utilizes 
the traditional .ini style file structure and is segregated into sections indicated by “[   ]”. 
Within each section, parameters are defined using the “<tag> = <tag value or range 
value>” syntax.  Tag values may  consist of other section names.  This results in a tree-
like structure through the isakmpd.conf file.  (ISAKMPD.CONF(5), OpenBSD 
Programmer’s Manual, October 1998) 
2.  Process of Replacing isakmpd.conf with KeyNote 
In order to properly modify the current process of loading the valid set of security 
proposals to incorporate dynamic parameters and reduce the security policy management 
scope to KeyNote, the following must be accomplished. First a method to retrieve  the 
current values of the dynamic parameters and to inject them into the loading process must 
be implemented. Second, the loading process must be modified to allow for the valid set 
of security proposals to be retrieved from isakmpd.policy/KeyNote instead of 
isakmpd.conf. 
94 
2.1  Modification of the Valid Set of Security Proposal Loading 
Process  
 To successfully achieve the goal of modifying the current implementation 
of the loading process of the valid set of security proposals, the following steps had to be 
accomplished. First, a  review of the current methodology and code was required to 
determine the appropriate location for the code modification. Second, an understanding 
of the isakmpd.conf  configuration loading syntax was required so that security proposals 
retrieved from KeyNote could be appropriately translated. Third it was necessary to 
develop the parsing mechanism to retrieve valid security proposals from KeyNote and 
properly translate them, as required, into the form expected by the (re)initialization 
process. Last, the dynamic parameter values had to be incorporated into the security 
proposal retrieval process, to allow for further granularity in the selection process. 
2.1.1.  Review of the Current Implementation of the 
isakmpd.conf Loading Process 
 
  Currently isakmpd.conf is read during initialization of the IPsec 
mechanism and the re- initialization is triggered by a change of state.  
   2.1.1.1  Design Approach 
Isakmpd.conf contains information on peers (IP addresses, 
Net Masks), IKE phase I parameters (IKE security associations: encryption, 
authentication and keys), and IPsec phase II security proposals.  The IPsec mechanism 
reads the isakmpd.conf file from the conf.c file located in the /usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/ 
directory. The file is read into a string buffer all at once. The buffer is then parsed, start to 
finish, using section tags as indicators of section existence. As information is retrieved it 
is stored in memory using a structure list/array. 
   2.1.1.2 Pseudo  Code 
   The following is a brief step-by-step description of the 
process: 
- Function: conf_init() – called to begin the initialize phase of the IPsec 
process. 
- Storage structure for extracted information from isakmpd.conf  is 
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prepared. 
- conf_reinit() is called. 
 - Function conf_renit() – called to begin the (re)initialization process. 
  - file_secrecy () is called.  
   - size of file is returned (by reference to int). 
  - If isakmpd.conf exists. 
- isakmpd.conf is opened. Error checking is performed in 
the event of  I/O error. 
- Entire contents of isakmpd.conf is read into a string 
buffer. 
   - File is closed. 
   - conf_begin() is called 
    - if first call, define static transaction number as 1 
     and returns. 
    - Otherwise increments transaction number 
     and returns. 
   - conf_parse() called to parse string buffer. 
    (See conf_parse() description below). 
  - Otherwise – conf_begin() is called. 
  - conf_load_defaults() is called. Pre-defined stored 
   values of security attributes are loaded into memory as 
   required. In the event of an incomplete load or loading error, 
   the default values is used. 
  - As required, memory is freed. 
- Function: conf_parse()  
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- While not at the end of buffer, parses the string buffer one line at 
a time. 
   - conf_parse_line() is called. (See description below). 
- Function: conf_parse_line() – parse string buffer one line at a time 
  - Skips comments demoted by # 
  - Recognizes section headers. 
   - Parses sections by tags and values. 
- conf_set() is called to load tags and values into memory 
structure. 
   (See description below) 
- Function: conf-set() – receives transaction number, section name, tag 
name, value and other override/default flags. The information is then 
stored in a structure for later use. 
  
2.1.2  Syntax Required by the conf.c Loading Process 
   Conf.c requires a specific syntax for the set of valid security 
proposals. Specifically, it requires that information be broken into sections, tags and tag 
values (as found in isakmpd.conf). This information is then loaded into the structure 
used to store the security proposal until required. As the information is parsed from the 
isakmpd.conf, it is sent to conf_set() function which loads it into memory. 
 In order to modify the loading process to allow all security proposal 
information to be retrieved from KeyNote/isakmpd.policy, a translation will be required 
from KeyNote/isakmpd.policy form to the isakmpd.conf form. Specific syntax 
differences between the two forms are as follows: 
 - Phase II suite (set of valid security proposals).  
  - isakmpd.conf – exists in the following syntax: 
   - Tags separated by dashes (-). 
<Phase Mode (QM)>-<ESP or AH>-<Encryption or 
Authentication used><other security related attributes> 
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- Additional security proposals are added via comma (,). 
- KeyNote/isakmpd.policy – does not exist in simple form. Information exists 
within the condition assertion. In order to generate the proper syntax it  must be 
derived from condition assertion.   
- Tag and Tag Value 
  - isakmpd.conf – are a mixture of uppercase and lower case.  
- KeyNote/isakmpd.policy – all tag and tag values exist in 
lowercase and tag 
values are in quotes (“”). All possible tags and section names must 
be accounted for to ensure  proper capitalization translation. 
 - Assignment symbol 
  - isakmpd.conf – utilized single equals sign for assignment (“=”). 
- KeyNote/isakmpd.policy – utilizes double equals signs for 
assignment (“= =”). 
 - File structure. 
- isakmpd.conf – utilizes a sequential file structure with section 
tags to differentiate between sections. 
- KeyNote/isakmpd.policy – utilizes a logical predicate format. 
The information is embedded in a series of && and ||. A method of 
assertion translation will be required to retrieve the require 
information. 
  Some of the information found  in isakmpd.conf was not security 
policy related. It dealt with other connection-oriented specifics. I decided to leave this 
information inside isakmpd.conf. In other words, only the security policy information 
was removed from iskampd.conf. 
2.1.3.  Parsing Mechanism to Retrieve Valid Security Proposals 
from KeyNote and Properly Translate as Required 
 
  A parsing mechanism is required to retrieve the security proposal 
information from the current form of KeyNote’s condition assertion and translate it into 
the expected format required by conf.c. 
2.1.3.1 Design Approach 
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   The first step in the parsing process was to develop an 
algorithm to properly evaluate KeyNote’s condition assertions. A few attempts of direct 
parsing involving recursive calls and parenthesis counting proved to be too syntax 
dependent and unstable.  
The next approach relied on the concurrent development of 
a DNF parser that would extract embedded security proposals from an assertion and 
reconstruct them in the following format ( NPS-CS-02-002, January 2002): 
(((<tag> == <tag value>) && (<tag>==<tag value>) && …. )|| 
(((<tag> == <tag value>) && (<tag>==<tag value>) && …. )|| 
2.1.3.2 Processing Description 
   Given the previous DNF format, the following is  the 
processing description of the  implemented  parser: 
 - Initialize and define a list of structures (linked list/array).  
- Read in the DNF security proposal file. 
 - Parse the file according to security proposals. 
- Provide a new structure to store information for each security 
proposal. 
 - Translate the stored information into the expected isakmpd.conf syntax. 
 - Load memory with the set of valid security proposals. 
2.1.3.3 Pseudo Code 
   Below is the detailed description of the parsing 
implementation. The function call to the KeyNote parsing (conf_kn_parse()) was 
inserted in the conf_reinit() in conf.c, after the load_default() function call. A 
description of the implementation follows: 
- Suite_Struct was used to hold the extracted security proposal 
information retrieved from the DNF security proposal. The structure 
contained all possible entries (within the scope of the research. Note that 
potentially, there could be other undefined parameters. This is discussed 
further in the Future Work Chapter Seven). Memory for each char string 
was dynamically created for memory conservation.  In other words 
memory was allocated as needed throughout the parsing routine. 
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struct suite_struct { 
        char * suite_name; 
        char * suite_protocol; 
        char * suite_transform; 
        char * protocol_id; 
        char * transform_id; 
        char * encapsulation_mode; 
        char * group_description; 
        char * authentication_algorithm; 
        char * life; 
        char * life_type; 
        char * life_duration; 
        char * network_mode;  
        char * security_level; 
        char * esp;  
        char * ah; 
        char * esp_enc_alg; 
        char * esp_auth_alg; 
        char * ah_auth_alg; 
        char * pfs; 
        char * key_length; 
}; 
- Function: conf_kn_parse() – function called to activate the DNF 
security proposal  parsing mechanism.  
  - input: int trans – used for the transaction number for sequential 
   processing. 
  - output: void. 
  - process: 
- Array of structures initialized for two security proposals. 
The number two was chosen because my testing example 
consist of two security proposals. 
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   - DNF security proposal file is opened 
- Error checking is performed. If the error occurs, 
exit routine and return to conf_reinit(). 
- Utilize technique taken from file_secrecy () function  
stat (<file name>, &<size variable>) to determine size of 
file to be read. This enabled a dynamic approach to 
allocating only enough memory as needed.   
- Read in entire DNF file into string buffer.  
- Close the file. 
- While not at end of string buffer: 
-Search for the first security proposal expression. 
The search is performed by searching for the first 
occurrence of “(“. An assumption is made that for 
every variation of DNF security proposal possible, 
they will all begin with “(“. 
     -   DNF_parse() function is called. 
      - if 1 (true) is returned then a valid security 
 proposal was found and the counter is 
incremented. 
   -  Check to see if any valid security proposals were found. 
- If so, call send_to_conf_set() function to load 
valid security proposals into memory. 
    - Free temporary memory used. 
- Function: send_to_conf_set(int trans, char * suite_title, char * suite, 
struct suite_struct * suite_profile, int struct_size) – this functions sends 
parsed information to conf_set in the correct syntax. 
 - Input: 
  - int trans – transaction number. 
- char * suite_title – holds title for tag defined in previous 
function. 
- char * suite – holds set of security proposals 
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- struct suite_struct * suite_profile – points to the list/array 
 of suite structures. 
- int struct_size – holds the size of the list. 
 - Output: None. 
   - Process: 
- Performs initial conf_set call for the General section 
including the set of security proposals (suite). 
- Loops through the list/array of structures and executes 
conf_set in accordance with the information loaded in the 
structure.  
- No NULL check is performed. It is assumed that a 
 NULL value will not have a negative effect on the 
 loading process and that the loaded default will be  
used instead. 
- The following is the standard suite structure is 
expected by conf_set(): 
- [General] section with a Default-Phase-2-
Suite tag and value (set of security 
proposals). Sent only once. 
      - [<suite name>] section with suite protocol 
       per structure. 
- [<suite protocol>] section with protocol id 
per structure. 
- [<suite transform>] section with  
- transform id  
- encapsulation mode 
- group description 
- authentication algorithm 
- lifetime 
- per structure. 
- [<suite lifetime  definition>] section with 
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 - lifetime type 
 - lifetime duration 
 - per structure. 
     
     
- Function:  struct suite_struct* struct_initialization (struct 
suite_struct * suite_profile) – used to initialize each suite structure. 
- Input: - struct suite_struct * suite_profile – holds the pointer to 
suite structure. 
 - Output: - returns the newly initialized structure. 
 - Process: 
- In an effort to minimize wasted memory, all elements of 
the structure are initialized to NULL.   
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, pointer to 
pointer coding syntax at times was required. By having a pointer to 
a pointer, memory created in a function will still be resident/within 
scope after returning from the function. 
  - Function: int DNF_parse(char **suite, char *buff_temp, int 
* buff_temp_counter, int szkn, struct suite_struct *suite_profile, 
struct dynamic_packet * package, int package_size) – This function 
parses each security proposal found. 
 - Input: 
  - Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
   pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By 
   having a pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function 
   will still be resident/within scope after returning from the 
   function. 
- char **suite – holds the set of security proposals. Pointer 
to a pointer used to for dynamic memory creation. 
- char *buff_temp – string buffer holding the DNF file. 
- int* buff_temp_counter – location of parsing index. 
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Pointer to integer is used to allow for pass by reference. 
- int szkn – size of file/string buffer. 
- struct suite_struct *suite_profile – pointer to suite 
structure.   
   - Outputs:  
    - integer  
– returns 1 (false) if parse routine successful. 
     - returns 0 (false) otherwise. 
   - Process: 
    - Note: The methodology used in the following parsing 
     function is as follows. The parsing is performed on per 
     character basis. If a character matches the first character of 
     an expected key word, one of two functions are called: 
     parse_ipsec_para_tag() or parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
     Parse_ipsec_para_tag() (explained later in detail) is used 
for specific tags utilizing Boolean tag values, usually “yes” 
or “no.” 
Parse_ipsec_parameter() (explained later in detail) is used 
for normal tag and tag value expressions. 
    - Initialize suite structure; 
    - While loop with Boolean flag 
- The following parsing is performed on a character 
by character basis. If the first character matches and 
a further string comparison will not cause a buffer-
overflow,  then a follow-up routine is called to 
check for the full comparison. If a comparison 
match is found, parsing continues in the called 
function. If not, function returns and parsing in local 
function continues until Boolean flag is set.  
- Check for ESP. Call parse_ipsec_para_tag() 
- If ESP is found then dynamic memory is 
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created in the suite structure for the string 
IPSEC_ESP.  
- Check for ESP encryption algorithm by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter() . 
- If ESP encryption algorithm is found then 
dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for ESP encryption algorithm.  
- Check for ESP authentication algorithm by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If ESP authentication algorithm is found 
then dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for the ESP authentication 
algorithm. 
- Check for AH by calling parse_ipsec_para_tag(). 
- If AH is found then dynamic memory is 
created in the suite structure for the string 
IPSEC_AH. 
- Check for PFS by calling 
parse_ipsec_para_tag(). 
- If PFS is found then dynamic memory is 
created in the suite structure for the string 
yes (as found in the Keynote). 
- Check AH for authentication algorithm. Call 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If AH authentication algorithm is  found 
then dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for the algorithm. Note that HMAC 
is added to the end of the authentication 
algorithm. The end result is: 
HMAC_<Authentication Algorithm> (ie 
HMAC_SHA). This is done to conform to 
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the iskampd.conf syntax. 
- Check for ESP Group Description by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If ESP Group Description is  found then 
dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for the KeyNote version of the 
Group Description. The function 
group_description_translation() is then 
called to convert the string into the 
isakmpd.conf form required by the 
conf_set().  
- Check for AH Group Description by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If AH Group Description is  found then 
dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for the KeyNote version of the 
Group Description. The function 
group_description_translation() is then 
called to convert the string into the 
isakmpd.conf form required by the 
conf_set(). 
 
- Check for ESP Encapsulation by  calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If ESP Encapsulation is  found then 
dynamic memory is created in the suite 
structure for the encapsulation mode. 
- Check for AH Encapsulation by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If AH Encapsulation is  found then 
dynamic memory is created in the suite 
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structure for the encapsulation mode. 
- Check for ESP life seconds by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If ESP life seconds is found then dynamic 
memory is created in the suite structure and 
life_seconds_translation() is called to 
convert the string into the iskampd.conf  
format. The converted string is then copied 
into the newly created space in the suite 
structure. 
- Check for AH life seconds by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If AH life seconds is found then dynamic 
memory is created in the suite structure and 
life_seconds_translation() is called to 
convert the string into the iskampd.conf  
format. The converted string is then copied 
into the newly created space in the suite 
structure. 
- Check for ESP life kilobytes by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If ESP life kilobytes is found then dynamic 
memory is created in the suite structure and 
life_kilobytes_translation() is called to 
convert the string into the iskampd.conf  
format. The converted string is then copied 
into the newly created space in the suite 
structure. 
- Check for AH life kilobytes by calling 
parse_ipsec_parameter(). 
- If AH life kilobytes is found then dynamic 
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memory is created in the suite structure and 
life_kilobytes_translation() is called to 
convert the string into the iskampd.conf  
format. The converted string is then copied 
into the newly created space in the suite 
structure. 
- Check for the end of a DNF suite set by checking 
for “|”. 
- If found then the Boolean flag is set to exit 
while loop. 
- add_para_values() is called to properly 
configure the suite. 
- Check for end of file. If not found advance 
file character index to the next character. 
    - Return int 1 (true) to indicate successful parsing 
     iteration. 
 - Function: void life_kilobytes_translation(char ** life, char 
**life_type, char **life_duration) – this function is used to convert 
lifetime in kilobytes from the KeyNote/isakmpd.policy format to the 
isakmpd.conf format.  
   - Inputs: 
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
   pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By 
   having a pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function 
   will still be resident/within scope after returning from the 
   function. 
- char ** life – holds the initial life time input. Pointer to a 
pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
- char ** life_type – holds the life time type string 
KILOBYTES. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic 
memory allocation. 
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- char ** life_duration – holds the life time duration string . 
Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
   - Outputs: 
- char ** life – used to return life time. Pointer to a pointer 
used for dynamic memory allocation. 
- char ** life_type – used to return life time type string 
KILOBYTES. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic 
memory allocation. 
- char ** life_duration – used to return the life time 
duration string . Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic 
memory allocation. 
- Process: 
- This function takes the input value of life and compares it 
with predefined life constants. If the constant is found, the 
appropriate information is stored in life_type and 
life_duration. All memory is dynamically created in this 
function. 
- Check if life equals 1000. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “LIFE_1000_KB.” 
- Dynamically create memory for “KILOBYTES”. 
- Dynamically create memory for “1000,768:1356”. 
 - Check if life equals 32000. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “LIFE_32_MB.” 
- Dynamically create memory for “KILOBYTES”. 
- Dynamically create memory for 
“32768,16384:65536”. 
- Check if life equals 45000000. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “LIFE_4.5_GB.” 
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- Dynamically create memory for “KILOBYTES” 
- Dynamically create memory for 
“4608000,4096000:8192000”. 
- If no match is found, the default load of 1000 is used. 
- Function: void life_seconds_translation(char ** life, char **life_type, 
char **life_duration) – this function is used to convert lifetime in 
seconds from the KeyNote/isakmpd.policy syntax to the isakmpd.conf  
syntax. 
   - Inputs: 
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
   pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By 
   having a pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function 
   will still be resident/within scope after returning from the 
   function. 
- char ** life – holds the initial life time input. Pointer to a 
pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
- char ** life_type – holds the life time type string 
SECONDS. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory 
allocation. 
- char ** life_duration – holds the life time duration string . 
Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
   - Outputs: 
- char ** life – used to return life time. Pointer to a pointer 
used for dynamic memory allocation. 
- char ** life_type – used to return life time type string 
SECONDS. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory 
allocation. 
- char ** life_duration – used to return the life time 




- This function takes the input value of life and compares it 
with predefined life constants. If the constant is found, the 
appropriate information is stored in life_type and 
life_duration. All memory is dynamically created in this 
function. 
- Check if life equals 600. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “LIFE_600_SECS.” 
- Dynamically create memory for “SECONDS”. 
- Dynamically create memory for “600,450:720”. 
 - Check if life equals 3600. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for 
“LIFE_3600_SECS.” 
- Dynamically create memory for “SECONDS”. 
- Dynamically create memory to for 
“3600,1800:7200”. 
- If no match is found, the default value of 3600 is 
used. 
- Function: void group_description_translation(char ** 
group_description) – this function is used to convert group description 
from the KeyNote/isakmpd.policy syntax to the isakmpd.conf syntax. 
   - Inputs: 
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
   pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By 
   having a pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function 
   will still be resident/within scope after returning from the 
   function. 
- char ** group_description– holds the initial group 
description variable. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic 
memory allocation. 
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   - Outputs: 
- char ** group_description – used to return translated 
group_description. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic 
memory allocation. 
- Process: 
- This function takes the input value of the group 
description and compares it with predefined  constants. If 
the constant is found, the appropriate information is stored 
in group_description. All memory is dynamically created in 
this function. 
- Check if group_description equals 1. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by 
group_description and dynamically create memory 
for “MOPD_768” 
- Check if group_description equals 2. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “MODP_1024” 
- Check if group_description equals 3. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “MODP_155” 
- Check if group_description equals 4. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “MODP_185” 
- Check if group_description equals 5. If so: 
- Free memory used previously by life and 
dynamically create memory for “MODP_1536” 
- If no match is found, the default value of 
group_description 1 is used. 
- Function: void add_para_values(char ** suite, struct suite_struct ** 
suite_profile)- this function generates the security proposal format 
required by the configuration process. 
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- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
  pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By 
having a pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function 
  will still be resident/within scope after returning from the 
  function. 
 - Inputs:  
- char ** suite - holds the set of security proposals. 
Pointer to a pointer used to for dynamic memory creation. 
- struct suite_struct **suite_profile  – pointer to suite 
structure.   
   - Outputs: 
- char ** suite – returns the modified  set of security 
proposals. Pointer to a pointer used to for dynamic memory 
creation. 
- struct suite_struct **suite_profile  – pointer to suite 
structure used to return the modified suite_profile structure. 
  - Process: 
- This function uses the parsed data and generates the 
suite/set of security proposals in the required isakmpd.conf  
syntax.   
- Dynamically creates memory for suite_name in 
suite_profile structure. 
- Checks if suite is large enough for further modification. If 
not, memory is dynamically reallocated for the suite. 
- If suite has not been allocated memory, default size of 
memory is allocated. 
- Performs basic error testing. If ESP and AH were not 
loaded during parsing routine, then checks to see what 
types of algorithms are used to determine if security 
proposal uses AH or ESP. 
- Check if suite structure parameters are null, if not, use the 
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value to construct the suite list. 
- Function: char * convert_to_uppercase(char * lowercase_string) – 
converts a lower case string to an upper case string and returns the string. 
  - Input:  
   - char * lowercase – lower case string. 
     - Output: 
    - char * - returns uppercase string. 
   - Process: 
- Loops through the input string capitalizing each character 
with the toupper function to convert the string to uppercase. 
- Function: void parse_ipsec_parameter(char *buff_temp, int * 
buff_temp_counter, char * sys_para_name, char ** temp_hold, int * 
success)  – verifies that the tag is the expected tag and then parses the tag 
and the tag value, storing information in input suite structure char string. 
   - Inputs: 
- char *buff_temp – pointer to the file being parsed. 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in 
file being parsed. 
- char * sys_para_name – pointer to the expected parameter 
tag name 
- char ** temp_hold – pointer to a pointer (used for the 
purpose of dynamic memory allocation) of char string in 
suite structure. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success 
flag. 
   -Outputs: 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in 
file being parsed is returned via pointer reference. Pointer 
may be advance in function. 
- char * temp_hold - pointer to a pointer of a character 
string (used for the purpose of dynamic memory allocation) 
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in the suite structure returned via pointer reference. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used to hold success 
flag returned via reference. 
  - Process: 
- Check to see if expected parameter string matches target 
string in string buffer being parsed. If so : 
- Advance index pointer in buffer to tag value – 
determined by “” in KeyNote/isakmpd.policy 
syntax. 
- Create dynamic memory in input suite structure 
string for the tag value from buffer. 
- Copy tag value to input suite structure string. 
     - Set success flag to 1 (true). 
- Convert tag value to upper case using 
convert_to_uppercase() function. 
- If match not found, set success flag to 0 (false) and exit. 
- Function: void parse_ipsec_para_tag(char *buff_temp, int * 
buff_temp_counter, char * sys_para_name, char ** temp_hold, int 
sys_para_name_reduced, int * success) - verifies that the tag is the 
expected tag and that tag value contains “yes”. If so, parses tag  and stores 
its value in suite structure char string. 
   - Inputs: 
- char *buff_temp – pointer to the file being parsed. 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in 
file being parsed. 
- char * sys_para_name – pointer to the expected parameter 
tag name 
- char ** temp_hold – pointer to a pointer (used for the 
purpose of dynamic memory allocation) of char string in 
suite structure. 
- int sys_para_name_reduced – integer that holds the string 
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size of the tag. Either 2 or 3 used for AH, ESP or PFS tags. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success 
flag. 
   -Outputs: 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to the index of character 
in file being parsed is returned via pointer reference. 
Pointer may be advanced in the function. 
- char * temp_hold - pointer to a pointer of a character 
string (used for the purpose of dynamic memory allocation) 
in the suite structure returned via pointer reference. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success 
flag returned via reference. 
  - Process: 
- Check to see if expected parameter string matches target 
string in the string buffer being parsed. If so : 
- Advance index pointer in buffer to tag value – 
determined by “” in KeyNote/isakmpd.policy 
syntax. 
- Check to see if the tag value is “yes”. If so: 
- Use sys_para_name_reduced to determine 
the appropriate size of the tag for dynamic 
memory creation and coping purposes.  
- Create dynamic memory for input suite 
structure string to ho ld the tag from the  
buffer (i.e. AH, ESP or PFS). Note: the 
difference between this function and the 
previous one, is that the tag value is copied 
as opposed to the tag. 
- Copy tag  into input suite structure string. 
      - Set success flag to 1 (true). 
- Convert tag value to upper case using 
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convert_to_uppercase() function. 
- If match not found, set success flag to 0 (false) and exit. 
 
    Figure 5.3 provides a diagram of the process. 
 
Logical Flow of Functions

























Figure 5.3. Logical Flow of Functions for Parsing KeyNote into isakmpd.conf Syntax. 
 
2.2 Incorporating the Dynamic Parameters into the Security 
Proposal Loading Process 
 
 The last step required in the modification of the security proposal loading 
process is incorporating dynamic parameters.  One mechanism is required to retrieve the 
current value of the dynamic parameters. Another mechanism will be required to utilize 
these values in the security proposal parsing process described earlier.  
2.2.1 Design for Retrieving Value of Dynamic Parameters 
   Reusing the module implemented for the retrieval of the dynamic 
parameters in above section B.1.3, the process retrieves the current value of the dynamic 
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parameters from a file. An important assumption is made here: when the values of the 
dynamic parameters change, a process will initiate a reconfiguration to cause the 
triggering of the security proposal loading process (in order for the security proposal to 
properly reflect the new dynamic parameter values).  
2.2.2 Design  for Mechanism for Incorporating Dynamic 
Parameter Values into the Security Proposal Parsing 
Process 
 
  A mechanism is required to incorporate the values of the dynamic 
parameters during the security proposal parsing process. For efficiency the mechanism 
should first scan the DNF security assertion for valid dynamic parameters. If valid values 
exist then parsing continues. If not then there are no changes relevant to the query and the 
process skips to the next DNF security assertions. 
2.2.2.1 Processing Description  
The following is the processing description  for the 
mechanism: 
  - Load current dynamic parameter values into a memory structure 
- Prior to parsing each DNF security proposal assertion, perform a 
preliminary scan to check for matching dynamic parameter values. 
If a match exists, continue with the parsing process. If not, advance 
to the next DNF assertion and return to primary parsing loop to 
process next available DNF security proposal assertion. 
 2.2.2.2 Pseudo  Code 
   The loading of dynamic parameter values into a memory 
structure utilizes the same routine discussed in section B1.3 in this chapter. The following 
functions are used to scan DNF security proposals for valid dynamic parameters. 
- Function: int dynamic_package_verification(char * buff_temp, int 
*buff_temp_counter, int buff_temp_end, struct dynamic_packet * 
package, int package_size, int szkn) – used to check dynamic parameters 
of DNF security proposal assertions. 
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  - Input: 
-  char * buff_temp – character string/buffer used to hold 
the isakmpd.conf/KeyNote file being parsed.   
- int *buff_temp_counter – index used for parsing the 
buff_temp.  
- int buff_temp_end – index to last character of buffer used 
to check for end-of- file (EOF) condition. 
- struct dynamic_packet * package – structure that holds 
current value of the dynamic parameters. 
- int package_size – size of array of dynamic_packet 
structure.     
   - int szkn – size of KeyNote file. 
  - Output: 
- int – used as a Boolean flag to indicate if DNF security 
proposal assertion dynamic parameters match. Return 0 
(false). Return 1 (true). 
  - Process:  
   - Loop through the array of the dynamic_packet structure: 
- Set temp index pointer to the beginning of the DNF 
security proposal assertion. 
      - Loop through DNF security proposal assertion: 
- Check for the first character match of dynamic 
parameter tag. Avoid checking beyond the buffer by 
using szkn to check for buffer size limit. 
- Call verify_parameter() function to check rest of 
dynamic_parameter tag and tag value. Returns a  
flag 0-dynamic parameter does not ma tch, 1-
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dynamic parameter matches , 2- rest of tag does not 
match  dynamic parameter tag. 
- If  0  (dynamic parameter does not match), then 
advance to the next DNF security proposal assertion 
by calling advance_to_end_DNF() function. 
Return to calling function. 
- If 1 (dynamic parameter matches) then set loop 
flag to exit DNF security proposal assertion loop 
and check for other dynamic parameter value 
matches. 
- If 2 (rest of tag does not match  dynamic 
parameter tag) then continue searching through 
DNF security proposal assertion loop. 
- Check for end of DNF security proposal assertion 
(check for “|”). If found, set exit flag from loop 
searching through DNF security proposal assertion. 
- Check for end-of- file (EOF) using szkn parameter. 
If found, set exit flag from loop searching through 
DNF security proposal assertion. 
- Advance buff_temp index counter. 
- Check to ensure that all dynamic parameter matches were 
found by comparing match counter to number of dynamic 
parameters in the array structure.  
- If  match counter and array size equal, return 1 
(true) to calling function. 
- Else advance buffer index to the next  DNF 
security proposal and return 0 (false).  
- Function: verify_parameter(char *buff_temp, int 
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*buff_temp_counter, char * sys_para_name, char * 
sys_para_value,int buff_temp_end) – checks input dynamic parameter 
tag value and if valid, compares tag value with given value. Returns three 
possible flag values. 
  - Input: 
   - char *buff_temp – string buffer used for KeyNote file. 
- int *buff_temp_counter  - index of pointer in buff_temp 
string buffer. 
   - char * sys_para_name – Dynamic parameter tag  
   - char * sys_para_value – Dynamic parameter tag value 
- int buff_temp_end – index of end-of-file (EOF) in 
buff_temp. 
  - Output: 
   - int – flag with the following three values: 
    - 0 (dynamic parameter tag value does not match)  
    -  1 (dynamic parameter tag value matches)  
    -  2 (dynamic tag does not match). 
  - Process: 
    - Compare dynamic parameter tags: 
- If match found : 
-Advance index pointer to the start of 
the tag value for further comparison.  
- Compare dynamic parameter tag 
values: 
- If match found, set return 
flag to 1. 
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       - Else (match not found) set 
        return flag to 0. 
     - Else set return flag to 2. 
    - Return flag. 
 
- Function: DNF_parse() – previously described above in section 
B.2.2.3.3,  required additional modifications to fully incorporate the 
dynamic parameter functionality.  The modifications are listed below: 
     - Prior to perform parsing, a call to  
   dynamic_package_verification() function is made 
    to determine if DNF security proposal assertion is  
   valid in accordance to current dynamic parameters.  
   If so parsing process continues. If not function  
   skips parsing process and returns to calling  
function (which will advance to the next DNF security 
proposal assertion if EOF is not reached). 
  Figure 5.4 provides a diagram of the process. 
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Logical Flow of Security Proposal
Parsing and Loading Process with 

































Figure 5.4. Logical Flow of Security Proposal Parsing and Loading Process with the 
Added Dynamic Parameter Interface. 
    
2.3 Additional Modifications to Further Fine -tune Security 
Proposal Loading Process 
 To ensure the security proposal loading process runs smoothly, further 
fine tuning mechanisms are required. First a default value loading mechanism must be 
inserted to ensure that proposals that have incomplete fields are filled with default values. 
Second, the possibility of having more than one identical security proposal must be 
appropriately handled. Duplicates may result from the added granularity in the  security 
proposal definitions caused by the inclusion  of dynamic parameter field attributes into 
KeyNote. 
2.3.1. Default Value Loading Mechanism 
  In the event of an incomplete security proposal, default values are 
required to fill the holes in the proposal.  This will help to avoid a runtime system crash 
and/or unstable secure communications.  To accomplish this, a default policy must be 
determined to handle all cases. The mechanism can then either utilize the whole default 
policy (in cases where insufficient policy is successfully parsed) or portions of the default 
policy (in cases where security policy is only partially defined). 
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 The following security policy was determined to be default policy. Note: the 
default setting is set to the least upper bound of all possible proposals providing the 
highest level of security. 
 - ESP protected IPsec protocol 
  - Encryption algorithm: AES 
 - Authentication Algorithm: SHA 
 - Utilizing perfect Forward Security 
 - Transportation Mode: Tunnel 
 - Life: 3600 seconds 
 - Group description: MODP_1024   
   2.3.1.1 Processing  Description  
   The following is the processing descriptionused to perform 
default loading: 
- After all parsing has been performed, check to see if any valid 
security proposals were created: 
   - If so call send_to_conf_set().  
-  Perform a validity check to ensure that enough security 
parameters exist for the security proposal to be valid:  
- If enough parameters exist, continue loading parameters with 
conf_set().  
  - If not, abort and call load_defaul_sa() to load  
  default security proposal. 
- While sending the security proposal parameters to conf_set(), 
check for empty required parameters. If any are found, fill them 
with the appropriate values from the default security proposal 
structure.   
  - Else load full default security proposal structure. 
2.3.1.2 Pseudo  Code 
The following is a description of the pseudo  code: 
 -  Function: struct suite_struct * initialize_default_suite_profile(struct 
  suite_struct *temp_ss) – initialize a default suite structure. 
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  - Input: 
   - struct suite_struct *temp_ss – pointer to structure to be 
    initialized and loaded with default parameters. 
  - Output: 
   - struct suite_struct * - pointer to structure to be returned. 
  - Process: 
   - create just enough memory as required and copy default 
    string values into structure character strings. 
   - return the pointer to the structure. 
- Function: void load_default_sa(int trans,char * section, char * 
title,struct suite_struct* default_suite_profile) – loads default security 
proposal into 
  conf_set(). 
  - Input: 
   - int trans – transaction number required for conf_set() 
- char * section – character string defined in calling 
function 
   - char * title – character string defined in calling function 
   - struct suite_struct* default_suite_profile – default 
    suite structure for the default security proposal  
   parameters. 
    - Output: 
   - void 
  - Process: 
   - Call conf_set() using the default values from the default 
suite structure to load default security proposal into 
memory. 
 - Modification to Function: send_to_conf_set(….,struct suite_struct * 
default_suite_profile) – modifications to send_to_conf previously 
described will be required to handle default loading of parameters for 
incomplete security 
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  proposals. 
  - Input: 
   - struct suite_struct * default_suite_profile – structure  
   for default security proposal. 
  - Output: void. 
  - Process: 
   - Test if no suites were defined. If so, abort and call  
   load_default_sa()  
- Call test_suite_structure() to verify that parsed security 
proposal(s) contains sufficient parameters to be used: 
   - If 0 (false) is returned, abort and call load_default_sa() 
- If 1 (true) is returned, continue. 
   - Loop through array of security proposals: 
    - Verify that each required parameter has a value. 
    - If not, use the default structure to load appropriate  
    default value. 
    - If so, continue. 
- Call conf_set() as needed to load security 
proposal. 
- Function: int test_suite_structure(struct suite_struct * 
suite_profile,int struct_size) – used to verify that suite structures contain 
sufficient parameter to be valid. 
  - Input:  
   - struct suite_struct * suite_profile – pointer to list of 
    security proposal structures. 
   - int struct_size – size of array list 
    - Output:  
   - int – Boolean return flag: 0 (false), 1 (true). 
  - Process: 
   - Loop through the list of security proposal structures. 
   - Test if suite_name is NULL. If so, abort and return false. 
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   - Test if protocol_id is NULL. If so, abort and return false. 
   - Test if transform_id is NULL. If so, abort and return false. 
   - Return true. 











Figure 5.6. Security Proposal Default Loading Process. 
 
2.3.2 Mechanism To Handle Duplicate Security Proposals 
  With the incorporation of dynamic parameters into the KeyNote 
structure, the possibility of duplicate security proposals being generated exists. To 
maintain an efficient security process, a mechanism must be implemented that ensures 
that duplicate security proposals are not generated. To efficiently manage this problem, 
the mechanism must be inserted into the parsing process so that it will skip ahead to the 
next DNF security proposal when  a duplicate security proposal is recognized.   
2.3.2.1. Processing Description  
 Once valid security proposals have been initially parsed 
from KeyNote, a function is required to eliminate duplicate security proposals.  
 The following is the processing description  of the 
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procedure used to check for and handle duplicate security proposals: 
- The process will utilize a list of parsed security proposals. As 
new security proposals are added, they must  be compared to the 
current members of the list to check for duplication.  
- In order to check for duplicates,  the parsed  security parameters 
must be checked.  The following are the security parameters used 
for the proof of concept in this research: 
   - ESP encryption algorithm 
   - ESP authentication algorithm 
   - AH authentication algorithm 
   - encapsulation mode 
   - group description 
   - life time 
   - Perfect Forward Security 
   - Key Length 
 
2.3.2.2. Pseudo  Code  
The following is a description of the pseudo  code: 
- Function: int duplicate_sa (struct suite_struct * suite_list, int 
suite_count,struct suite_struct *suite_profile) – compares the security 
proposals list with new security proposal for duplicates. 
  - Input:  
- struct suite_struct * suite_list – pointer to a security 
proposal list/array. 
-  int suite_count – number of security proposal in the 
array. 
- struct suite_struct *suite_profile – pointer to the new 
security proposal. 
  - Output:  
- Int – used as Boolean flag. Returns 1 (true) if new 
security proposal is a duplicate. Returns false if new 
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security proposal is not a duplicate.  
  - Process: 
- For loop is used to traverse the array of security 
proposals. 
- Each member of the array is compared with the new 
security proposal. The elements of the security proposal are 
compared via strcmp() utilizing the embedded if/else 
statements. For each strcmp test, a NULL test is performed 
first in the if statement to avoid a potential run-time error 
(caused by strcmp(NULL)). If NULL is found, the rest of 
the strcmp test is by-passed and the next if statement is 
executed. This continues until all security proposal 
conditions are checked and found to be identical or not. If 
the process successful passes all if nested statements,  true 
(1) is returned to the calling function indicating a the new 
security proposal is a duplicate. Otherwise, the function 
continues checking all security proposals in the array.  If 
the complete array has been checked without finding a 
duplicate, false (0) is returned to the calling function. The 
elements of the security proposal checked are: 
- AH Authentication algorithm (ah_auth_alg). 
    - Encryption algorithm (esp_enc_alg). 
- ESP Authentication algorithm (esp_auth_alg). 
- Encapsulation mode (encapsulation_mode). 
- Group description (group_desription). 
    - Life time title (life). 
    - Life time type (life_type). 
    - Life time duration (life_duration). 
    - Key length (key_length). 











Figure 5.7. Security Proposal Duplicate Checking Process. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter described  the implementation of  dynamic parameterization of 
IPsec, and  includes  the methodology, processing description, and pseudo code  
summaries for each  component. The goal was to modify the current OpenBSD  
implementation of IPsec to incorporate additional fields representing  dynamic 
parameters. The modification was performed in two phases: the first provided  
granularity to KeyNote/isakmpd.policy, and the second streamlined  and incorporated  
parameterization into  the isakmpd.conf-KeyNote  security proposal set loading process.  
Additional error-checking functionality was added for  security proposal duplicates, and 
for incomplete security proposals. These included the capability of loading default fields 
and proposals as required.  
To demonstrate the  work represented in this chapter, an interface  was required. 
In the following chapter I will discuss the design and implementation of a Java graphical 
user interface that enables users to run IPsec while invoking dynamic parameters to 
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VI. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) DEMOSTRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current implementation of OpenBSD IPsec requires a complex sequence of 
commands via command-line prompts to establish a secure connection between peers. In 
the event of a dynamic parameter change requiring the reconfiguration of IPsec, a series 
of commands and scripts are used. This procedure is very time intensive and requires 
considerable operating system and environmental knowledge.  Also, the process of 
demonstrating the results of this thesis was challenging without an available graphical 
user interface (GUI) representation. As a result, a more user- friendly graphical oriented 
interface was designed and developed to allow users, with limited knowledge of 
OpenBSD operating environment, to operate and observe the security mechanism and its 
dynamic parameterization.  
This chapter will review the existing command line environment and will describe 
the Graphical User Interface (GUI) to simplify IPsec control and use. 
B. COMMAND-LINE ENVIRONMENT 
The OpenBSD operating environment, true to its UNIX roots, is controlled via the 
command-line for most operations. The typical commands used for operating the IPsec 
mechanism are explained below. 
The following sections are referenced from 
 (http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq13.html). 
1. IPsec System Flush 
Prior to initializing and starting the IPsec process, all previous security 
associations and security rules need to be removed from all databases and cached 
memory. This will allow new security associations to be generated. This clean-up and 
refresh process is called a “flush”. The syntax for the command is : ipsecadm flush. 
2. Setting Up and Mounting the Security Policy Database 
Prior to starting the IPsec process, the Security Policy Database (SPD) must be 
populated with a cached version of the peer connection and security attributes. Otherwise 
the IPsec will not properly secure network communications in accordance with the 
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defined security policy. In order to do so, two tasks must be performed: setup IPsec flows 
and mount the security policy database in the kernel (SPD). Note, that the SPD is updated 
periodically, with new security association (SA) security parameter index (SPI) 
references after successful peer negotiations are completed. The information found in the 
SPD can be derived from iskampd.conf (IPsec configuration file) and iskampd.policy 
(KeyNote). Future research should be performed to design a method of automating the 
population of the security policy data base based on entries found in isakmpd.conf and 
iskampd.policy. (See Future Work Chapter Seven). Note that security associations (SA) 
may also be  entered manually. However, this was not within in the scope of my research 
and, therefore,  I did not include manual keying in the design or implementation. 
To set up IPsec flows, the following information is required: 
- Protocol type (ESP/AH). 
- Destination IP address. 
- Transport port (indicates the method of communication i.e. Finger or Telnet) . 
- Source IP Address. 
- Direction ( In or Out). 
- Policy Action (Deny, Allow, Require, Acquire). 
- SPI (Security Parameter Index) – will be generated and inputted after 
SA’s are created from peer negotiations. 
The syntax to create IPsec flows is as follows:   
ipsecadm flow -proto  -dst  -spi -transport -src -<direction> -<Policy Action>. 
Flows can be generated manually via the command prompt calls or via a script. 
Below is the example of the IPsec flow script used in the testing phase of this 
thesis. The script is executed by the following syntax: sh vpn_28_ah_a (name of 
the saved file listed below). 
 #!/bin/sh 
#Set-up flows for the two specific hosts 
#Use for defining applications FINGER and TELNET 
# ESP for TELNET 
# AH for FINGER 
# -dport for egress traffic 
# -sport for ingress traffic 
 








# Create the host-to-host flow 
# 
 
#egress flow for finger 
$ipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE_HOST -proto ah \ 
              -addr $LOCAL_HOST 255.255.255.255 $REMOTE_HOST 
255.255.255.255 \ 
       -transport tcp -dport 79 \ 
              -src $LOCAL_HOST -out -require 
 
#ingress flow for finger 
$ipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE_HOST -proto ah \ 
              -addr $REMOTE_HOST 255.255.255.255 $LOCAL_HOST 
255.255.255.255 \ 
        -transport tcp -sport 79 \ 
       -src $REMOTE_HOST -in -require 
 
#egress flow for telnet 
$ipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE_HOST -proto esp \ 
              -addr $LOCAL_HOST 255.255.255.255 $REMOTE_HOST 
255.255.255.255 \ 
       -transport tcp -dport 23 \ 
              -src $LOCAL_HOST -out -require 
 
#ingress flow for telnet 
$ipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE_HOST -proto esp \ 
              -addr $REMOTE_HOST 255.255.255.255 $LOCAL_HOST 
255.255.255.255 \ 
        -transport tcp -sport 23 \ 




Note: When creating scripts within the OpenBSD environment, it is 
important to remember the following steps: 
- chmod 755 <script name> is used to change the scripts default 
permissions and enable the script to be executed. 
 - ./<script name> is the syntax for executing a script. 
Once the IPsec flows have been created, they need to be mounted in the 
kernel (SPD). The following is the syntax required:  mount –t kernfs /kern 
/kern. 
3. IPsec Execution 
To start the IPsec mechanism there are numerous syntaxes possible, depending on 
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the level of debugging desired. Since OpenBSD’s IPsec is still considered to be under 
development, a debugging mode is very useful to examine functionality and operation. 
The following are typical syntaxes: 
  - isakmpd – starts the IPsec mechanism without any debugging functionality. 
- isakmpd -d -DA=99 –  starts the IPsec mechanism with full debugging 
functionality. All levels of deugging messages will be displayed.  
-  isakmpd -d -DA=99 -D1=<Debug Number> - starts the IPsec mechanism with 
limited debugging functionality depending on the given debug number. 
4. IPsec Connection Termination 
There are numerous methods for terminating an existing IPsec connection. One 
way involves using CTRL-C in the shell to terminate the IPsec process and established 
connections. A similar result can be achieved by simply killing the IPsec process from 
the process list. This is performed by using ps –al to locate IPsec process id and then 
using kill <id number> to terminate the process.  
A gentler approach allows the user to terminate security association connections 
individually. In case the user must track the SA connection number index. The typical 
progression of index numbers starts at zero and advances by one for both new 
connections and terminations. For example, the generation of an SA for telnet 
communication between two peers advances the index number to from zero to one. The 
generation of another SA for finger communication between two peers advances the 
index from one to two. The termination of an existing SA (either of the previously 
generated SAs) advances the index from two to three. The termination of the last SA 
advances the index from three to four. This process continues until the IPsec mechanism 
is halted, which resets the index to zero. 
5. Display SPD 
During development, it often becomes necessary to review the entries currently 
existing in the SPD. The command-line method to perform this is based on the UNIX 
netstat command, which displays routing tables. By refining the command  using 
switches, it is possible to display only the routing information specific to the IPsec 
mechanism. The syntax is as follows: netstat -rn -f encap 
The following is an example of netstat –rn –f encap between two peers for telnet 
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Source             Port  Destination        Port  Proto SA(Address/Proto/Type/Direction) 
131.120.8.95/32    23    131.120.8.91/32    0     6     131.120.8.95/50/require/in 
131.120.8.95/32    79    131.120.8.91/32    0     6     131.120.8.95/51/require/in 
131.120.8.91/32    0     131.120.8.95/32    23    6     131.120.8.95/50/require/out 
131.120.8.91/32    0     131.120.8.95/32    79    6     131.120.8.95/51/require/out 
 
 
6. Display SAD 
To ensure that the IPsec mechanism is working properly, it is often important to 
view the existing security associations (SA’s) stored in the SAD. The Open BSD IPsec 
mechanism stores the SPD in the following file: /kern/ipsec.  
When no SA’s exist in the file, the file contains the following entry:  
Hashmark: 31, policy entries: 0. 
When, for example, two SAs exist (one for telnet and the other for finger 
communication) the /kern/ipsec file contain the following: 
Hashmask: 31, policy entries: 4 
SPI = c322801f, Destination = 131.120.8.91, Sproto = 51 
 Established 55 seconds ago 
 Source = 131.120.8.95 
 Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
 Crypto ID: 4 
 xform = <IPsec AH> 
  Authentication = <HMAC-SHA1> 
 577 bytes processed by this SA 
 Expirations: 
  Hard expiration(1) in 3545 seconds 
  Soft expiration(1) in 3185 seconds 
SPI = bd35c96d, Destination = 131.120.8.95, Sproto = 51 
 Established 55 seconds ago 
 Source = 131.120.8.91 
 Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
 Crypto ID: 3 
 xform = <IPsec AH> 
  Authentication = <HMAC-SHA1> 
 446 bytes processed by this SA 
 Expirations: 
  Hard expiration(1) in 3545 seconds 
  Soft expiration(1) in 3185 seconds 
SPI = 9dde8de1, Destination = 131.120.8.91, Sproto = 50 
 Established 66 seconds ago 
 Source = 131.120.8.95 
 Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
136 
 Crypto ID: 2 
 xform = <IPsec ESP> 
  Encryption = <3DES> 
  Authentication = <HMAC-SHA1> 
 1248 bytes processed by this SA 
 Expirations: 
  Hard expiration(1) in 1134 seconds 
  Soft expiration(1) in 1014 seconds 
SPI = 95bb697c, Destination = 131.120.8.95, Sproto = 50 
 Established 66 seconds ago 
 Source = 131.120.8.91 
 Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
 Crypto ID: 1 
 xform = <IPsec ESP> 
  Encryption = <3DES> 
  Authentication = <HMAC-SHA1> 
 1408 bytes processed by this SA 
 Expirations: 
  Hard expiration(1) in 1134 seconds 
  Soft expiration(1) in 1014 seconds 
7. tcpdump 
To verify packet security (either through encryption and/or authentication), a 
packet sniffer tool can be used to enable the user to view exchanged packets. Tcpdump, 
a packet sniffer utility, is available on OpenBSD. Syntax for the command is: tcpdump – 
N host <peer A IP address> and <peer b IP address>. 
The –N switch is used to reduce Domain name qualification to make output more 
readable. The host switch to identify peer IP addresses.  
C. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) DEMONSTRATION 
For many users, the above sequence of commands may be overwhelming and 
time consuming. A graphical user interface (GUI) would reduce the level of confusion 
and make the IPsec mechanism easier to control and use. 
1. Goal 
The goal of the GUI demonstration is to provide users with an ability to 
demonstrate and use the IPsec mechanism, and fully understand the successes in research 
and development that have been performed in this thesis. 
2. Mechanism of Demonstration 
Java was chosen as the demo’s development language because of its inherent 
graphical representation ability. OpenBSD utilizes Kaffe’s version of Java. In order to 
incorporate the full graphical capability of Java, a “Kaffe-friendly” SWING package was 
installed. 
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2.1 Run Time Execution of Shell Commands from Parent Java Process 
The following section is referenced from 
(http://java.sun.com/products/jdk/1.2/docs/api/) 
The demonstration module requires the ability to execute command-line 
calls. This is accomplished by using the following: 
- Static declaration of an instance of RunTime: Static Runtime rt. Every 
Java application has a single instance of the RunTime class. This instance 
enables the application to execute command-line calls from within the 
application. It is important to note that an application cannot create its own 
instance of the RunTime class.   
- Use of an array of strings to construct a shell script command to enable 
run time execution. In order for a command to be executed properly, the 
command must be incorporated into a string. The following example 
demonstrates a run time execution of IPsec:  
private static Runtime  rt; 
String[] s2 = new String[3]; 
  s2[0]= new String(“/bin/sh”); 
  s2[1] = new String(“-c”); 
  s2[2] = new String(“ipsec”); 
  rt.exec(s2); 
- Some commands require switches and additional data in order to be 
executed properly. In this case, there are two methods that are used in this 
research: 
- Command, switches and additional data are included in one string. An 
example of this is the use of the ps command (i.e. ps -ax | grep isakmpd | 
grep -v grep). 
- Command, switches and additional data are broken into separate string in 
the array. An example is the use of tcpdump command (i.e. tcpdump -N 
131.120.8.95 and 131.120.8.9.  
- If certain commands require immediate execution without the parent 
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routine proceeding in command execution, waitFor method can be added 
to the exec(<string>) to pause the process until the shell commands 
completes its processing. The following example demonstrates a run time 
execution of the IPsec flush routine, which would require the parent 
process to wait until shell’s completion: 
private static Runtime  rt; 
String[] s2 = new String[3]; 
s2[0]= new String(“/bin/sh”); 
s2[1] = new String(“-c”); 
s2[2] = new String(“ipsecadm flush”); 
rt.exec(s2); 
- All runtime calls require try-catch blocks. 
- To receive the current instance of Runtime, the following is the syntax is 
used: rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
Execution of all command line calls must utilize the RunTime class and methods. 
  2.2 Graphical Demonstration Components 
The demo consists of the following components: 
- Welcome Screen – provides the user with a demo title screen 
with the ability to incorporate logos and credits as needed. 
- Main Menu Console – provides the user with all available IPsec 
choices, and dynamic parameter console: 
- Start IPsec – initiates the IPsec mechanism. 
- Display SADB – displays current valid security 
associations. 
- Display SPD – displays contents of the SPD. 
- Display TCPDUMP – provides the user with a Java 
JFrame console to view the output of tcpdump. 
- Dynamic Parameter console – provides user with a 
console to make a selection on the dynamic parameters. 
- Display Current Security Policy – provides the user 
with a console to view the current security policy in 
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isakmpd.policy/KeyNote. 
3.  Graphical Demonstration Components 
The following sections describe in some detail each of the above listed menu 
choices. The functionality of the demo is broken into the following java classes: 
- Demo.java – creates the demo welcome screen and the menu choices in 
a Java JFrame console. 
- Demo_Support_Functions.java – holds all functions used by other 
classes. 
- DP_Console.java – creates dynamic parameter selection interface in a 
Java JFrame console. 
- Ipsec_Info.java  – creates a continuously updated output of the security 
association database (SAD) in a formatted Java JFrame console. 
- Tcpdump.java – creates a continuously updated output of the network 
packets captured by tcpdump in Java JFrame console. 
- SPFK.java – creates a Java JFrame console for formatting and 
displaying the security policy found in iskampd.policy/KeyNote.  
- SPD.java - creates a Java JFrame console for formatting and displaying 
the security policy found in the security policy database (SPD).  
  3.1. demo.java 
This class creates and handles the generation of the welcome 
screen and menu choices. 
3.1.1  Design Approach  
The initial design was to incorporate both the OpenBSD and NPS 
CISR logos on the welcome screen. However, Kaffe’s java library did not properly 
support graphic logos (i.e. jpegs, bmp, .gif files).  Therefore, the welcome screen consists 
of large font title and a continue  button.  
The menu screen consists of buttons allowing the user to make 
selections using a mouse. The menu also has an error checking display, which provides 
the user with feedback as necessary. Further details on error checking will follow. 
3.1.2  Processing Description  
The following is the processing description for the method: 
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- A welcome Java JFrame console is generated with a title and a 
continue button linked to an action handler. 
- Once the user selects the continue  button, the welcome screen is 
erased and the menu choice JFrame is painted. 
- The menu JFrame provides the user with menu selections via 
buttons: 
- Start IPsec – starts the IPsec mechanism. If the IPsec 
mechanism is already started, an error message is displayed 
in the error message display panel. 
- Display SAD – starts the ipsecinfo.java thread to provide 
the user with a continuously updated display of the 
currently existing security associations (SA) via a JFRame. 
- Display SPD – creates a formatted display for the 
currently existing entries in the Security Policy Database 
(SPD) via a JFrame. 
- Display Security Policy – parses 
iskampd.policy/KeyNote and displays information in a 
JFrame. 
- Display TCPDUMP – starts the tcpdump mechanism 
and displays continuous output in a Java JFrame. 
-  Dynamic Parameters Interface – provides the user with 
a console to select and submit dynamic parameters. If the 
user does not select two dynamic parameters prior to 
pressing the submit button, an error message is displayed in 
the error display panel. 
3.1.3  Pseudo Code 
The following is a description of the pseudo code used in 
demo.java: 
- Class: demo extends JFrame. 
- Variables used throughout the class, are declared as 
Global. 
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- Method: demo class constructor – initializes the welcome 
screen. 
- Initializes title to JFrame 
- Adds a window adapter to handle window exiting 
by calling dispose(). 
- Creates welcome message and displays on JFrame. 
- Creates the error display pane l. 
- Creates continue button with an action handler. 
- Initialize menu choices JFrame title and buttons. 
- Method: initialize_connection_index_file() – resets 
connection index counter to zero in the connection index 
counter file. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, file output stream 
and a print stream to 
/root/demo/connection_number 
- Writes the number “0” to the file. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method: load_dp_file(String nm, String sl) – accepts 
network mode and security level inputs and writes them 
into the dynamic parameter file. 
-Input: 
- String nm- network mode value. 
- String sl – security level value. 
- Output: none. 
- Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
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catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, file output stream 
and a print stream to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_paramete
rs 
- Writes the network mode value and 
security level value to the file in the 
following format: 
network_mode = <network mode value> 
security_level = <security level value> 
- Closes the file. 
- Class: ContinueButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for the continue button on the welcome JFrame. 
- Process:  
- Erases existing components on the 
Welcome JFrame. 
- Creates menu title, menu choices buttons 
and displays on menu choices JFrame. 
-Adds an action handler to all buttons. 
- Class: SPButtonHandler implements ItemListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for the start IPsec  button. 
  - Process:  
- Checks to see if IPsec is currently running 
by calling demo_support_functions 
.daemon_running(). 
- If IPsec is already running then displays 
error message in error display panel and exit 
handler routine. 
- Otherwise, proceeds. 
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- Loads default network mode and security 
level values using load_dp_file(). 
- Flushes the IPsec mechanism of previous 
existing security associations (SA) by 
calling 
demo_support_functions.flush_ipsec(). 
- Mounts the kernel by calling 
demo_support_functions.mount_kern(). 
- Loads the SPD policy values by calling 
demo_support_functions.load_spd(). 
- Class: DSButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Display SAD  button. 
- Process: 
- Instantiates and start ipsecinfo.java thread.  
- Class: SPDButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Display SPD  button. 
- Process: 
- Instantiates SPD.java class to display the 
SPD.  
- Class: DSPButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Display Security Policy  button. 
- Process: 
- Instantiates SPFK.java class to display the 
Security Policy.  
- Class: TCPButtonHandler implements ActionLis tener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Display tcpdump button. 
- Process: 
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- Instantiates and start tcpdump.java thread.  
- Class: DPButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – 
action handler for Dynamic Parameterization button. 
- Process: 
- Instantiates dp_console.java.  
 
- Class: INFButtonHandler implements ActionListener– action 
handler for Stop IPsec button. 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Exit menu. 
- Process: 
- Checks to see if IPsec is currently running 
by calling demo_support_functions. 
daemon_running(). 
- If so, then tears down existing connections 
by calling demo_support_functions. 
Tear_down_connections() and stopS the 
IPsec mechanism by calling 
demo_support_functions.stop_ipsec(). 
- Class: EXButtonHandler implements ActionListener– action 
handler for Exit button. 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action 
handler for Exit menu. 
- Process: 
- Checks to see if IPsec is currently running 
by calling demo_support_functions. 
daemon_running(). 
- If so, then tears down existing connections 
by calling demo_support_functions. 
Tear_down_connections() and stopS the 
145 
IPsec mechanism by calling 
demo_support_functions.stop_ipsec(). 
- Exits the program. 
- Method: static main(String args) – the main program of 
the demo class. 
- Process: 
- Gets the current runtime instance by 
calling getRuntime(). 
   - Initiates the demo.java class.  
 
  3.2. demo_support_functions.java 
This class holds commonly used functions by the other classes. 
3.2.1  Design Approach  
In accordance with proper software engineering techniques, 
commonly used functions should be shared among classes. This will reduce the code 
length and make code management easier. This module includes those functions. 
3.2.2  Processing Description  
No processing description is necessary since this class performs no 
tasks other than hold all functions used by other classes. 
  3.2.3.  Pseudo Code 
The following is a description of the pseudo code for 
demo_support_functions.java:   
- Class: demo_support_functions. 
- Variables used throughout this class, are declared as 
Global. 
   - Method: demo_support_functions constructor.  
    - Process: 
- Gets the current instance of Runtime by 
calling Runtime.getRuntime() . 
- Method: flush_ipsec() – generates the run time 
commands to flush the IPsec mechanism. 
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- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section B 2.1 in this chapter for more 
details) of ipsecadm flush.  
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
- Method: load_spd() – generates the run time commands 
to load SPD with the security policy. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section 2.1  for more detail) of sh 
vpn28_ah_a..  
- Note that waitFor() is not required  since it 
is not necessary for the parent process to 
wait for its completion. 
- Method: mount_kern() – generates the run time 
commands to mount the kernel. 
    - Input: none. 
147 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section 2.1 for more detail) of sh 
/root/mount_kern. This is the name of a 
script that contains the following code:  
mount –t kernfs /kern /kern. 
- Note that waitFor() is not required since 
the it is not necessary for the parent process 
to wait for its completion. 
- Method: start_ipsec() – generates the run time commands 
to start the ipsec mechanism. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section B 2.1 in this chapter for more detail) 
of sh /root/mount_kern. This is the name 
of a script that contains the following code:  
ipsec. 
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
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- Method: stop_ipsec() – generates the run time commands 
to stop the IPsec mechanism. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer and file input stream 
to /var/run/isakmpd.pid. 
- Reads in the process id found in the file, 
which will be used to kill the IPsec process.  
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section 2.1  for more detail) of sh 
/root/mount_kern. This is the name of a 
script that contains the following code:  kill 
<process id> 
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method read_connection_index_file()– reads in the 
current value of the index counter from a file. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer and file input stream 
to /root/demo/connection_number. 
149 
- Reads in the current connection index 
counter and store in a global variable. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method: write_connection_index_file()– writes the 
current value of the index counter to a file. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, file output stream, 
and print stream to 
/root/demo/connection_number. 
- Writes the current connection index 
counter and store in a global variable. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method: daemon_running() – checks to see if the IPsec 
process is currently running. 
- Input: none. 
- Output:  
- Boolean result – true if IPsec is currently 
running and false otherwise. 
    - Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section 2.1 for more detail) of sh 
/root/mount_kern. This is the name of a 
script that contains the following code:  ps -
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ax | grep isakmpd | grep -v grep > 
daemon_search. This command performs a 
ps list (active processes) and then retrieves 
only the entries that have the word iskampd 
and pipes them into daemon_search file. 
The switch –v grep removes the call from 
the ps listing. 
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
- Creates a file pointer and file input stream 
to /root/demo/daemon_search 
- Retrieves the current file size of 
daemon_search.  
- If the file size is zero, the IPsec mechanism 
is not running. Returns false. 
- If the file size is greater then zero, the 
IPsec mechanism is running. Returns true.  
     - Closes the file. 
- Method: stop_tcpdump() – terminates tcpdump process. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- While loop – until Boolean terminate flag 
is set. 
- The following process is enclosed 
in a try-catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold 
the sequence of commands and tags 
required to perform a run time 
execution (see above section 2.1 for 
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more detail) of   ps -ax | grep 
tcpdump | grep -v grep | grep -v 
/bin/sh. This command performs a 
ps list (active processes) that contain 
the tcpdump title. 
- Note that waitFor() is required 
since it is necessary for the parent 
process to wait for its completion. 
- Creates a data stream pointer to the 
above created process stream.  
- Retrieves the process id of the 
running tcpdump process.  
- Creates an array of strings to hold 
the sequence of commands and tags 
required to perform a run time 
execution (see above section 2.1 for 
more detail) of   kill  + <tcpdump 
process>. This command kills the 
tcpdump process.  
- Note: during testing it was 
discovered that when executing the 
tcpdump script two tcpdump 
processes are created. Therefore this 
routine loops until all tcpdump 
process are killed. 
- When no more tcpdump processes 
are found, set Boolean flag to exit 
while loop. 
- Method: tear_down_connections() – tears down existing 
security association (SA) connections between peers. 
- Input: none. 
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- Output: none.  
    - Process: 
- Calculates existing connections (security 
association) by calling calc_connection(). 
- Retrieves the current connection index 
counter by calling 
read_connection_index_file(). 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- An assumption is made here that every SA 
consist of pair of two connections. 
- Divide number of current connections by 
two. 
- If the number of current connection equals 
zero, no security association currently exist. 
Exits method. 
- Otherwise, proceeds. 
- For-loop for the number of connections 
(divided by two). 
- Writes the connection number 
index to a file to terminate that 
connection by calling 
write_to_fifo(); 
- Checks to see if in the last iteration 
of the loop. If so, exit loop by using 
break. 
- Otherwise, increases connection 
index counter by one. 
- For information on connection 
counter index refer to section A.5 in 
this chapter. 
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- Creates a file pointer and file input stream 
to /var/run/isakmpd.pid 
- Reads in the process id for IPsec from 
isakmpd.pid.  
- Closes the file. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section B 2.1  for more detail) of kill –HUP 
<process id>. The –HUB switch causes a 
“hang-up” action to be performed on the 
connection and instructs it to reread the 
configuration files.  
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
- The current index counter is then written to 
the connection_number file by calling 
write_connection_index_file(). 
- Method: write_to_fifo()– uses the current connection 
index to write teardown instructions to the IPsec 
mechanism in /var/run/isakmpd.fifo file.  
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, file output stream, 
and print stream to /var/run/isakmpd.fifo. 
- Writes the current connection index 
counter and the tear down instruction by 
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writing t Connection-+ <connection 
number index >. 
- Connection number is stored in a global 
variable. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method: synchronized copy_kern_ipsec() – copies the 
file /kern/ipsec (file containing the current security 
associations) to /root/demo/tempipsec (file used to parse 
security associations). This method is synchronized to 
avoid a deadlock when various threads, created by the 
demo, compete for this function. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section B 2.1 in this chapter  for more detail) 
of cp /kern/ipsec /root/demo/tempipsec.  
- Note that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. 
- Method: calc_connection()– calculates the number of 
existing security associations (SA) by reading 
/root/demo/tempipsec and parsing the information to 
count existing SAs. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process:  
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- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer and file input stream 
to /root/demo/tempipsec 
- Performs a “thread sleep” operation for 
one second to allow time for other processes 
to use the /root/demo/tempipsec. 
- Reads in the contents of the file into a 
StringTokenizer buffer. 
- Closes the file. 
- While loop until all tokens have been 
parsed. 
- Advances to next token. 
- Compares token with “SPI”. If 
match found, increment 
connection_counter (a global 
variable). 
 3.3 dp_console.java 
This class generates the dynamic parameter selection interface with radio 
buttons for network mode and security level selection. The user must select a network 
mode and security level and press the submit button. The interface also has an exit 
button to close the window. 
3.3.1  Design Approach  
The dynamic parameter console provides the user with a selection 
mechanism for network mode and security level. Error checking is provided to ensure 
that the user selects one of each. To activate the selection, the user must press the submit 
button. Action handlers are provided to initiate the change in mode and level. 
  3.3.2.  Processing Description  
  The following is the processing description used to design and 
develop dp_console.java: 
- The dp_console is initialized as a JFrame with radio 
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buttons for network mode and security level selections.  
- The user must select a network mode and a security level 
before pressing the submit button. If not, an error message 
is displayed.  
- Once a valid selection has been made, the submit button 
generates a signal to the IPsec mechanism to reconfigure in 
accordance to the new network mode and security level. 
  3.3.3  Pseudo Code 
The following is a description of the dp_console class pseudo 
code: 
  - Class: dp_console extends JFrame 
- Most variables used throughout this class are Global. 
-  Method: dp_console() constructor – initializes the 
dynamic parameter selection interface. 
    - Process:  
  - Initializes interface JFrame. 
- Adds a window adapter to handle window 
exiting by calling dispose(). 
- Creates titles for network mode and 
security level. 
- Creates radio buttons with action handlers 
for network modes and security levels. 
- Creates Submit button with an action 
handler. 
- Creates an Exit button with an action 
handler to close the window by calling 
dispose(). 
- Initializes global network mode and 
security level variables. 
- Instantiates an instance of 
demo_support_functions . 
157 
- Gets the current Runtime instance by 
calling getRuntime(). 
- Method: start_dp_console() – makes the dp_console 
visible. 
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process:  
     - Sets the JFrame to visible. 
- Method: reset_error_panel() – clears error message 
panel. 
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process:  
- Erases any existing text in the error 
message panel.  
- Method: set_dynamic_parameters() – stores the value of 
the dynamic parameters in a file. 
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- Ensures that that old file is deleted by 
calling delete_file(). 
- Writes the current value of the dynamic 
parameters in a file by calling 
write_dynamic_parameters_file(). 
- Method: write_dynamic_parameters_file – writes the 
global current value of the dynamic parameters to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters.     
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
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- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, file output stream, 
and print stream to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_paramete
rs.    
- Writes the current value of the network 
mode and security level stored in global 
variables to the file. 
- Closes the file. 
- Method: print_dynamic_parameters_file() – displays 
the current value of network mode and security level to the 
system console for trouble shooting purposes. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, and file input stream 
to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_paramete
rs.    
- Reads in the current value of the network 
mode and security level and displays the 
values via the system console.  
- Closes the file. 
- Method: read_dynamic_parameters_file() –  reads in 
the value of network mode and security level from file:  
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters  and stores 
them in the class global variables respectively.   
- Input: none. 
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- Output: none. 
- Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer, and file input stream 
to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_paramete
rs.    
- Reads in the current value of the network 
mode and security level and stores them in 
their global variables respectively.  
- Closes the file. 
- Method: delete_file() – deletes existing dynamic 
parameter file. 
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_paramete
rs.    
     - The file is deleted. 
- Class: SLRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener – 
security level radio button action handler  
- Method: itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) 
 - Process:  
- Stores the selected value in the global 
security level variable. 
- Class: NMRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener – 
network mode radio button action handler  
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- Method: itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) 
 - Process:  
- Stores the selected value in the global 
network mode variable. 
- Class: SubmitButtonHandler implements ActionListener – 
submit button action handler. 
   - Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
    - Process: 
- Verifies that a network mode and secur ity 
level have been chosen.  
- If not, displays an error message and exit 
handler. 
     - Otherwise continues. 
- Saves the selected values to the dynamic 
parameter file by calling 
set_dynamic_parameters(). 
- Verifies if IPsec mechanism is already 
running by calling 
demo_support_functions.daemon_runnin
g().  
     - If so, performs the following: 
- Copies the SAD values to a temp 
file for processing (used for 
connection calculations) by calling 
demo_support_functions.copy_ker
n_ipsec(). 
- Tears down existing connections to 
reconfigure the IPsec mechanism 
with the new network mode and 




- Flushes existing security 
association values from the IPsec 
mechanism by calling 
demo_support_functions.flush_ips
ec(). 
- Loads the SPD for the 
reconfiguration phase by calling 
demo_support_functions.load_spd
(); 
- Otherwise, displays a message informing 
the user that the IPsec mechanism must be 
started first before the dynamic parameter 
can take effect. 
- Class: ExitButtonHandler implements ActionListener – Exit 
button action handler. 
   - Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
    - Process: 
     - Terminate the JFrame by calling dispose(). 
3.4  ipsecinfo.java 
The ipsecinfo class provides a display mechanism fo r the Security 
Association Database (SAD). The display needs to be updated constantly to reflect 
changes caused by the dynamic parameterization of the IPsec mechanism (i.e. shift in 
network mode and/or security level). 
3.4.1.  Design Approach  
The ipsecinfo class will provide the user with a constantly updated 
display of existing security associations in the SAD. The mechanism once started must 
continue until terminated. To ensure that the user can easily read the output, the display 
should adjust in size in accordance with the number of SA’s with the Security 
Association Database (SAD). 
3.4.2.  Processing Description  
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The following is the processing description used to design and 
develop the ipsecinfo class: 
- Once initiated, the process runs independently 
(thread) until terminated. 
- Reads in data from /kern/ipsec and parses it 
accordingly. 
- To reduce wasted CPU processing time, the file is 
only read and parsed if it has been updated since the 
last parsing operation, and is in its complete form. 
To accomplish this, the class can utilize file date- 
time-stamps and comparison algorithms with 
previously displayed SA’s. During the development 
phase, it was discovered that the IPsec mechanism 
writes to /kern/ipsec incrementally. Therefore it is 
important to make sure the whole file is present 
prior to parsing. An algorithm is required that will 
check the file for all mandatory fields prior to 
parsing.  
- Also, a temporary file needs to be copied to avoid 
permission issues when the IPsec mechanism wants 
to write to the file. 
- When the file is updated, the process of reading 
the file and parsing begins. 







- As the parsing occurs, text is added to the display 
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dynamically. 
- At the completion of the parsing, the number of 
SA’s is used to determine the size of the JFrame. 
- The JFrame will terminate once the exit button is 
pressed. 
  3.4.3. Pseudo Code  
  The following is a description of the pseudo code for 
ipsecinfo.java: 
  - Class: ipsecinfo extends Thread 
- Most variables used throughout this class are Global. 
- Method: ipsecinfo() – class constructor. 
 - Process: 
  - Initializes a JFrame. 
  - Initializes all display mechanisms. 
- Gets the current Runtime instance by 
calling getRuntime(). 
- Instantiates an instance of 
demo_support_functions  
- Adds a window adapter to handle window 
exiting by calling dispose(). 
- Method: frame_initialization() – initializes the JFrame to 
repaint new SAs. 
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process:  
- Removes existing components from the 
JFrame.  
     - Reinitializes all components. 
- Method: prelimanary_test(StringTokenizer st) – 
compares the current SA’s in the JFrame with the SA’s 
from the new file. This is performed to avoid unnecessary 
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painting and maintain good display resolution. 
    - Input:  
- StringTokenizer st – contents of the file to 
be verified. 
    - Output: 
- Boolean – True if string contains new 
SA’s. False otherwise. 
    - Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- While loop through all string tokens. 
- Compares SPI’s of existing SA’s 
with new SA’s. 
- If a new SA is found, returns true. 
- Otherwise, keep checking all SA’s  
      - Default return is false. 
- Method: String wait_for_full_copy(String record)– 
verifies that all the required tags exist in the string prior to 
parsing. If not, file is reread and the string is verified until 
all the tags are found. 
    - Input:  
- String record – contents of the file to be 
verified. 
    - Output: 
- String – String that contains all required 
fields. 
    - Process:  
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
-  While loop through all string tokens. 
- Tests to see if the following tokens 
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- If all tokens are found, the current string is 
returned. 
- Otherwise, the file is reread and the new 
string is verified. This process continues 
until all required fields are found. 
- Method: parse(String record) – parses the string into 
SA’s to be displayed on the JFrame.  
- Input:  
- String record – contains the file to be 
parsed. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a 
try-catch block. 
- Verifies that the new string contains new 
SA’s to paint by calling 
prelimanary_test().  
- If new strings are found, continues parsing. 
- Otherwise, exits the method. 
- Verifies that all fields are present in the 
string. If not, waits until all fields are 
present. This is performed by calling 
wait_for_full_copy(). 
- If all fields are present, continues parsing. 
- Uses the StringTokenizer to efficiently 
breakup the string for parsing. 
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- While loop through the string tokens. 
- Parses the string based on the 
following fields: 
- SPI – indicates new SA. 
Skip a line in JFrame. 
Increment SA counter. 
- Destination – used to 
retrieve the destination IP 
address. 
- Source – used to retrieve the 
source IP address. 
- xform – used to determine 
the method of protection (AH 
or ESP) 
- Encryption – used to 
determine the encryption 
algorithm. 
- Authentication – used to 
determine the authentication 
algorithm. 
- Sizes the JFrame according to the number 
of SA’s (SA counter). 
   - Method: run()  
    - Input: none. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- The following process is enclosed in a try-
catch block. 
- Creates a file pointer to 
/root/demo/tempipsec.    
- While loop continuously until thread is 
167 
terminated. 
- Compares old file date time stamp 
with new date time stamp. 
- If they do not match, reads in the 
file. 
- Creates a file input stream to 
/root/demo/tempipsec. 
- Reads in the file into a string.  
- Closes the file. 
- Initiates the parsing routine by 
calling parse(). 
 3.5  tcpdump.java 
A valuable tool in demonstrating the IPsec mechanism is tcpdump 
(described earlier in section B.8). It enables the user to view the actual packets being sent 
and received across the network. Specifically, it facilitates the demonstration of packets 
sent in the clear, encrypted and/or authenticated. This tool is typically used via the 
command prompt. The challenge was to filter the tool’s terminal console output through a 
Java JFrame to maintain a consistent graphical user interface approach. Again the goal is 
to limit the user’s required knowledge of the operating system and environment to utilize 
the security mechanism. 
3.5.1 Design Approach  
The goal of this class is to provide the user with graphical console 
display of tcpdump. By selecting the Display TCPDUMP option from the main menu, 
the tcpdump function starts and displays captured packet information in the generated 
Java JFrame. When the user closes the window, the tcpdump function terminates. 
3.5.2.  Processing Description  
   The following is the processing description for the tcpdump.java: 
- Once instantiated, the tcpdump class launches, creating a 
JFrame Java console window. 
- The JFrame should contain: 
- Console title. 
- Scrollable view pane (since a large amount of data 
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generated by tcpdump). 
- Exit button to close the JFrame and terminate 
tcpdump. 
3.5.3. Pseudo Code 
  The following is the pseudo code for tcpdump.java: 
- Class: tcpdump extends Thread. 
- Variables used throughout the class, are declared as 
Global. 
- Method: tcpdump() – constructor for the class. 
- Process:  
-  Instantiates demo_support_functions  
class. 
-  Gets the current Runtime instance by 
calling getRuntime().  
-  Initializes JFrame with title. 
-  Initializes scrollable text frame. 
-  Initializes exit button panel. 
-  Adds exit button action listener. 
-  Terminates tcpdump by calling 
demo_support_functions.stop_tcpdump(). 
-  Closes the JFrame by calling dispose(). 
-  Adds a window listener that closes JFrame 
by calling dispose(). 
-  Method:  start_tcpdump()  - executes tcpdump and 
creates a pipe to capture packet information. 
- Input: none. 
-  Output: none. 
-  Process: 
-  The following code is enclosed in a try 
catch block. 
-  Creates an array of strings to hold the 
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sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
section B 2.1 in this chapter for more detail) 
of tcpdump -N 131.120.8.95 and 
131.120.8.9.  
- Note1: that wait() is required since it is not 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion. If it did not wait, further 
processing in the class would be performed 
until the tcpdump process was terminated. 
- Note2: With tcpdump, all tags and values 
have to be added to the string array 
separately in order to execute properly 
(unlike other commands where switches and 
tag values can be included in the string array 
as one string).  
- Create an input stream to the tcpdump 
process. 
-  Method: repaint_frame() – this method generates the 
output from the piped stream and displays to the scrollable 
text area. 
-  Input: none. 
-  Output: none. 
-  Process:  
-  The following code is embedded in a try-
catch block. 
-  Initializes the buffer reader to buffer the 
piped information from tcpdump. 
-  While loop until JFrame  is closed (while 
(true)). 
-  Reads data from the buffered 
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reader pipe. 
-  Appends data to the scrollable 
pane. 
-  Pauses to allow for printed 
changes to be viewed on the screen.  
- Method: run() – run method for the thread. 
-  Process: 
-  Sets JFrame to visible. 
-  Executes tcpdump by calling 
start_tcpdump(). 
- Activates the display of tcpdump by 
calling repaint_frame(). 
3.6. SPD.java 
The purpose of this class is to provide a display for the security policy 
database (SPD). Since the database has a specific format, title tags are used to display the 
information. 
3.6.1. Design Approach  
The goal of this class is to retrieve the data stored in the security 
policy database (SPD) and display on screen in an easy to read format. A static 
implementation is used.  
3.6.2. Processing Description   
The following is the processing description used to design and 
develop SPD.java: 
- Initializes a JFrame with a view panel to display the SPD 
information and an exit button to terminate the window. 
- Executes the command to generate an output of the SPD 
(netstat -rn -f encap). 
- Creates a pipe to the process to retrieve the data. 
- Displays the data on the screen in an organized easy to 
read manner. 
  3.6.3 Pseudo Code 
  The following is a description of the pseudo code used in 
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SPD.java: 
  - Class: SPD 
- Variables used throughout the class, are declared as 
Global. 
   - Method: SPD() class constructor. 
-  Instantiates demo_support_functions class. 
-  Gets the current Runtime instance by calling 
getRuntime(). 
-  Initializes JFrame with a title. 
-  Initializes the view panel. 
-  Initialize the JPanels, JLabels and Text areas to be 
used in displaying SPD data. 
-  Initializes the exit button panel. 
-  Adds exit button action listener to close the 
JFrame by calling dispose(). 
-  Adds a window listener to close JFRame by 
calling dispose(). 
-  Retrieves data and display information in the 
JFrame by calling setTextFields(). 
- Method: String create_SPD_input() – this method 
retrieves the SPD data, stores it in a string and returns it to 
the calling function. 
- Input: none. 
- Output:  
 - String – contains the retrieved SPD data. 
- Process: 
-  The following code is enclosed in a try 
catch block. 
-  Creates an array of strings to hold the 
sequence of commands and tags required to 
perform a run time execution (see above 
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section B 2.1 in this chapter for more detail) 
of netstat -rn -f encap  
-  Note: that waitFor() is required since it is 
necessary for the parent process to wait for 
its completion.  
-  Creates an input stream to the netstat 
process. 
-  Retrieves the SPD data from the input 
stream by calling inputStream.read(). 
-  Casts the information as a string and 
returns to calling method. 
-  Method: setTextFields() – this method parses the input 
string and displays the SPD data in the JFrame. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
-  Process: 
- Casts the string as a String Tokenizer to 
parse data using blank space as the token 
delimiter. 
- Skips the header titles. 
- While loop through all string tokens. 
-  Parses the expected data 
appropriately into a display field. 
- Adjusts JFrame size according to 
number of rows in the SPD. 
  3.7  SPFK.java 
The purpose of the SPFK.java class is to provide the user with a 
more readable display of the KeyNote file. From previous discussions and examples 
provided in this thesis, it should be clear that KeyNote can become quite complex and 
difficult to read. SPFK.java attempts to provide the user with an easier representation of 
the defined security policy. 
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   3.7.1.  Design Approach  
The goal of this class is to translate KeyNote’s complex 
assertion format into an easy to understand syntax and display it in a JFrame. By using 
the DNF parser (NPS-CS-02-002, January 2002), the class can take advantage of the 
translated DNF form to perform a parsing routine. The display should be equipped with a 
scroll bar for long policies (quite typical when dealing with numerous security attributes 
and dynamic parameters). It should also have an exit button to close down the JFrame.  
   3.7.2.  Processing Description  
   The following is the processing description used to design 
and develop SPDK.java: 
- Once instantiated, a Java JFrame console window is 
created. 
- The JFrame contains: 
-  Console title. 
-  Scrollable view pane (since a large amount of policy 
data will typically be displayed). 
-  Exit button to close the JFrame and terminate SPDK. 
3.7.3.  Pseudo Code 
The following is a description of the pseudo code 
description for SPDK.java: 
- Class: SPFK() 
- Variables used throughout the class, are declared as 
Global. 
- Method: SPFK() – this method initializes the JFrame and 
reads in the security policy data from a file. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none. 
- Process: 
 - Initializes the JFrame with a title. 
 - Initializes the scrollable text area. 
- Initializes the exit button and add an action 
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handler that will terminate the JFrame by 
calling dispose(). 
- Retrieves the security policy from DNF 




storing data in a string. 
- The following code is embedded within a 
try-catch block. 
- Casts the string into a string tokenizer 
using ‘|’ as the delimiter. 
- While loop through all string tokens. 
- Parses through the code retrieving 
security proposals as tokens. 
- Further parses and appends 
KeyNote security attribute to the 
scrollable text area by calling 
showPolicy(). 
- Method: showPolicy(String policy) – takes input string 
(security proposal ), parses it into security attributes and 
dynamic parameters, and appends to the scrollable text 
area. 
- Input: 
 - String – security proposal to be parsed. 
- Output: none. 
- Process: 
 - Casts input string as string tokenizer. 
 - While loop through all string tokens. 
- Parses through the string, checking 
for expected tags and retrieving tag 
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values. 
- Displays tags and tag values on the 
scrollable text area by calling 
addText(). 
- Method: addText((String, String) – takes input strings 
and appends them to the scrollable text area. 
- Input: 
     - String – tag. 
     - String – tag value. 
    - Output: none. 
    - Process: 
- If tag value is not null, appends tag and tag 
value to the screen. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the process used to design and develop a graphical user 
interface demonstration to support the research performed in this thesis.  Prior to this 
demo, all commands and processes were managed from the command prompt. This 
proved to very cumbersome and difficult to understand for most users. By researching the 
mechanics involved in the “command-line” commands required to operate the IPsec 
mechanism, I was able to capture the functionality in a GUI. The GUI demo is easy to 
use and understand, and ultimately provides an efficient method to perform a 
demonstration on the completed research from this thesis. 
The following chapter is a future work discussion, outlining all the potential areas 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
177 
VII. RESEARCH SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
The research presented in this thesis, provides a proof of concept for 
parameterizing the IPsec mechanism, specifically OpenBSD 2.8 IPsec. The focus of this 
work and development was on a limited number of security parameters and a peer-to-peer 
network configuration. Although the design was generalized to handle all security 
parameters and network configurations, further implementation will be required to 
broaden the functionality of IPsec parameterization. Additionally, there are other features 
that require research, development and implementation to harness OpenBSD’s  IPsec’s 
capabilities. 
In this chapter, the research performed in this thesis will be summarized  and  the 
future areas of research in OpenBSD IPsec will be dicussed. 
B.  SUMMARY  OF RESEARCH PERFORMED IN THIS THESIS 
The goal of this thesis was to provide dynamic parameterization to security 
mechanisms, specifically OpenBSD 2.8 IPsec. To perform this, I studied  the concepts of 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS), Dynamic Parameters (Network Mode and Security 
Level), and IPsec architecture. I then designed a dynamic parameterization 
implementation specific to OpenBSD IPsec version 2.8. To further illustrate this 
mechanism, I designed and implemented a graphical user interface that enabled the user 
to view and understand the dynamism of the modified IPsec mechanism. Below is a brief 
summary of all the above-mentioned areas. 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) provides a mechanism to access security 
services in accordance with the user and system requirements, as constrained by  the 
network environment.  Security services can be defined in terms of user and system 
requirements, network environment factors and available resources.  Without a range of 
security options, a user is faced with the rigid and limited choice of “all or nothing”: 
security or no security.  Historically, security services have been static.  Quality of 
Security Service (QoSS) provides a more flexible approach to security services. Users 
can define requirements with finer granularity through QoSS.  The security resource 
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manager and/or the Security System can adjust security service accordingly to meet user 
requirements, system policy and network environment.  The utilization of security 
services comes with a cost to the user, application, system and resources.  Whether in the 
form bandwidth, algorithm processing time, overhead, or funds, the cost of security is a 
challenging concern to resource managers.  A costing framework is required to map 
system resource impact to enable a management system to effectively handle security 
service requests. 
Security services include non-repudiation, auditing, authentication, encryption, or 
intrusion detection. Each service will require a governing policy, consisting of specific 
rules of how and when to use the service. Therefore each network task associated with 
QoSS can be mapped to a vector of security requirements directly associated with the 
security services the task requires.    
Static security parameters limit a security system’s ability to adapt to changes. By 
introducing a dynamic mechanism, a system can modulate its security settings in 
accordance with changing conditions.  To illustrate the ability to adapt dynamic 
parameters to a QoSS framework we utilize the Network Mode and Security Level 
abstractions.  
Network Mode enables a network security policy to be classified according to  
environmental variables. Some example modes might be normal, impacted, and crisis. 
Normal mode could be defined as ordinary operating conditions with normal traffic load 
and no heightened threat conditions. Impacted mode may be defined when the 
network/system is experiencing high levels of traffic and therefore certain security 
selection may not be available due to efficiency constraints.  Crisis mode may be defined 
as a situation that requires the highest level of security or the lowest level dependent on 
the situation and policy.   
Security Levels are used to provide further granularity to Network Security 
Policies. By developing a security definition that encompasses general security settings 
required by users or applications, the complexity of security settings can be simplified to 
present to users selections such as High, Medium and Low.  High would require the 
strongest security settings. Medium would require moderate security settings. Low would 
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require weak to no security settings. A mapping of security settings to security levels 
providing a range of selection or specific values will be required to properly enforce the 
system security policy.  
As a proof of concept to demonstrate how a specific security mechanism can be 
modulated to provide different levels of security in accordance with QoSS, the OpenBSD 
IPSec security mechanism was used.  OpenBSD IPsec utilizes the KeyNote Trust 
Management component, which enables a security policy to be mapped to appropriate 
security attributes. When a initiator, peer A, wants to establish secure communication 
with a responder, peer B, the peer A’s IPsec mechanism proposes a set security proposals 
to peer B. Peer B’s IPsec mechanism verifies the proposal by performing a  query against 
their security policy in KeyNote. If a suitable security proposal is found, the 
communication handshake is completed, and the peers establish secure communication 
channels defined by security associations (SA).  
This process is static because when the network mode or security level change 
and an adjustment in security policy is required, then the IPsec mechanism must be halted 
and manual adjustments are required.  This is not practical or efficient. An automated 
technique is required to modulate IPSec's variant security attributes according to network 
mode and security level selections, enabling the security mechanism to dynamically 
adjust security parameters and settings in accordance with policy.  
The current process also maintains security policy definitions in numerous areas, 
resulting in management challenges. During (re)configuration phase in IPsec, two 
separate files are read to load the security proposal set. Thus, another goal of this thesis 
was to streamline the security policy loading process by maintaining the security policy 
in only one area/file (KeyNote). 
1. Research Conclusions  
To accomplish the goals stated above, the following modifications to the existing 
IPsec implementation were required. The first modification was to provide granularity to 
KeyNote, and parameterize and improve isakmpd.conf / isakmpd.policy (KeyNote) 
security proposal range loading process. Providing granularity to KeyNote required an in-
depth review of the KeyNote structure including the Boolean query mechanism. The 
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research proved to be successful in logically inserting the dynamic parameter values 
according to policy definition, therefore, providing finer granularity to Boolean query 
mechanism. Other modifications included the changes to the configuration process to 
enable security proposal ranges to be retrieved from KeyNote. All modifications were 
successful in providing the IPsec mechanism with the ability to adjust security attributes 
according to dynamic parameters and security policy. 
OpenBSD IPsec currently requires a complex sequence of commands via 
command-line commands to establish secure connection between peers.  The process of 
establishing an IPsec connection with a peer requires considerable knowledge of the 
operating environment. The command-line procedure also provides challenges in 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the parameterization of IPsec mechanism. As a result, 
a user- friendly graphical oriented interface was design and developed to allow users, with 
limited knowledge of OpenBSD operating environment, to observe the security 
mechanism and its dynamic parameterization. 
C. FUTURE  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ON 
PARAMETERIZATION 
To further develop the functionality of the parameterization of the 
OpenBSD IPsec mechanism, additional design and implementation is required. Listed 
below are the major items that will require future attention. 
1.  Ability to Handle all Possible Security Parameter Combinations  
The research performed was limited in the range of possible security parameters. 
The goal instead was to achieve a proof of concept to pave the path for a fully functional 
parameterization of IPsec.  To achieve full functionality,  research will be required to 
ensure all possible combinations of security attributes are taken into consideration in the 
actual implementation. Examples of further implementation involve incorporating all 
possible encryption and authentication algorithms, algorithm key length, and time-of-day 
parameters. Additional development will be required to incorporate inequality definitions 
( <, >, != )  in the security policy management mechanism.  For example, esp_enc_alg > 
DES which would imply 3DES and AES. 
2.  Improving Dynamic Parameter Loading by Utilizing “Policy-
Callback” Embedded Functionality 
The original implementation of OpenBSD IPsec utilizes a “policy_callback” 
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routine to load security proposals into a structure for KeyNote query operation. The 
procedure is very efficient because all parameters are loaded into the KeyNote query 
structure at once. During the implementation portion of this thesis, all attempts to utilize 
the existing “policy-callback” mechanism to load dynamic parameters were unsuccessful. 
The work-around was to load one dynamic parameter at a time.  
3.  Eliminate the Need for isakmpd.conf Entirely 
This thesis involved removing isakmpd.conf security parameters specific to the 
ISAKMP Phase II quick mode. However, main/aggressive mode information and 
additional peer information (IP addresses, Net Mask, Gateway Address) still remain 
resident in isakmpd.conf. The challenge is that the current configuration of KeyNote 
does not support non-security specific parameters. Further research and development is 
required to evaluate the elimination of isakmd.conf. 
4. Develop a Parsing Mechanism to Retrieve the Initial Security Policy 
Database Entries 
A parsing routine similar to one developed in this research is required to load the 
appropriate security rules into the Security Policy Database (SPD). The challenge will be 
to provide an intelligent parsing routine that can read a security policy file 
(KeyNote/isakmpd.policy) and generate rules for the SPD. Currently, security policy 
relevant rules are loaded independent of the parameterization mechanism by a script that 
loads predefined policy rules into the SPD (see Chapter VI). 
D.   HARNESSING OPENBSD’S IPSEC MECHANISM CAPABILITIES 
OpenBSD’s IPsec mechanism provides a wide range of flexible options involving 
network security. This research was limited due to the objectives and the required focus 
areas. Additional research is required to explore the other possible configurations and 
application of the OpenBSD IPsec.   
1.  Behavior with all Possible Combinations of QoSS and non-QoSS 
Peers  
The research performed in this thesis was limited to a model involving a Quality 
Of Security Service (QoSS) aware initiator and a non-QoSS aware respondent. To 
account for the mechanism’s full capability and functionality, other combinations need to 
be researched and tested. Specifically, non-QoSS aware initiator and a QoSS responder, 
and both initiator and responder are QoSS aware. 
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2.  Per-User / Per-Application Relationship Capability  
The testing and implementation performed within this research involved two 
specific applications: Telnet and Finger from a root access. In reality, an implemented 
IPsec mechanism would be required to support a broader range of applications and 
authorization levels of users.  Some typical applications might include e-mail, video-
conferencing, Internet Remote Chat (IRC), and Web Portals. Further design, development 
and testing needs to be performed, to support  these other applications with the IPsec 
mechanism. 
3. Explore Proposal Caching Issues 
Further research and testing is required to determine the security mechanism’s 
QoSS behavior concerning the change of non-QoSS parameters. An example is the 
expiration of a valid Security Association (SA) without a change to Network 
Mode/Security Level.  Will the SA expiration trigger a reconfiguration? Other examples 
include testing behavior resulting from the non-QoSS initiators, QoSS aware initiators 
and responders (both capable of initiated changes to QoSS and non-QoSS parameters), 
and more frequent negotiations (resulting from shorter lifetimes).  
4.   Security Policy Editor 
The current syntax and the potential complexity of QoSS and security parameter 
combinations in KeyNote pose a challenge in usability for the human user interface 
component used by security policy managers and implementers. A security policy editor 
that translates the KeyNote syntax into an “easy-to-read” format is required. This editor 
would enable an authorized user, to view and edit a security policy using a graphical user 
interface. 
5.    Additional Network Configurations  
IPsec is designed to be able to handle numerous network configurations 
(discussed in the IPsec Architecture Chapter III section B.2.3). The research and 
development performed and discussed in this thesis is based on the peer-to-peer 
configuration. Therefore, further design, implementation, and testing will be required to 
ensure proper functionality of IPsec mechanism and the parameterization functionality of 
security parameters. Specifically additional research is required for Gateway-to-Gateway, 
Gateway to IPsec-enabled hosts, and hosts behind IPsec ga teways. 
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6.   IPV6 Addresses 
In order to account for IPV6 addresses, further research, development and testing 
will be required. 
7.   Distribution of KeyNote Policies 
The ability to securely distribute keying information to peers in a Public Key 
Infrastructure( PKI) environment is a crucial and challenging element of a secure network 
environment. Likewise, the ability to securely distribute KeyNote policy to participating 
peers or gateways is crucial to IPsec architecture. Research is required to explore 
potential mechanisms to enable this functionality.   
8.   KeyNote Protection 
Ensuring that only authorized users have access to and the ability to modify 
KeyNote, is essential  to the security policy mechanism of IPsec. An identification and 
authentication mechanism is required to ensure only authorized users have access to 
sensitive IPsec files and applications. A range of access may also be desired. For 
example, a user may have read-only permission to the security policy file, while the 
security manager will have read-write permissions. 
9.   Secure Dissemination & Storage of QoSS Parameters' Values 
To effectively employ QoSS parameters, a method of secure storage and 
dissemination across a network is required. Vulnerabilities and threats posed by Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks, and packet capturing and modification need to be examined. 
10.  IPsec Costing Issues 
As with any security system, methods for calculating system resource costs 
related to IPsec choices and connections are required.  To fully implement the QoSS 
model, system managers need measurement tools to be able to gauge resource costs per 
security requirement to properly govern the IPsec mechanism. 
11.   Graphical User Interface 
The current implementation of OpenBSD IPsec is command-line driven. To 
provide for easier human computer interaction , a graphical user interface (GUI) that is 




E.  CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I summarized  the research performed on the paramertization of 
IPsec in this thesis and discussed future areas on research in OpenBSD IPsec. 
185 
APPENDIX A.  CONF.C 
The following is code added to /usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/conf.c: 
 
/******************************************************************** 
*          
* Structure: suite_struct      
*          
*    This structure is used to stored security proposal 




struct suite_struct { 
 
    char * suite_name; 
    char * suite_protocol; 
    char * suite_transform; 
    char * protocol_id; 
    char * transform_id; 
    char * encapsulation_mode; 
    char * group_description; 
    char * authentication_algorithm; 
    char * life; 
    char * life_type; 
    char * life_duration; 
    char * esp;  
    char * ah; 
    char * esp_enc_alg; 
    char * esp_auth_alg; 
    char * ah_auth_alg; 
    char * pfs; 
    char * key_length; 





*          
* Structure: dynamic_packet      
*          
*    This structure is used to stored dynamic parameter 
*  data, including dynamic parameter name, assignment symbol 




struct dynamic_packet { 
 
  char* title; 
  char* symbol; 




// The following are function prototypes added to conf.c to implement 
// dynamic parameterization. 
 
void conf_kn_parse(int); 
int add_para_values(char**,struct suite_struct *,struct suite_struct*, 
int); 
char * convert_to_uppercase(char*); 
void parse_selection_parameter(char*,int*,char*,char*,char*,int*, 
int,int * ); 
void parse_ipsec_parameter(char*,int*,char*,char**,int*); 
int DNF_parse(char **, char*, int*, int, struct suite_struct *, struct 





int test_suite_structure(struct suite_struct *, int );  
void send_to_conf_set(int,char*,char*,struct suite_struct *,int, struct 
suite_struct *); 
void load_default_sa(); 
void test_print_suite_list(struct suite_struct *, int); 
void test_conf_get_str(); 
int duplicate_sa (struct suite_struct *, int,struct suite_struct *); 
void test_print_dynamic_packet(struct dynamic_packet *, int); 
void test_print_suite_struct(struct suite_struct *); 
int dynamic_package_verification(char *, int *, int, struct 
dynamic_packet *, int,int); 
struct suite_struct * struct_initialization(struct suite_struct *); 
struct suite_struct * initialize_default_suite_profile(struct 
suite_struct *); 
struct dynamic_packet* package_dynamic_parameters(int *); 
int verify_parameter(char *, int *, char *, char *,int); 






* Function: package_dynamic_parameters()This function reads a file that 
*  contains the current inputs of dynamic parameters such as 
*  Network Mode and Security Level. Initializes an array of 
*  structures that will dynamically grow as required. Loads the 
*  file input into the array of struct. 
* 
*   - Input:  
* - int * package_counter - used to determine the size of the 
*  struct array 
* 
*   
*   - Output:  
* - struct dynamic_packet * - pointer to an array of 









   
  int array_size = 10 ;  // chosen as average case for struct size  
 
  struct dynamic_packet * package;  // pointer to array of struct 
 
  // strings used to read from file 
  char * title = (char*)malloc(20); 
  char * symbol= (char*)malloc(20); 
  char * value = (char*)malloc(20); 
 
  // used for file IO 
  FILE * pifp; 
  int file_status=0; 
 
  (*package_counter) = 0;  // initialize the array size to zero 
 
  // initialize the pointer to an array size of array_size 
 
  package = (struct dynamic_packet *)malloc(sizeof(struct 
dynamic_packet)*array_size); 
   
  // open file to read in dynamic parameters  
  // check for errors in openning the file 
  
  if ( (pifp = fopen("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters", 
"r"))== NULL) { 
    // error openning the file 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ERROR OPENNING FILE %d",errno)); 
 
  } 
  else  {  // file was successfully openned 
 
    // do-while loop to read in data until EOF reached 
 
    do { 
 
      // read in from the file expecting the following syntax: 
      //               title  symbol  value  
 
      file_status = fscanf(pifp, "%s%s%s", title, symbol, value); 
 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Just read from file....","")); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Title: %s Symbol: %s Value: %s",   
  title,  symbol, value)); 
 
      // check for reading errors... 
 
      if (file_status == 0) { 
 
 // reading error occurred 
 
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "error reading from the 
file....","")); 
      } 
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      // check for EOF... 
 
      else if (file_status == EOF) { 
 
 // EOF reached 
  
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "end of file....","")); 
      } 
 
      // otherwise... read operation successful 
 
      else { 
 
 // create new struct space for dynamic parameters and 
 // assign values from file to struct 
 
 package[(*package_counter)].title = strdup(title); 
 package[(*package_counter)].symbol = strdup(symbol); 
 package[(*package_counter)].value = strdup(value); 
      
 // increment package counter array of struct 
 (*package_counter)++; 
 
 // dynamic resize array if more memory is required 
 
 if ((*package_counter) == array_size) { 
 
   array_size+=10;  // grow array in increments of 10 
 
   package = (struct dynamic_packet 
*)realloc(package,sizeof(struct dynamic_packet)*array_size); 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  while ((file_status != 0) && (file_status !=EOF)); 
 
  fclose(pifp); // close file 
 
  test_print_dynamic_packet(package,*package_counter); 
   
  } 
 
  // free memory 
  free(title); 
  free(symbol); 
  free(value); 
  // free(pifp); 
 









* test_print_dynamic_packet()-This function displays all information in 
*  the array of dynamic_packet struct.  
* 
* - input: 
*     - struct dynamic_packet * packet - array of struct 
*     - int  package_counter - used for the size of the struct 
*   array 





void test_print_dynamic_packet(struct dynamic_packet *packet, int 
packet_counter){ 
 
  int counter; 
 
  for (counter = 0; counter < packet_counter; counter++) { 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Packet: %i",counter)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Title: %s",packet[counter].title)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Symbol: %s ",packet[counter].symbol)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Value: %s",packet[counter].value)); 
 








* Function: conf_kn_parse()function called to activate the DNF 
security proposal   
*  parsing mechanism.  
* 
* 
* - Input: 
*     - int trans - used for the transaction number for 
*   sequential processing. 




void conf_kn_parse(int trans) { 
   
  char *suite_title; // used for default phase 2 title 
  char *suite;       // used to hold constructed suites 
  char *namekn;      // used to hold name of keynote file 
  char *buffer_kn;   // used to hold contents of keynote file 
  char *buff_temp;   // used to traverse keynote file 
  
  struct stat stkn;  // used to determine the size of the file 
  off_t szkn;        
  int fdkn;  
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  int not_done=1; 
  int not_found=1; 
  char * section; 
  int buff_temp_counter=0; 
  int buff_temp_end; 
  int SA_counter = 0; 
  int suite_list_size = 2; 
 
  struct dynamic_packet *package; 
  int package_size=0; 
 
  struct suite_struct * suite_list; 
  struct suite_struct * default_suite_profile; 
 
  // Initialize the array of structures used to hold parsed security      
  // proposal information. 
 
  suite_list = (struct suite_struct *)malloc(sizeof(struct 
suite_struct)*suite_list_size);   
   
  // Initalizing the default suite structure 
 
  default_suite_profile = (struct suite_struct*) malloc (sizeof(struct 
suite_struct));  
   
  section = (char*) malloc (100); 
  suite_title = (char *) malloc(100); 
  suite = NULL; //(char *) malloc(100); 
  namekn = (char *) malloc(100); 
  
  default_suite_profile = 
initialize_default_suite_profile(default_suite_profile); 
 
  suite_title = strcpy (suite_title,"Default-Phase-2-Suite"); 
 
  namekn = strcpy (namekn,"/etc/isakmpd/keynotednffinal.policy"); 
  
  // call function to retireve dynamic_parameters and load them into 
struct 
 
  package =  package_dynamic_parameters(&package_size); 
 
  if ( (fdkn = open(namekn, O_RDONLY, 0))== -1) { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ERROR OPENNING FILE %d",errno)); 
 
  } 
  else { 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "OPENED KEYNOTE FILE","")); 
 
  } 
 
  if (stat (namekn, &stkn) == -1) 
    { 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY,40, "STAT FAILED %s", namekn)); 
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    } 
 
  // allocate memory for file buffer 
  szkn = stkn.st_size; 
  buffer_kn = (char *) malloc(szkn); 
  buff_temp = (char*) malloc(szkn); 
 
  // read in file into buffer 
  if (read(fdkn, buffer_kn, szkn) !=szkn) { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ERROR READING KEYNOTE FILE","")); 
 
  } 
   
  close(fdkn); 
 
  buff_temp = buffer_kn; 
  buff_temp_end = szkn-1;  
         
  not_found=1; 
 
  // search thru and find the next open parathesis 
 
  while (buff_temp_counter <= buff_temp_end) { 
 
   
    if (buff_temp[buff_temp_counter] == '(') {  
  
  
 if (DNF_parse(&suite, buff_temp, &buff_temp_counter, szkn, 
&suite_list[SA_counter], package,package_size, suite_list, SA_counter) 
== 1) { 
 
    
   SA_counter++; 
    




 else { 
  not_found = 0; 
 }// end else 
       
      } // end of if 
     
      buff_temp_counter++; 
   
      if (buff_temp_counter <= buff_temp_end) { 
 
 if (SA_counter == suite_list_size) { 
 
   suite_list_size+=2;  // grow array in increments of 2 
 
   test_print_suite_list(suite_list,SA_counter); 
 




    
 } 
      } 
       
  }// end while 
      
    // if no matches found... 
 
    if (SA_counter == 0) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40,"No matches were found.... No SA's 
Loaded from Keynote DNF","")); 
       LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Calling Load Default SA function..")); 
       load_default_sa(default_suite_profile); 
    } 
 
    else { // matches found... 
  
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40,"%i Matches were found.... Matching SA's 
Loaded from Keynote DNF",SA_counter)); 
 
       
      test_print_suite_list(suite_list,SA_counter); 
     
      send_to_conf_set(trans,suite_title,suite,suite_list,SA_counter, 
default_suite_profile); 
 
      test_conf_get_str(); 
    } 
 





* Function: test_print_suite_list()- displays all security 
*   proposals that currently exist in the array of 
*   structures. This function can be used for error checking 
*   and debugging.  
* - Input: 
*     - struct suite_struct *suite_list – pointer to the array 
*   of security proposals. 
*   - int struct_size – number of current structures in the 
*   array. 
* 






void test_print_suite_list(struct suite_struct *suite_list, int 
struct_size) { 
 
  int count = 0; 
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  LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 40,"TEST PRINT SUITE LIST","")); 
  LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 40,"Struct Size:%i ",struct_size)); 
             
   
  for (count = 0; count < struct_size; count++) { 
 
    LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY,40,"STRUCT NODE: %i",count)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE 
NAME:%s",suite_list[count].suite_name)); 
    //LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE NAME 
size:%i",strlen(suite_list[count].suite_name))); 
    
    //LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY,40,"Pointer address of suite_nanme: 
%i",suite_list[count].suite_name)); 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE 
PROTOCOL:%s",suite_list[count].suite_protocol)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE 
TRANSFORM:%s",suite_list[count].suite_transform)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE TRANSFORM 
ID:%s",suite_list[count].transform_id)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE ENCAPSULATION 
MODE:%s",suite_list[count].encapsulation_mode)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE GROUP 
DESCRIPTION:%s",suite_list[count].group_description)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE AUTHENTICATION 
ALGORITHM:%s",suite_list[count].authentication_algorithm)); 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE LIFE:%s",suite_list[count].life)); 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "LIFE 
TYPE:%s",suite_list[count].life_type)); 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "LIFE 
DURATION:%s",suite_list[count].life_duration)); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "COPY 
FLAG:%i",suite_list[count].copy_flag)); 
      





* Function: test_print_suite_struct()- displays security 
*   proposal info in a suite structure. This function can be 
*  used for error checking and debugging.  
* - Input: 
*     - struct suite_struct *suite_list – pointer to the  
*   security proposal structure. 
* 





void test_print_suite_struct(struct suite_struct *suite) { 
 
  LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 40,"TEST PRINT SUITE STRUCT","")); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE NAME:%s",suite->suite_name)); 
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  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE PROTOCOL:%s",suite-
>suite_protocol)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE TRANSFORM:%s",suite-
>suite_transform)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE TRANSFORM ID:%s",suite-
>transform_id)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE ENCAPSULATION MODE:%s",suite-
>encapsulation_mode)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE GROUP DESCRIPTION:%s",suite-
>group_description)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM:%s",suite-
>authentication_algorithm)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "SUITE LIFE:%s",suite->life)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "LIFE TYPE:%s",suite->life_type)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "LIFE DURATION:%s",suite->life_duration)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "COPY FLAG:%i",suite->copy_flag)); 







int test_suite_structure(struct suite_struct * suite_profile,int 
struct_size) { 
  int result = 1; 
  int count; 
  for (count = 0; count < struct_size; count++) { 
 
    if (suite_profile[count].copy_flag == 1) { 
 




    } 
 
    else { 
  
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "copy flag not set...performing suit 
test","")); 
 
       
      if (suite_profile[count].suite_name == NULL) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "suite_name is empty on struct #: 
%i",count)); 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "entry required... suite_struct test 
failed..","")); 
       return(0); 
     } 
 
      if (suite_profile[count].protocol_id == NULL) { 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "protocol_id is empty on struct #: 
%i",count)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "entry required... suite_struct test 
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failed..","")); 
       return(0); 
 
      } 
 
      if (suite_profile[count].transform_id == NULL) { 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "transform_id is empty on struct #: 
%i",count)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "entry required... suite_struct test 
failed..","")); 
       return(0); 
 
      } 
 
   
 
 
  } 
  } 









*   Function: int duplicate_sa ()– compares the security proposals 
*  list with new security proposal for duplicates. 
* - Input:  
*  - struct suite_struct * suite_list – pointer to a security 
*  proposal list/array. 
*  -  int suite_count – number of security proposal in the  
*  array. 
*  - struct suite_struct *suite_profile – pointer to the new  
*  security proposal. 
* - Output:  
*  - Int – used as Boolean flag. Returns 1 (true) if new 
*   security proposal is a duplicate. Returns false if new  




int duplicate_sa (struct suite_struct * suite_list, int 
suite_count,struct suite_struct *suite_profile) { 
  int count1=0; 
  int true = 1; 
  int false = 0; 
 
  for (count1 = 0; count1 < suite_count; count1++) { 
 
 
     if (((suite_list[count1].ah_auth_alg==NULL) && (suite_profile-







        if (((suite_list[count1].esp_auth_alg==NULL) && (suite_profile-




    
 
 if (((suite_list[count1].esp_enc_alg==NULL) && (suite_profile-
>esp_enc_alg==NULL)) || (((suite_list[count1].esp_enc_alg!=NULL) && 
(suite_profile->esp_enc_alg!=NULL)) && 
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].esp_enc_alg,suite_profile->esp_enc_alg) == 
0))) {  
 
   
    if (((suite_list[count1].encapsulation_mode==NULL) && 
(suite_profile->encapsulation_mode==NULL)) || 
(((suite_list[count1].encapsulation_mode!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>encapsulation_mode!=NULL)) &&  
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].encapsulation_mode,suite_profile-
>encapsulation_mode) == 0))) {  
 
   
      if (((suite_list[count1].group_description==NULL) && 
(suite_profile->group_description==NULL)) || 
(((suite_list[count1].group_description!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>group_description!=NULL))  && 
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].group_description,suite_profile-
>group_description) == 0))) {  
 
 
     if (((suite_list[count1].life==NULL) && (suite_profile-
>life==NULL)) || (((suite_list[count1].life!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>life!=NULL)) && (strcmp(suite_list[count1].life,suite_profile->life) 
== 0))) {  
     
 
       if (((suite_list[count1].life_type==NULL) && 
(suite_profile->life_type==NULL)) || 
(((suite_list[count1].life_type!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>life_type!=NULL))  && 
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].life_type,suite_profile->life_type) == 0))) 
{  
 
  if (((suite_list[count1].life_duration==NULL) && 
(suite_profile->life_duration==NULL)) || 
(((suite_list[count1].life_duration!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>life_duration!=NULL))  && 
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].life_duration,suite_profile->life_duration) 
== 0))) {    
   
    if (((suite_list[count1].pfs==NULL) && (suite_profile-
>pfs==NULL)) || (((suite_list[count1].pfs!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>pfs!=NULL))  && (strcmp(suite_list[count1].pfs,suite_profile->pfs) == 
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0))) {    
 
      if (((suite_list[count1].key_length==NULL) && 
(suite_profile->key_length==NULL)) || 
(((suite_list[count1].key_length!=NULL) && (suite_profile-
>key_length!=NULL))  && 
(strcmp(suite_list[count1].key_length,suite_profile->key_length) == 
0))) {    
 
      
 
        suite_profile->copy_flag = 1; 
        LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Match found setting 
copy flag","")); 
        return (true); 
 
      } 
    } 
  } 
       } 
     } 
   } 
    } 
  } 
       } 
     } 
  } 
 







*   Function: send_to_conf_set() – this functions sends parsed  
*  information to conf_set in the correct syntax. 
* 
* - Input: 
*  - int trans – transaction number. 
*  - char * suite_title – holds title for tag defined in 
*   previous function. 
*  - char * suite – holds set of security proposals 
*  - struct suite_struct * suite_profile – points to the 
*   list/array of suite structures. 
*  - int struct_size – holds the size of the list. 




void send_to_conf_set(int trans,char * suite_title, char * suite, 
struct suite_struct * suite_profile, int struct_size, struct 
suite_struct * default_suite_profile) { 
 
  char * section = (char *) malloc(100); 
  char * title = (char *) malloc(100); 
  int count =0; 
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  int tempsize = 0; 
 
  char * temp1, *temp2, *temp3 = malloc(100); 
   
  strcpy(section,"General"); 
 
  if (suite == NULL) { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading error: suite is null","")); 
  
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Aborting suite struct load","")); 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading default default suite 
structure","")); 
       
     load_default_sa(trans,section,suite_title,default_suite_profile); 
 
     return; 
  } 
 
  else { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Suite Set complete....continuing","")); 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Testing suite structures for min 
requirements","")); 
      
     if (test_suite_structure(suite_profile, struct_size) == 1) { 
 
        LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Suite Structure has min required 
entries... continuing loading process","")); 
 
     } 
     else { 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Suite Structure does not have min 
requirements...","")); 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY,40, "Aborting suite struct load","")); 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY,40,"Loading default suite structure","")); 
       
load_default_sa(trans,section,suite_title,default_suite_profile); 
 
      return; 
     } 
  } 
     
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading suite set into conf_set...","")); 
  conf_set(trans, section, suite_title, suite,0,0);  
 
  for (count = 0; count < struct_size; count++) { 
 
    if (suite_profile[count].copy_flag == 0 ) { 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading suite#: %i into conf_set 
...",count)); 
 




    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_name);  
    title = strcpy(title, "Protocols"); 
    
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].suite_protocol,0,0);  
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading protocol_id into conf_set 
...","")); 
 
    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_protocol);  
    title = strcpy(title, "PROTOCOL_ID"); 
 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].protocol_id,0,0);  
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading suite_transform into conf_set 
...","")); 
    title = strcpy(title, "Transforms");     
    
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].suite_transform,0,0);  
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading transform_id into conf_set 
...","")); 
    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "TRANSFORM_ID"); 
    
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].transform_id,0,0); 
  
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading encapsulation_mode into conf_set 
...","")); 
    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "ENCAPSULATION_MODE"); 
 
    if (suite_profile[count].encapsulation_mode == NULL) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading error: encapsulation_mode is 
null","")); 
  
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading default encapsulation 
mode","")); 
        LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "default encapsulation mode: 
%s",default_suite_profile->encapsulation_mode)); 
       conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>encapsulation_mode,0,0);  
        
     } 
 
    else { 
 
      
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].encapsulation_mode,0,
0);  
    } 
     
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading group_description into conf_set 
...","")); 
    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION"); 
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    if (suite_profile[count].group_description == NULL) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading error: group_description is 
null","")); 
  
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading default 
group_description","")); 
       conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>group_description,0,0);  
        
     } 
 
    else { 
 
      
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].group_description,0,0
);  
    } 
    
    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM"); 
     
    if ((suite_profile[count].authentication_algorithm == 
NULL)&&(strcmp(suite_profile[count].protocol_id,"IPSEC_AH") == 0)) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading error: 
authentication_algorithm is null","")); 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "AH SA... using transform_id to load 
authentication algorithm","")); 
        
  
       //LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading default 
authentication_algorithm","")); 
       
conf_set(trans,section,title,strcat("HMAC_",default_suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm),0,0);  
        
     } 
 
    else if ((suite_profile[count].authentication_algorithm == 
NULL)&&(strcmp(suite_profile[count].protocol_id,"IPSEC_ESP") == 0)) { 
 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "no authentication algorithm found for 
ESP suite...","")); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Assuming no ESP authenctication 
algorithm needed... no default loading..","")); 
 
 
    } 
    else { 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading authentication 
algorithm...","")); 
 
      
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].authentication_algori
thm,0,0);  
    } 
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    section = strcpy (section,suite_profile[count].suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "Life"); 
     
     if ((suite_profile[count].life == 
NULL)||(suite_profile[count].life_type == 
NULL)||(suite_profile[count].life_duration == NULL)) { 
 
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading error: 1 or more life time 
parameters are null","")); 
  
       LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading default life 
parameters","")); 
       conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile->life,0,0);  
       section = strcpy(section,default_suite_profile->life); 
       title =strcpy(title, "LIFE_TYPE"); 
       conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>life_type,0,0); 
       title = strcpy(title,"LIFE_DURATION"); 
       conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>life_duration,0,0); 
     } 
 
    else { 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "loading life parameters...","")); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Life title....","")); 
      conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].life,0,0);  
      section = strcpy(section,suite_profile[count].life); 
      title =strcpy(title, "LIFE_TYPE"); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Life_Type....","")); 
      conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].life_type,0,0); 
      title = strcpy(title,"LIFE_DURATION"); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Life_Duration....","")); 
      
conf_set(trans,section,title,suite_profile[count].life_duration,0,0); 
 
    } 
    } 
    else { 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Skipping a duplicate sa in 
send_to_conf_set","")); 
    } 









*  - Function: void load_default_sa()– loads default security proposal 
* into conf_set(). 
* 
* - Input: 
*  - int trans – transaction number required for conf_set() 
*  - char * section – character string defined in calling 
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*  function 
*  - char * title – character string defined in calling 
*  function 
*  - struct suite_struct* default_suite_profile – default 
*   suite structure for the default security proposal  
*  parameters. 





void load_default_sa(int trans,char * section, char * title,struct 
suite_struct* default_suite_profile) { 
 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Loading default sa's...","")); 
   
  conf_set(trans, section, title, default_suite_profile-
>suite_name,0,0);  
 
  section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_name);  




  section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_protocol);  
  title = strcpy(title, "PROTOCOL_ID"); 
  conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile->protocol_id,0,0);  
   




    section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "TRANSFORM_ID"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>transform_id,0,0);  
    section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "ENCAPSULATION_MODE"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>encapsulation_mode,0,0);      
    section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>group_description,0,0);  
 
    section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm,0,0);  
 
     section = strcpy (section,default_suite_profile->suite_transform);  
    title = strcpy(title, "Life"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile->life,0,0);  
     
    section = strcpy(section,default_suite_profile->life); 
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    title =strcpy(title, "LIFE_TYPE"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile->life_type,0,0); 
 
    title = strcpy(title,"LIFE_DURATION"); 
    conf_set(trans,section,title,default_suite_profile-
>life_duration,0,0); 
 




*   Function:  struct suite_struct* struct_initialization()- used to 
*  initialize each suite structure. 
*  
* - Input: - struct suite_struct * suite_profile – holds the  
* pointer to suite structure. 








 // initialize struct 
  suite_profile->suite_name = NULL; 
  suite_profile->suite_protocol= NULL; 
  suite_profile->suite_transform= NULL; 
  suite_profile->transform_id= NULL; 
  suite_profile->protocol_id= NULL; 
  suite_profile->encapsulation_mode= NULL; 
  suite_profile->group_description= NULL; 
  suite_profile->authentication_algorithm= NULL; 
  suite_profile->life= NULL; 
  suite_profile->life_type= NULL; 
  suite_profile->life_duration= NULL; 
  suite_profile->esp = NULL; 
  suite_profile->ah = NULL; 
  suite_profile->esp_enc_alg = NULL; 
  suite_profile->esp_auth_alg = NULL; 
  suite_profile->ah_auth_alg = NULL; 
  suite_profile->pfs = NULL; 
  suite_profile->key_length = NULL; 
  suite_profile->copy_flag = 0; 
 






 *  Struct suite_struct * initialize_default_suite()  
 * 
 *  Initializes default suite in the event of failure to properly  





struct suite_struct * initialize_default_suite_profile(struct 
suite_struct *temp_ss) { 
 
 // struct suite_struct temp_ss; 
 // initialize struct 
 
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "in initialize_default_suite_profile","")); 
  temp_ss->suite_name = strdup("QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS-SUITE"); 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "test1","")); 
  temp_ss->suite_protocol= strdup("QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS"); 
  temp_ss->suite_transform= strdup("QM-ESP-AES-SHA-PFS-XF"); 
  temp_ss->transform_id= strdup("AES"); 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "test2","")); 
 temp_ss->protocol_id= strdup("IPSEC_ESP"); 
  temp_ss->encapsulation_mode= strdup("TUNNEL"); 
  temp_ss->group_description= strdup("MODP_1024"); 
  temp_ss->authentication_algorithm= strdup("HMAC_SHA"); 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "test3","")); 
  temp_ss->life= strdup("LIFE_3600_SECS"); 
  temp_ss->life_type= strdup("SECONDS"); 
  temp_ss->life_duration= strdup("3600,1800:7200"); 
  temp_ss->copy_flag=0; 






*   Function: int dynamic_package_verification() - used to check  
* dynamic parameters of DNF security proposal assertions. 
* - Input: 
*  -  char * buff_temp – character string/buffer used to hold  
*  the isakmpd.conf/KeyNote file being parsed.   
*  - int *buff_temp_counter – index used for parsing the  
*  buff_temp.  
*  - int buff_temp_end – index to last character of buffer  
*  used to check for end-of-file (EOF) condition. 
*  - struct dynamic_packet * package – structure that holds  
*  current value of the dynamic parameters. 
*  - int package_size – size of array of dynamic_packet  
*   structure.     
*  - int szkn – size of KeyNote file. 
* - Output: 
*     - int – used as a Boolean flag to indicate if DNF security 
*      proposal assertion dynamic parameters match. Return 0  




int dynamic_package_verification(char * buff_temp, int 
*buff_temp_counter, int buff_temp_end, struct dynamic_packet * package, 
int package_size, int szkn) { 
 
  int temp_buff = *buff_temp_counter; 
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  int loop_counter;   
 
  // used to verify that all packages parameters exist in expression 
  int package_counter_check = 0;  
 
  int not_done = 1; 
 
  int result = 0; 
 
  int dynamic_test_counter = 0; // used to count matches 
 
  char * testprint = (char*)malloc(buff_temp_end + 50); 
 
  //loop through dynamic package array to check for matching parameters 
 
   if ((buff_temp_end - (temp_buff)) > 0) { 
 




   } 
   else  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Here is our problem","")); 
 
   for (loop_counter = 0;loop_counter < package_size; loop_counter++) 
     { 
       // reseting temp pointer for scan 
 
       temp_buff = *buff_temp_counter; 
 
       not_done = 1; // reset for while loop 
 
       while (not_done==1) { 
 
       // check to see if first letter matching 
 
  
       if ((buff_temp[temp_buff] == package[loop_counter].title[0]) 
&&((temp_buff + strlen(package[loop_counter].title)) < szkn)) { 
       
    // if result is false not a match return false... 
 
   result = 
verify_parameter(buff_temp,&temp_buff,package[loop_counter].title, 
package[loop_counter].value,buff_temp_end); 
     
   // if dynamic parameter title found but value does not match  
   //advance to next DNF expression and exit 
    
   if (result == 0) { 
 
      
advance_to_end_DNF(buff_temp,buff_temp_counter,buff_temp_end); 
 
     return (0); // return false 
   } 
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   // if dynamic parameter title found and value matches...MATCH! 
 
   if (result == 1) { 
 
      package_counter_check++; 
      not_done =0; // set flag to exit while loop 
   } 
 
   // title match not found keeping looking... 
 
   if (result == 2) { 
      
   } 
   
  } 
 
       if (buff_temp[temp_buff] == '|') { 
    
  not_done = 0; 
 
       } 
    
       else { 
      
  // Check to see if at end of file 
  if (*buff_temp_counter >= szkn) { 
 
    not_done = 0; 
 
  } 
 
  else { 
 
    temp_buff++; 
 
  } 
       } 
       } 
        
 
     } // end of for loop 
 
     // if counter match all conditions met return true 
 
 
     if (package_counter_check == package_size) { 
 




       return (1);  // return true; 
 
     } 
 
      else { // not all conditions met.... 
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 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Not all conditions met....advancing 
book mark and return false...","")); 
 





        // set actual buffer place holder to advanced marker 
 (*buff_temp_counter) = temp_buff; 
 
 // return false; 
 return (0); 





*  Function: int DNF_parse()– This function parses each security 
*  proposal found. 
*  - Input: 
*   - Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory  
*    use, pointer to pointer coding syntax at times 
*     was required. By having a pointer to a pointer, 
*     memory created in a function will still be 
*     resident/within scope after returning from the 
*     function. 
*   - char **suite – holds the set of security proposals.  
*   Pointer to a pointer used to for dynamic memory  
*   creation. 
*   - char *buff_temp – string buffer holding the DNF  
*   file. 
*   - int* buff_temp_counter – location of parsing index.  
*   Pointer to integer is used to allow for pass by  
*   reference. 
*   - int szkn – size of file/string buffer. 
*   - struct suite_struct *suite_profile – pointer to  
*   suite structure.   
*  - Outputs:  
*   - integer  
*    – returns 1 (false) if parse routine  
*    successful. 




int  DNF_parse(char **suite, char *buff_temp, int * buff_temp_counter, 
int szkn, struct suite_struct *suite_profile, struct dynamic_packet * 
package, int package_size, struct suite_struct *suite_list, int 
SA_counter) { 
 
  int success =0; 
  char *temp_name, *temp_value;  
  int not_done = 1; 
  //int para_counter=0; 
  int buff_temp_end = szkn -1; 
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  int temp_size=0; 
  int completed = 1;// if dynamic parameters are met 
  temp_name = (char*)malloc(100); 
  temp_value =(char*)malloc(100); 
  
  suite_profile = struct_initialization(suite_profile); 
 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ENTERING DNF PARSE","")); 
 
 
     // check expression dynamic parameter matching 
 




      
     if (dynamic_package_verification(buff_temp, buff_temp_counter, 
buff_temp_end, package, package_size,szkn)==0) { 
 
       return (0) ; 
 
     } 
 
     else { 
 
        LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Dynamic package conditions were 
met!...preceding to perform parsing ...","")); 
 




  while (not_done == 1) { 
 
    // Check for ESP 
    
    if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_present")) < szkn)) { 
       
      temp_name = "esp_present"; 
 
      temp_size = 3; 






      // if successful load esp protocol into structure 
 
      if (success == 1) { 
 
 suite_profile->protocol_id = strdup("IPSEC_ESP"); 
      }     
    } 
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    // Check for ESP ENC ALG 
  
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_enc_alg")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "esp_enc_alg"; 
     success=0; 
      
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "CHECKING FOR ESP_ENC_ALG","")); 




     // if successful copy appropriate esp enc alg to structure 
     if (success == 1) { 
        
      suite_profile->transform_id = strdup(suite_profile->esp_enc_alg); 
 
      }  
        
 
    } 
 
   // Check for ESP AUTH ALG 
  
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&(*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_auth_alg") < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name ="esp_auth_alg"; 
     success=0; 




      // if successful copy appropriate esp auth alg to structure 
     if (success == 1) { 
       char * temp_holder = (char*)malloc(20); 
       char * temp_holder2 = NULL;//(char*) malloc(20); 
 
        // check for HMAC- header on transform_id 
       if (suite_profile->authentication_algorithm[0] == 'H') { 
   
  temp_holder2 = strchr(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm,'-'); 
  //suite_profile->authentication_algorithm[4] == '_'; 
  (*temp_holder2) = '_'; 
  temp_holder2++; 
  suite_profile->transform_id = strdup(temp_holder2); 
  suite_profile->esp_auth_alg = strdup (temp_holder2); 
 
 } 
       else { 
 
  temp_holder = strcpy(temp_holder,"HMAC_"); 
  suite_profile->esp_auth_alg = strdup(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm); 
  suite_profile->transform_id = strdup(suite_profile-
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>authentication_algorithm); 
  temp_holder = strcat(temp_holder,suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm); 
  free(suite_profile->authentication_algorithm); 
       
  suite_profile->authentication_algorithm = strdup(temp_holder); 
   
       } 
       
       free(temp_holder); 
       free(temp_holder2); 
      }  
 
    } 
 
   // Check for AH 
 
    if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_present")) < szkn)) { 
       
      temp_name = "ah_present"; 
      success=0; 
      temp_size = 2; 
 




       // if successful load ah protocol into structure 
 
      if (success == 1) { 
  
  
 suite_profile->protocol_id = strdup("IPSEC_AH"); 
      } 
 
       
 
    } 
 
 
     // Check for PFS 
 
    if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'p')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("pfs")) < szkn)) { 
       
      temp_name = "pfs"; 
      success=0; 
      temp_size = 3; 
             
parse_ipsec_para_tag(buff_temp,buff_temp_counter,temp_name,&suite_profi
le->pfs, temp_size,&success); 
       
      if (success == 1) { 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "pfs= %s",suite_profile->pfs)); 
      } 
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    } 
 
    // check for ah_auth_alg 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_auth_alg")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "ah_auth_alg"; 
     success=0; 
  
 parse_ipsec_parameter(buff_temp,buff_temp_counter,temp_name, 
 &suite_profile->authentication_algorithm, &success); 
 
     // if successful copy appropriate ah auth alg to structure 
     if (success == 1) { 
       char * temp_holder = (char*)malloc(20); 
       char * temp_holder2 = NULL;//(char*) malloc(20); 
        
       // check for HMAC- header on transform_id 
       if (suite_profile->authentication_algorithm[0] == 'H') { 
  //suite_profile->authentication_algorithm[4] = '_'; 
  //temp_holder2 = strchr(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm,'_'); 
  //temp_holder2++; 
  temp_holder2 = strchr(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm,'-'); 
  (*temp_holder2) = '_'; 
  temp_holder2++; 
  suite_profile->transform_id = strdup(temp_holder2); 
 
  suite_profile->ah_auth_alg = strdup (temp_holder2); 
 




       } 
       else { 
 
  temp_holder = strcpy(temp_holder,"HMAC_"); 
  suite_profile->ah_auth_alg = strdup(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm); 
  suite_profile->transform_id = strdup(suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm); 
  temp_holder = strcat(temp_holder,suite_profile-
>authentication_algorithm); 
  free(suite_profile->authentication_algorithm); 
       
  suite_profile->authentication_algorithm = strdup(temp_holder); 
   
       } 
       
       free(temp_holder); 
     } 
 
    } 
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   // check for esp_group_desc 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_group_desc")) < szkn)) { 
       
     char * temp_holder = NULL;//(char *) malloc(20); 
     temp_name = "esp_group_desc"; 




      // if successful load esp_group_desc into structure 
 
      if (success == 1) { 
 




      } 
      
    } 
 
    // check for ah_group_desc 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_group_desc")) < szkn)) { 
       
     char * temp_holder=NULL; //(char*)malloc(100); 
     temp_name = "ah_group_desc"; 
     success=0; 




      // if successful load ah_group_desc into structure 
 
      if (success == 1) { 
  





      } 
 
    } 
 
 // check for esp_encapsulation 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_encapsulation")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "esp_encapsulation"; 
     success=0;  
      





    } 
 
 
// check for ah_encapsulation 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_encapsulation")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "ah_encapsulation"; 
     success=0; 




    } 
 
 
   // check for esp_life_seconds 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_encapsulation")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "esp_life_seconds"; 
     success=0; 




      // if success then do esp life in seconds transalation 
 





      } 
 
    } 
 
   // check for ah_life_seconds 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_life_seconds")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "ah_life_seconds"; 
     success=0; 




       // if success then do ah life in seconds transalation 
 






      } 
 
    } 
 
   // check for esp life time in kilobytes 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'e')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("esp_life_kilobytes")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "esp_life_kilobytes"; 
     success=0; 




       // if success then do esp life in kilobytes transalation 
 





      } 
 
    } 
 
    // check for ah life time in kilobytes 
 
   if ((buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == 'a')&&((*buff_temp_counter + 
strlen("ah_life_kilobytes")) < szkn)) { 
       
     temp_name = "ah_life_kilobytes"; 
     success=0; 




       // if success then do ah life in kilobytes transalation 
 





      } 
 
    } 
 
   // check for end of DNF expression 
 
    
   if (buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] == '|') { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "END OF EXPRESSION","")); 
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     not_done = 0; 
 
     if (add_para_values(suite, suite_profile, suite_list, SA_counter) 
== 1) { 
        
       completed =1; 
 
     } 
     else {  
        completed = 0; 
     } 
   } 
    
   else { 
      
 
       // Check to see if at end of file 
       if (*buff_temp_counter >= szkn) { 
 
  not_done = 0; 
 
       } 
 
       else { 
 
  (*buff_temp_counter)++; 
 
       } 
            
   } 
 
  } 
    







* Function: void life_kilobytes_translation() - this function is 
*  used to convert lifetime in kilobytes from the 
*  KeyNote/isakmpd.policy format to the isakmpd.conf format.  
*  - Inputs: 
*   - Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory  
*   use, pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was  
*   required. By having a pointer to a pointer, memory  
*   created in a function will still be resident/within  
*   scope after returning from the function. 
*   - char ** life – holds the initial life time input.  
*   Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory  
*   allocation. 
*   - char ** life_type – holds the life time type string  
*   KILOBYTES. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic  
*   memory allocation. 
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*   - char ** life_duration – holds the life time  
*   duration string . Pointer to a pointer used for  
*   - dynamic memory allocation. 
*  - Outputs: 
*   - char ** life – used to return life time. Pointer to  
*   a pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
*   - char ** life_type – used to return life time type  
*   string KILOBYTES. Pointer to a pointer used for  
*   dynamic memory allocation. 
*   - char ** life_duration – used to return the life  
*   time duration string . Pointer to a pointer used for  









  if (strcmp(*life, "1000")== 0) { 
    
    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_1000_KB"); 
    *life_type = strdup("KILOBYTES"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("1000,768:1536"); 
 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*life, "32000")== 0) { 
  
    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_32_MB"); 
    *life_type = strdup("KILOBYTES"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("32768,16384:65536"); 
    
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*life, "45000000")== 0) { 
 
    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_4.5_GB"); 
    *life_type = strdup("KILOBYTES"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("4608000,4096000:8192000"); 
 
  } 
 
  else { 
 
    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_1000_KB"); 
    *life_type = strdup("KILOBYTES"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("1000,768:1536"); 
 







* Function: void life_seconds_translation() - this function is 
*  used to convert lifetime in kilobytes from the 
*  KeyNote/isakmpd.policy format to the isakmpd.conf format.  
*  - Inputs: 
*   - Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory  
*   use, pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was  
*   required. By having a pointer to a pointer, memory  
*   created in a function will still be resident/within  
*   scope after returning from the function. 
*   - char ** life – holds the initial life time input.  
*   Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory  
*   allocation. 
*   - char ** life_type – holds the life time type string  
*   SECONDS. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic  
*   memory allocation. 
*   - char ** life_duration – holds the life time  
*   duration string . Pointer to a pointer used for  
*   - dynamic memory allocation. 
*  - Outputs: 
*   - char ** life – used to return life time. Pointer to  
*   a pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
*   - char ** life_type – used to return life time type  
*   string SECONDS. Pointer to a pointer used for  
*   dynamic memory allocation. 
*   - char ** life_duration – used to return the life  
*   time duration string . Pointer to a pointer used for  









  if (strcmp(*life, "600")== 0) { 
 
    free(*life); 
 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_600_SECS"); 
    *life_type = strdup("SECONDS"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("600,450:720"); 
 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*life, "3600")== 0) { 
    
    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_3600_SECS"); 
    *life_type = strdup("SECONDS"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("3600,1800:7200"); 
 




    free(*life); 
    *life = strdup("LIFE_3600_SECS"); 
    *life_type = strdup("SECONDS"); 
    *life_duration = strdup("3600,1800:7200"); 
    
 







Function: void group_description_translation– this function is used to 
convert group description from the KeyNote/isakmpd.policy syntax to the 
isakmpd.conf syntax. 
    
- Inputs: 
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, pointer to 
pointer coding syntax at times was required. By having a pointer to a 
pointer, memory created in a function will still be resident/within 
scope after returning from the function. 
- char ** group_description– holds the initial group description 
variable. Pointer to a pointer used for dynamic memory allocation. 
- Outputs: 
- char ** group_description – used to return translated 






void group_description_translation(char ** group_description) { 
 
  if (strcmp(*group_description, "1")== 0) { 
     
    free(*group_description); 
    *group_description = strdup("MODP_768"); 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*group_description,"2")==0) { 
   
    free(*group_description); 
    *group_description = strdup("MODP_1024"); 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*group_description,"3")==0) { 
   
    free(*group_description); 
    *group_description = strdup("MODP_155"); 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*group_description,"4")==0) { 
   
    free(*group_description); 
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    *group_description = strdup("MODP_185"); 
  } 
 
  else if (strcmp(*group_description,"5")==0) { 
    
    free(*group_description); 
    *group_description = strdup("MODP_1536"); 
  } 
else { 
 
    free(*group_description); 
    *group_description = strdup("MODP_768"); 








- Function: void add_para_values()- this function generates the 
security proposal format required by the configuration process. 
 
- Note: That in order to facilitate dynamic memory use, 
pointer to pointer coding syntax at times was required. By having a 
pointer to a pointer, memory created in a function will still be 
resident/within scope after returning from the function. 
- Inputs:  
- char ** suite - holds the set of security proposals. Pointer to a 
pointer used to for dynamic memory creation. 
- struct suite_struct **suite_profile  – pointer to suite structure.   
  - Outputs: 
- char ** suite – returns the modified  set of security proposals. 
Pointer to a pointer used to for dynamic memory creation. 
- struct suite_struct **suite_profile  – pointer to    suite structure 







int add_para_values(char ** suite, struct suite_struct *suite_profile, 
struct suite_struct * suite_list, int SA_counter){ 
 
  int success = 0; 
  char * temp_hold4; 
  //int suite_current_length=0; 
  int max_SA_suite_size = 50; 
 
  // Checking for duplicate SA.... 
 
  if (duplicate_sa(suite_list,SA_counter,suite_profile) == 0 ) { 
 
    success = 1; 
 
  // allocated enough space for SA 
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  suite_profile->suite_name=(char*)malloc(max_SA_suite_size);  
 
  if (*suite != NULL) { 
 
     if ((*suite =realloc(*suite, (strlen(*suite) + 
max_SA_suite_size))) == NULL) { 
  
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Memory Reallocation error...","")); 
 return(0); 
 
      } 
 
    (*suite) = strncat(*suite, ",", strlen(",")); 
         
  } 
 
  else {  // suite equals NULL 
     
 
    // Allocated max space needed for SA 
    (*suite)=(char*)malloc(max_SA_suite_size); 
      } 
 
  // use length of string for coping of suite info at end of routine 
 
   
   suite_profile->suite_name = strcpy(suite_profile->suite_name,"QM"); 
 
 
     // check for missing ESP or AH but existing ESP alg or AH alg 
 
   
  if ((suite_profile->esp == NULL) && (suite_profile->ah == NULL)) { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ESP & AH are empty....","")); 
 
    // check for exisitng ESP enc alg or ESP auth alg then add ESP 
       
    if ((suite_profile->esp_enc_alg!= NULL)||(suite_profile-
>esp_auth_alg!=NULL)) { 
 
     suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name,"-
ESP",strlen("-ESP")); 
       
    } 
    // check for AH auth alg then add AH 
     
        else if (suite_profile->ah_auth_alg != NULL) {   
            suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile-
>suite_name,"-AH", strlen("-AH")); 
 
    } 
  } 
 
  // ESP or AH exist.... 
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  else {  
 
     
    if (suite_profile->esp != NULL) { 
      suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, "-
",strlen("-")); 
      suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile-
>suite_name,suite_profile->esp,strlen(suite_profile->esp)); 
       
 
    } 
   
    
    else if (suite_profile->ah != NULL) { 
             
      suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, "-
", strlen("-")); 
      suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, 
suite_profile->ah,strlen(suite_profile->ah )); 
            
    } 
  }         
 
  if (suite_profile->esp_enc_alg != NULL) { 
    
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, "-
",strlen("-"));  
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile-
>suite_name,suite_profile->esp_enc_alg,strlen(suite_profile-
>esp_enc_alg )); 
       
  } 
 
  if (suite_profile->esp_auth_alg != NULL) { 
    
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, "-
",strlen("-")); 
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile-
>suite_name,suite_profile->esp_auth_alg,strlen(suite_profile-
>esp_auth_alg )); 
  } 
 
  if (suite_profile->ah_auth_alg != NULL) { 
     
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name, "-
",strlen("-")); 
    suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile-
>suite_name,suite_profile->ah_auth_alg,strlen(suite_profile-
>ah_auth_alg )); 
        
  } 
 
  // check for PFS .. if true add -PFS 
 
  // Check to make sure PFS is not NULL... 
 
  if (suite_profile->pfs != NULL) { 
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    if (strcmp(suite_profile->pfs,"PFS")==0) { 
 
      suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name,"-
PFS",strlen("-PFS")); 
 
    } 
  } 
 
  else { 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "PFS is NULL","")); 
  } 
  
  // dynamially creat memory for SA info and generate proper SA syntax 
 
  suite_profile->suite_protocol = strdup(suite_profile->suite_name); 
 
 
  suite_profile->suite_transform = (char*) malloc(strlen(suite_profile-
>suite_protocol) + 4); 
   
  suite_profile->suite_transform = strcpy(suite_profile-
>suite_transform,suite_profile->suite_protocol); 
 
  suite_profile->suite_transform = strncat( suite_profile-
>suite_transform,"-XF",strlen("-XF")); 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Protocol suite: AFTER: 
%s",suite_profile->suite_protocol)); 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Transform suite: AFTER: %s",suite_profile-
>suite_transform)); 
 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Suite Name before: %s and size of: 
%i",suite_profile->suite_name,strlen(suite_profile->suite_name) )); 
 
  suite_profile->suite_name = strncat(suite_profile->suite_name,"-
SUITE",strlen("-SUITE")); 
 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Suite Name after: %s and size of: 
%i",suite_profile->suite_name,strlen(suite_profile->suite_name) )); 
 
     //dynamically assign space if necessary to suite 
  if (*suite == NULL) { 
 
    (*suite) = strdup(suite_profile->suite_name); 
 
  } 
  else { 
   




  } 
 
  } 
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  else { // duplicate exists.... 
          success = 0; 
  } 
 
  return (success); 




Function: char * convert_to_uppercase()– converts a lower case string 
to an upper case string and returns the string. 
 
  - Input:  
   - char * lowercase – lower case string. 
    - Output: 






char * convert_to_uppercase(char * lowercase_string) { 
 
  int string_size = strlen(lowercase_string); 
  char * uppercase_string = (char *) malloc(100); 
  char temp_char; 
  int c;  
 
  for ( c=0; c< string_size; c++) { 
 
    temp_char = lowercase_string[c]; 
    temp_char = toupper(temp_char); 
 
    uppercase_string = strncat(uppercase_string,&temp_char,1); 
  } 
 
  lowercase_string = strcpy(lowercase_string,uppercase_string); 
 






- Function: verify_parameter()– checks input dynamic parameter tag 
value and if valid, compares tag value with given value. Returns three 
possible flag values. 
 
- Input: 
  - char *buff_temp – string buffer used for KeyNote 
   file. 
- int *buff_temp_counter  - index of pointer in buff_temp string 
buffer. 
  - char * sys_para_name – Dynamic parameter tag  
  - char * sys_para_value – Dynamic parameter tag value 
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- int buff_temp_end – index of end-of-file (EOF) in buff_temp. 
 - Output: 
  - int – flag with the following three values: 
   - 0 (dynamic parameter tag value does not 
    match)  
   -  1 (dynamic parameter tag value matches)  




     
int verify_parameter(char *buff_temp, int *buff_temp_counter, char * 
sys_para_name, char * sys_para_value,int buff_temp_end) { 
 
  int sys_para_name_size = strlen(sys_para_name); 
  int sys_para_value_size = strlen(sys_para_value); 
  char * temp_string = (char *) malloc(buff_temp_end); 
  char * temp_hold = (char*)malloc(100); 
  int success = 2; 
  char * temp_str = (char *) malloc(100); 
 
    
 
   temp_str = strncpy(temp_str,&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter],25); 
 
   temp_string= &buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter]; 
 
  // compare tag titles 
 
  if (strncmp (&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter], sys_para_name, 
sys_para_name_size) == 0) { 
           
    (*buff_temp_counter)+= sys_para_name_size; 
 
    // advance pointer to " 
 
    while (buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] != '\"') { 
   
 (*buff_temp_counter)++; 
   
       } 
       // advance to pass ending " 
       (*buff_temp_counter)++; 
 
       // compare tag value with current selection parameter 
       // if valid save value and advance counter 
 
       temp_str = 
strncpy(temp_str,&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter],sys_para_value_size); 
       temp_str[sys_para_value_size]='\0'; 
 
       if (strncmp(&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter], sys_para_value, 
sys_para_value_size) == 0) { 
 
  LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Parameter value MATCH","")); 
      




  temp_hold[sys_para_value_size]='\0'; 
 
  //set flag to true 
 
  success = 1; 
 
  // advance buffer counter to end of tag value 
  (*buff_temp_counter)= (*buff_temp_counter) + 
sys_para_value_size; 
   
  // make temp_hold all UPPER_CASE 
 
 temp_hold= convert_to_uppercase(temp_hold); 
  
       } 
         
       else { 
      success = 0; 
  
       } // end else 
               
  } 
    
   return (success); 
   
} 
     
 
/********************************************************************* 
- Function: advance_to_end_DNF()– advances file pointer to the next DNF 
security proposal.  
 
- Input: 
  - char *buff_temp – string buffer used for KeyNote 
   file. 
- int *buff_temp_counter  - index of pointer in buff_temp string 
buffer. 
- int buff_temp_end – index of end-of-file (EOF) in buff_temp. 
 - Output: 












  // advance buffer to end of expression 
 
  while ((*buff_temp_counter <= buff_temp_end) && 
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(buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] != '|')) { 
     
   (*buff_temp_counter)++; 








Function: void parse_ipsec_parameter(char *buff_temp, int * 
buff_temp_counter, char * sys_para_name, char ** temp_hold, int * 
success)  – verifies that the tag is the expected tag and then parses 
the tag and the tag value, storing information in input suite structure 
char string. 
    
- Inputs: 
- char *buff_temp – pointer to the file being parsed. 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in file being 
parsed. 
- char * sys_para_name – pointer to the expected parameter tag name 
- char ** temp_hold – pointer to a pointer (used for the purpose of 
dynamic memory allocation) of char string in suite structure. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success flag. 
  -Outputs: 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in file being 
parsed is returned via pointer reference. Pointer may be advance in 
function. 
- char * temp_hold - pointer to a pointer of a character string (used 
for the purpose of dynamic memory allocation) in the suite structure 
returned via pointer reference. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used to hold success flag 






void parse_ipsec_parameter(char *buff_temp, int * buff_temp_counter, 
char * sys_para_name, char ** temp_hold, int * success) { 
 
  int temp_counter, temp_buffer; 
 
  int sys_para_name_size = strlen(sys_para_name); 
  int sys_para_value_size = 0; 
  char * temp_string; 
  temp_string = (char *) malloc(100); 
 
 
  // CHECKING FOR TAG LABEL MATCH 
 
  if (strncmp (&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter], sys_para_name, 
sys_para_name_size) == 0) { 
 
    LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Match Found... copying label info","")); 
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       *buff_temp_counter+= sys_para_name_size; 
 
       // ADVANCE TO THE START OF PARATHESISES 
       while (buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter] != '"') { 
 
        sys_para_value_size++;  
  (*buff_temp_counter)++; 
 
       } 
 
 
       // advance passed openning " 
        
       (*buff_temp_counter)++; 
 
       // COUNT THE SIZE OF TAG VALUE - UNTIL CLOSE " 
 
       temp_counter = 0; 
       temp_buffer = *buff_temp_counter; 
 
       while (buff_temp[temp_buffer] != '"') { 
 
        temp_buffer++;  
  temp_counter++; 
 
       }        
 
      
       //COPYING TAG VALUE 
 
 
       // creating dynamic memory space for variable storage 
 
       (*temp_hold) = (char*)malloc(temp_counter+1); 
       
 
       *temp_hold = strncpy(*temp_hold, &buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter], 
temp_counter); 
       
       (*temp_hold)[temp_counter]='\0'; 
        
       (*buff_temp_counter)= temp_buffer + 1; 
  
 *success=1; // set success flag to true 
               
 // make temp_hold all UPPER_CASE 
 
  *temp_hold = convert_to_uppercase(*temp_hold); 
 
    } 
 
  else {  
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Match Not Found...","")); 
  } 
 
 
}     
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- Function: void parse_ipsec_para_tag()- verifies that the tag is the 
expected tag and that tag value contains “yes”. If so, parses tag  and 
stores its value in suite structure char string. 
   
- Inputs: 
- char *buff_temp – pointer to the file being parsed. 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to index of character in file being 
parsed. 
- char * sys_para_name – pointer to the expected parameter tag name 
- char ** temp_hold – pointer to a pointer (used for the purpose of 
dynamic memory allocation) of char string in suite structure. 
- int sys_para_name_reduced – integer that holds the string size of the 
tag. Either 2 or 3 used for AH, ESP or PFS tags. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success flag. 
  -Outputs: 
- int *buff_temp_counter – pointer to the index of character in file 
being parsed is returned via pointer reference. Pointer may be advanced 
in the function. 
- char * temp_hold - pointer to a pointer of a character string (used 
for the purpose of dynamic memory allocation) in the suite structure 
returned via pointer reference. 
- int *success – pointer to an integer used for the success flag 






        
void parse_ipsec_para_tag(char *buff_temp, int * buff_temp_counter, 
char * sys_para_name, char ** temp_hold, int sys_para_name_reduced, int 
* success) { 
 
  //int temp_counter; 
  int  temp_buffer; 
 
  int sys_para_name_size = strlen(sys_para_name); 
  //int sys_para_value_size = 0; 
  char * bool_tag = "yes"; 
  int bool_tag_size = 3; 
  char * temp_string; 
  temp_string = (char*) malloc (100); 
 
  // CHECKING FOR TAG LABEL MATCH 
 
  if (strncmp (&buff_temp[*buff_temp_counter], sys_para_name, 
sys_para_name_size) == 0) { 
       *buff_temp_counter+= sys_para_name_size; 
 
       temp_buffer = *buff_temp_counter; 
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       // ADVANCE TO THE START OF PARATHESISES 
        
       while (buff_temp[temp_buffer] != '"') { 
 
  temp_buffer++; 
 
       } 
 
       // advance passed openning " 
        
       temp_buffer++; 
 
       // Check to see if boo_tag equals "YES" 
 
       if (strncmp (&buff_temp[temp_buffer], bool_tag, bool_tag_size) 
== 0) { 
 
  *buff_temp_counter = temp_buffer; 
 
  *temp_hold=(char*)malloc(sys_para_name_reduced+1); 
 
  *temp_hold = strncpy(*temp_hold, sys_para_name, 
sys_para_name_reduced); 
   
  (*temp_hold)[sys_para_name_reduced]='\0'; 
        
  (*buff_temp_counter)+= bool_tag_size; 
      
  *success = 1; // set success flag to true 
 
  // make temp_hold all UPPER_CASE 
 
  *temp_hold=convert_to_uppercase(*temp_hold); 
 
       } 
       else { 
   LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Tag bool match not found...","")); 
       } 
 
  } 
  else { 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Tag Name no match....","")); 
  } 
 
}     
       
            
 [ In the function conf_reinit() the following line of code is added] 
 
con_kn_parse(trans);       
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APPENDIX B.  IKE_QUICK_MODE.C 
The following is the code added to /usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/ike_quick_mode.c: 
/******************************************************************** 
*          
* Structure: dynamic_packet      
*          
*    This structure is used to stored dynamic parameter 
*  data, including dynamic parameter name, assignment symbol 




struct dynamic_packet { 
 
  char* title; 
  char* symbol; 




struct dynamic_packet* package_dynamic_parameters(int *); 





* Function: package_dynamic_parameters()This function reads a file that 
*  contains the current inputs of dynamic parameters such as 
*  Network Mode and Security Level. Initializes an array of 
*  structures that will dynamically grow as required. Loads the 
*  file input into the array of struct. 
* 
*   - Input:  
* - int * package_counter - used to determine the size of the 
*  struct array 
* 
*   
*   - Output:  
* - struct dynamic_packet * - pointer to an array of 





struct dynamic_packet *  package_dynamic_parameters( int 
*package_counter) { 
 
   
  int array_size = 10 ;  // chosen as average case for struct size  
 
  struct dynamic_packet * package;  // pointer to array of struct 
 
  // strings used to read from file 
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  char * title = (char*)malloc(20); 
  char * symbol= (char*)malloc(20); 
  char * value = (char*)malloc(20); 
 
  // used for file IO 
  FILE * pifp; 
  int file_status=0; 
 
  (*package_counter) = 0;  // initialize the array size to zero 
 
  // initialize the pointer to an array size of array_size 
 
  package = (struct dynamic_packet *)malloc(sizeof(struct 
dynamic_packet)*array_size); 
   
  // open file to read in dynamic parameters  
  // check for errors in openning the file 
  
  if ( (pifp = fopen("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters", 
"r"))== NULL) { 
    // error openning the file 
 
     LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "ERROR OPENNING FILE %d",errno)); 
 
  } 
  else  {  // file was successfully openned 
 
    // do-while loop to read in data until EOF reached 
 
    do { 
 
      // read in from the file expecting the following syntax: 
      //               title  symbol  value  
 
      file_status = fscanf(pifp, "%s%s%s", title, symbol, value); 
 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Just read from file....","")); 
      LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "Title: %s Symbol: %s Value: %s",   
  title,  symbol, value)); 
 
      // check for reading errors... 
 
      if (file_status == 0) { 
 
 // reading error occurred 
 
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "error reading from the 
file....","")); 
      } 
 
      // check for EOF... 
 
      else if (file_status == EOF) { 
 
 // EOF reached 
  
 LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "end of file....","")); 
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      } 
 
      // otherwise... read operation successful 
 
      else { 
 
 // create new struct space for dynamic parameters and 
 // assign values from file to struct 
 
 package[(*package_counter)].title = strdup(title); 
 package[(*package_counter)].symbol = strdup(symbol); 
 package[(*package_counter)].value = strdup(value); 
      
 // increment package counter array of struct 
 (*package_counter)++; 
 
 // dynamic resize array if more memory is required 
 
 if ((*package_counter) == array_size) { 
 
   array_size+=10;  // grow array in increments of 10 
 
   package = (struct dynamic_packet 
*)realloc(package,sizeof(struct dynamic_packet)*array_size); 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  while ((file_status != 0) && (file_status !=EOF)); 
 
  fclose(pifp); // close file 
 
  test_print_dynamic_packet(package,*package_counter); 
   
  } 
 
  // free memory 
  free(title); 
  free(symbol); 
  free(value); 
  // free(pifp); 
 





[In the check_policy() function the following lines of code are added 
to read int dynamic parameters and then load them in the KeyNote query 
mechanism] 
 
   package =  package_dynamic_parameters2(&package_size); 
 
   // load Dynamic parameters into KeyNote 
    
   for (c= 0; c < package_size;c++) { 
 
234 
   
     if (LK (kn_add_action, (isakmp_sa->policy_id,     
         package[c].title,package[c].value,0)) == -1)                           
      
    { 
      log_print ("CHECK_POLICY: " 
   "kn_add_action loading FAILED for title: %s value: %s", 
   package[c].title,package[c].value); 
      LK (kn_close, (isakmp_sa->policy_id)); 
      isakmp_sa->policy_id = -1; 
      return 0; 
    } 
    else { 
 
        LOG_DBG ((LOG_POLICY, 40, "CHECK_POLICY: load successful for  
 title: %s value: %s",package[c].title,package[c].value)); 
 
  } 
   } 
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APPENDIX C.  DEMO.JAVA 
 
/********************************************************************* 
Class demo.java - This class creates and handles the generation of the 
















public class demo extends JFrame { 
    private SPD spd; 
    private JPanel p, ptitle, pchoices; 
    private JButton enter; 
    Color bg_color = Color.white; 
 
    private JRadioButton sp_choice, dp_choice, ep_choice, ds_choice, 
b2_choice, b3_choice, b4_choice, ex_choice; 
    private JButton sp_button, dp_button, ep_button, ds_button, 
b2_button, b3_button, b4_button, ex_button; 
    private JLabel qoss_menu, status_label;  
    private dp_console dp; 
    private ipsecinfo ip; 
    private tcpdump tcp; 
    private SPFK spfk; 
    private  static Runtime  rt; 
 private demo_support_functions dsf; 
    // private Thread file_copy fc; 
 








 public demo() { 
 
  super("QoSS IPsec"); 
  dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 
  dp = new dp_console(); 
   
  dp.addWindowListener( 
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  new WindowAdapter() { 
   public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) 
   { 
     
 
    System.exit(0); 
   } 
  } 
  ); 
 
 
  p = new JPanel(); 
  pchoices = new JPanel(); 
  setContentPane(p); 
  p.setBackground(bg_color); 
  p.repaint(); 
  pchoices.setBackground(bg_color); 
  pchoices.repaint(); 
  
  p.setLayout(new FlowLayout() ); 
  enter = new JButton("Continue"); 
  ContinueButtonHandler ct_handler = new 
ContinueButtonHandler(); 
  enter.addActionListener(ct_handler); 
 
  JLabel label; 
  p.add(label = new JLabel("OpenBSD ")); 
  label.setForeground(Color.black); 
  label.setFont(new Font("Serif",Font.BOLD,20)); 
  p.add(label = new JLabel("IPsec        ")); 
  label.setForeground(Color.blue); 
  label.setFont(new Font("Serif",Font.BOLD,50)); 
   
  p.add(label = new JLabel("Dynamic Parameterization")); 
  label.setForeground(Color.red); 
  label.setFont(new Font("Serif",Font.ITALIC,40)); 
  p.add(label = new JLabel("                               by 
Chris Agar, LT USN                                  "));    
  label.setForeground(Color.black); 
  label.setFont(new Font("Serif",Font.BOLD,15)); 
  p.add(enter); 
  p.repaint(); 
  setSize(500,175); 
  setVisible(true); 
  status_label = new JLabel(""); 




   
  sp_button = new JButton("Start IPsec"); 
  dp_button = new JButton("Dynamic Parameterization"); 
  ep_button = new JButton("Stop IPsec"); 
  ds_button = new JButton("Display SAD"); 
  b2_button = new JButton("Display TCPDUMP"); 
  b3_button = new JButton("Display SPD"); 
  b4_button = new JButton("Display Security Policy"); 
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  ex_button = new JButton("Exit"); 
 
  SPButtonHandler spb_handler = new SPButtonHandler(); 
  DPButtonHandler dpb_handler = new DPButtonHandler(); 
  DSButtonHandler dsb_handler = new DSButtonHandler(); 
  EXButtonHandler exb_handler = new EXButtonHandler(); 
  TCPButtonHandler tcpb_handler = new TCPButtonHandler(); 
  SPDButtonHandler spdb_handler = new SPDButtonHandler(); 
  DSPButtonHandler dspb_handler = new DSPButtonHandler(); 
  INFButtonHandler infb_handler = new INFButtonHandler(); 
 
  sp_button.addActionListener(spb_handler); 
  dp_button.addActionListener(dpb_handler); 
  ex_button.addActionListener(exb_handler); 
  ds_button.addActionListener(dsb_handler);  
  b2_button.addActionListener(tcpb_handler); 
  b3_button.addActionListener(spdb_handler); 
  b4_button.addActionListener(dspb_handler); 
  ep_button.addActionListener(infb_handler); 
 
  // initialize connection_index 
  initialize_connection_index_file(); 
  show(); 





Method: initialize_connection_index_file() – resets connection index 
counter to zero in the connection index counter file. 
- Input: none. 




public void initialize_connection_index_file() { 
 
 try { 
     int temp_string = 0; 
     System.out.println("Writing connection# to the file."); 
     File f = new File("/root/demo/connection_number");     
      
     FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
      
     PrintStream out = new PrintStream(fos); 
  
     out.println("0"); 
      
     fos.close(); 
     out.close(); 
      
 } 
 
 catch (Exception e) { 
 
  System.out.println("Execption Thrown in Write_CF e: " +e); 
 } 
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    } 
 
/********************************************************************** 
Method: reset_error_panel() – refreshes error panel and removes old 
message. 
- Input: none. 




    public void reset_error_panel() { 
 
 status_label.setText("  "); 
 




Method: load_dp_file(String nm, String sl) – accepts network mode and 
security level inputs and writes them into the dynamic parameter file. 
-Input: 
- String nm- network mode value. 
- String sl – security level value. 




public void load_dp_file(String nm, String sl) { 
 
 try { 
File f = new File("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters");     
      
     FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
      
     PrintStream out = new PrintStream(fos); 
  
     out.println("network_mode = " + nm+ "\n"); 
     out.println("security_level = " + sl + "\n"); 
   
     fos.close(); 
     out.close(); 
      
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
  System.out.println("Execption Thrown in Write_DP e: " +e); 
 } 
    } 
 
/********************************************************************** 
Class: ContinueButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action handler for the 







private class ContinueButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     try{ 
  
  System.out.println("Continue Button Selected"); 
 
  p.removeAll(); 
   
  p.setLayout(new FlowLayout() ); 
  p.add(qoss_menu); 
  p.add(status_label); 
  pchoices.setLayout(new GridLayout(4,2)); 
  pchoices.add(sp_button); 
  pchoices.add(ds_button); 
  pchoices.add(dp_button); 
  pchoices.add(ep_button); 
   
  pchoices.add(b2_button); 
  pchoices.add(b3_button); 
  pchoices.add(b4_button); 
  pchoices.add(ex_button); 
  p.add(pchoices); 
   
  setSize(450,150); 




   
   
 catch (Exception s) { 
   System.out.println("Exception thrown in Continue Button 
Handler."); 
   System.out.println("Exception: "+s); 
 } 
     








Class: SPRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener 
 
- Method: itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) – action handler for the start 




// Start IPsec Process 
    
private class SPButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
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 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
      
  System.out.println("Start IPsec choice was selected."); 
 
  // check to see if process is running 
  if (dsf.daemon_running()) { 
 
   status_label.setText("IPsec is already running!"); 
 
  } 
 
  else {   // ipsec is not running 
 
   // load default security level and network mode into 
dp file 
 
      load_dp_file("default","default");    
   initialize_connection_index_file(); 
 
   // Flushing ipsec mechanism 
   dsf.flush_ipsec(); 
    
   // Mount kernel 
   dsf.mount_kern(); 
    
   // LOad SPD 
   dsf.load_spd(); 
 
   //start ipsec mechanism 
   dsf.start_ipsec(); 






Class: DSRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener 
 
- Method: itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) – action handler for Display 




private class DSButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
 
  System.out.println("Display Negotiated SA's was 
selected."); 
   
  ip = new ipsecinfo(); 
  ip.start(); 
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Class: INFButtonHandler implements ItemListener– item listener for stop 
ipsec button. 
 






private class INFButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
    public void actionPerformed (ActionEvent e) 
    { 
  
 reset_error_panel(); 
 System.out.println("Stop IPsec choice was selected."); 
 
  if (dsf.daemon_running()) { 
 
   System.out.println("IPsec  is running...."); 
   dsf.tear_down_connection();  
   dsf.stop_ipsec(); 
  } 
  else System.out.println("IPsec is not running...."); 
 
 





Class: TCPButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
 






private class TCPButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
  System.out.println("TCP Dump start...."); 
   
  tcp = new tcpdump(); 
  tcp.start(); 







Class: SPDButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action handler for Display 






private class SPDButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
  System.out.println("Display SPD"); 
   
  spd = new SPD(); 
   







Class: DSPButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
 
- Method: actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) – action handler for Display 





private class DSPButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
  System.out.println("Display Security Policy"); 
   
  spfk = new SPFK(); 







Class: EXButtonHandler implements ActionListener– action handler for 
Exit  button. 
 







private class EXButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
  System.out.println("Exit IPsec choice was selected."); 
 
  if (dsf.daemon_running()) { 
 
   System.out.println("IPsec  is running...."); 
   dsf.tear_down_connection();  
   dsf.stop_ipsec(); 
  } 
 







Class: DPButtonHandler implements ActionListener 
 






private class DPButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
     //dp_choice.setSelected(false); 
  System.out.println("Dynamic Parameter selection choice was 
selected."); 












public static void main (String args[]) 
{ 
 demo d = new demo(); 




  new WindowAdapter() { 
   public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) 
   { 
 
    System.exit(0); 
   } 









APPENDIX D.  SPD.JAVA 
 
/********************************************************************* 
Class SPD.java - This class creates and handles the 

























public class SPD { 
    JSeparator separator; 
    demo_support_functions dsf; 
    private static Runtime  rt; 
    InputStream in; 
    Process p; 
    FileInputStream fin; 
    JPanel contentPane; 
    JPanel panel, toolbar; 
    JPanel [] subpanel1, subpanel2, subpanel3; 
    JButton exitButton; 
    JTextField []sourceIP; 
    JTextField []sourcePort; 
    JTextField []destIP; 
    JTextField []destPort; 
    JTextField []protocol; 
    JTextField []sa; 
    JFrame j; 
   
/********************************************************************** 






    public SPD() { 
 j = new JFrame("Security Policy Database"); 
  
        j.addWindowListener(new WindowAdapter() { 
            public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) { 
                doExit(); 
            } 
        }); 
 
 rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
 dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 
 
        // build GUI 
  
 contentPane = new JPanel(new BorderLayout()); 
      panel = new JPanel(new GridLayout(0,1)); 
  
 subpanel1 = new JPanel[12]; 
 subpanel2 = new JPanel[12]; 
 subpanel3 = new JPanel[12]; 
 sourceIP = new JTextField[12]; 
 sourcePort = new JTextField[12]; 
 destIP = new JTextField[12]; 
 destPort = new JTextField[12]; 
 protocol = new JTextField[12]; 
 sa = new JTextField[12]; 
  
 toolbar = new JPanel(); 
         
 for (int c=0;c<11;c++) { 
     // source IP 
     subpanel1[c] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,4)); 
     //panel.add(subpanel[0]); 
     subpanel1[c].add(new JLabel("Source IP:   ")); 
     subpanel1[c].add(sourceIP[c] = new JTextField("DATA NOT 
AVAILABLE")); 
     sourceIP[c].setEditable(false); 
 
     // source port 
 
         
     subpanel1[c].add(new JLabel("Source Port:   ")); 
     subpanel1[c].add(sourcePort[c] = new JTextField(4)); 
     sourcePort[c].setEditable(false); 
 
     // dest IP 
     subpanel2[c] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,4)); 
     subpanel2[c].add(new JLabel("Destination IP:   ")); 
     subpanel2[c].add(destIP[c] = new JTextField(20)); 
     destIP[c].setEditable(false); 
 
     // dest port 
     subpanel2[c].add(new JLabel("Destination Port:   ")); 
     subpanel2[c].add(destPort[c] = new JTextField(4)); 
     destPort[c].setEditable(false); 
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     // protocol 
     subpanel3[c] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,4)); 
     subpanel3[c].add(new JLabel("Protocol:   ")); 
     subpanel3[c].add(protocol[c] = new JTextField(4)); 
     protocol[c].setEditable(false); 
 
     // SA 
     subpanel3[c].add(new JLabel("SA(Addr/Proto/Type/Dir):")); 
     subpanel3[c].add(sa[c]= new JTextField(20)); 
     sa[c].setEditable(false); 
 } 
     // separator 
     separator = new JSeparator(SwingConstants.HORIZONTAL); 
 
        // panel for exit button 
 
        toolbar.add(exitButton = new JButton("Exit")); 
        exitButton.setToolTipText("Exit Security Policy Database"); 
        exitButton.setMnemonic ('x'); 
        exitButton.addActionListener(new ActionListener() { 
            public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
                doExit(); 
            } 
        }); 
     
  
        
 contentPane.add(panel, BorderLayout.NORTH); 





      // now fill in actual values 
      setTextFields(); 
    } 
 
    // ---------------------------------------------------------- 
    // exit 
    // ---------------------------------------------------------- 
    void doExit() { 
        j.dispose(); 




Method: String create_SPD_input() – this method retrieves 
the SPD data, stores it in a string and returns it to the 
calling function. 
 
- Input: none. 
- Output:  




    String create_SPD_input() { 
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 String SPD_s = new String(); 
 
  try { 
      
         String[] s = new String[3]; 
       s[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
       s[1] = new String("-c"); 
       s[2] = new String("netstat -rn -f encap"); 
        
       p=rt.exec(s); 
       p.waitFor(); 
       in = p.getInputStream(); 
       System.out.println("buffer size: "+in.available()); 
       byte[] buffer = new byte[in.available()]; 
       in.read(buffer); 
       SPD_s = new String(buffer); 
       System.out.println("spd buffer: \n"+SPD_s); 
        
  } 
  catch (Exception e) { 
       System.out.println("Exception thrown in create spd input 
"+e); 
   
  } 
 
  return (SPD_s); 




Method: setTextFields() – this method parses the input 
string and displays the SPD data in the JFrame. 
- Input: none. 
- Output: none 
 
**********************************************************************/ 
     
    void setTextFields() { 
 String s = create_SPD_input(); 
 int field_counter = -1; 
 
  StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(s); 
        try { 
     if (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
 
  System.out.println("SPD data..."); 
  // skip initial tokens 
  for (int i=0; i<9; i++) { 
      System.out.println("next spd token: "+st.nextToken()); 
  } 
 
  // set text fields 
  
  // Check for no entries in table 
  if (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
      //panel.removeAll(); 
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      while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
   field_counter= field_counter +1;      
      
   String temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   sourceIP[field_counter].setText(temps); 
      
   temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   sourcePort[field_counter].setText(temps); 
   panel.add(subpanel1[field_counter]); 
   subpanel1[field_counter].setVisible(true); 
 
   temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   destIP[field_counter].setText(temps); 
             
   temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   destPort[field_counter].setText(temps); 
   panel.add(subpanel2[field_counter]); 
   subpanel2[field_counter].setVisible(true); 
 
   temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   protocol[field_counter].setText(temps); 
 
   temps = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println("next spd token: "+temps); 
   sa[field_counter].setText(temps); 
   panel.add(subpanel3[field_counter]); 
   subpanel3[field_counter].setVisible(true); 
   
   panel.add( new 
JSeparator(SwingConstants.HORIZONTAL)); 
 
      } 
  } 
  else {  // empty table 
      panel.add(new JLabel("No Entries Exist in the SPD")); 
  } 
 
     } 
     else { 
  System.out.println("Empty String...no tokens to parse."); 
     } 
 
        } catch (NoSuchElementException e) { 
            System.out.println("SPD tokenizer error in string <" 
                                                  + s + ">\n" + e); 
        } 
     
 
 j.pack(); 






APPENDIX E.  DEMO_SUPPORT_FUNCTIONS.JAVA 
 
/********************************************************************* 











public class demo_support_functions { 
  
 private static Runtime  rt; 
 private int connection_count = 0; 
 private int connection_index = 0; 
     private Process p; 









public demo_support_functions() { 
 
 try { 
     connection_count =0; 
     connection_index=0; 
 rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
 } 
 
 catch (Exception e) {  
 








Method: flush_ipsec() – generates the run time commands to 
flush the IPsec mechanism. 
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- Input: none. 






public void flush_ipsec() { 
 
 try { 
 
  System.out.println("performing ipsecadm flush..."); 
  String[] s = new String[3]; 
  s[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s[2] = new String("ipsecadm flush"); 
  rt.exec(s).waitFor(); 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 






Method: load_spd() – generates the run time commands to 
load SPD with the security policy. 
 
- Input: none. 





public void load_spd() { 
 
 
 try {  
  System.out.println("performing sh vpn28_ah_a - loading SPD 
with defaults"); 
  String[] s2 = new String[3]; 
  s2[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s2[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s2[2] = new String("sh /root/vpn28_ah_a"); 
  rt.exec(s2); 
 } 
 
 catch (Exception e) { 










Method: mount_kern() – generates the run time commands to 
mount the kernel. 
 
- Input: none. 





public void mount_kern() { 
 
 try { 
  System.out.println("Mounting Kern"); 
      
  String[] s3 = new String[3]; 
  s3[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s3[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s3[2] = new String("sh /root/mount_kern"); 
  rt.exec(s3); 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
  System.out.println("Excpetion thrown in mount_kern : "+e); 







Method: start_ipsec() – generates the run time commands to 
start the ipsec mechanism. 
  
- Input: none. 




public void start_ipsec() { 
 
 try { 
  System.out.println("Executing isakmpd/ipsec"); 
      
  String[] s3 = new String[3]; 
  s3[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s3[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s3[2] = new String("isakmpd"); 
  rt.exec(s3).waitFor(); 
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 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
  System.out.println("Excpetion thrown in start_ipsec : "+e); 







Method: stop_ipsec() – generates the run time commands to 
stop the IPsec mechanism. 
- Input: none. 





public void stop_ipsec() { 
 
 try { 
 
  System.out.println("Stopping IPsec..."); 
 
  File f = new File("/var/run/isakmpd.pid"); 
 
  if (f.exists()) { 
 
       FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
 
   byte[] buffer = new byte[fis.available()]; 
  
   fis.read(buffer); 
      
   String tempString = new  String(); 
  
   String kill_value = new String(buffer);     
      
   System.out.println("Killing the ipsec process id: " + 
kill_value); 
   String[] s3 = new String[3]; 
   s3[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
   s3[1] = new String("-c"); 
   s3[2] = new String("kill " + kill_value); 
       
   rt.exec(s3).waitFor(); 
     
   fis.close(); 
  } 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 










Method read_connection_index_file()– reads in the current 
value of the index counter from a file. 
- Input: none. 




public void read_connection_index_file() { 
 
    System.out.println("Reading connection file"); 
 
    int test =5; 
 
    try { 
  
     File f = new File ("connection_number"); 
      
     FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
     int size = fis.available(); 
 
     byte[] buffer = new byte[size]; 
  
     String ts = new String(); 
 
     fis.read(buffer); 
 
     String tempString = new  String(buffer); 
     StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(tempString); 
     while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
  try { 
      ts = st.nextToken(); 
      System.out.println("ts token:"+ts+":"); 
      connection_index = Integer.parseInt(ts); 
      System.out.println("ci:"+connection_index); 
  } 
  catch (Exception ef) {System.out.println("error dude: 
"+ef);} 
     } 
          
     fis.close(); 
  
    } 
    catch (Exception e) { System.out.println("Exception Thrown in 







Method: write_connection_index_file()– writes the current 
value of the index counter to a file. 
- Input: none. 





public void write_connection_index_file() { 
 
 try { 
     System.out.println("Writing connection# to the file."); 
     File f = new File("/root/demo/connection_number");     
    FileOutputStream("/root/demo/connection_number");  
     FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
     PrintStream out = new PrintStream(fos); 
     out.println(connection_index); 
      
     fos.close(); 
     out.close(); 
 
      
 } 
 
 catch (Exception e) { 
 
  System.out.println("Execption Thrown in Write_CF e: " +e); 
 } 





Method: daemon_running() – checks to see if the IPsec 
process is currently running. 
- Input: none. 
- Output:  
- Boolean result – true if IPsec is currently running 





public boolean daemon_running() { 
   
    boolean result = false; 
 
    try { 
 
 System.out.println ("Testing to see if daemon is running..."); 
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 String[] s = new String[3]; 
 s[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
 s[1] = new String("-c"); 
 s[2] = new String("ps -ax | grep isakmpd | grep -v grep > 
daemon_search"); 
 rt.exec(s).waitFor(); 
        
      File f = new File("daemon_search"); 
  
 if (f.exists()) { 
     System.out.println("File daemon_search exists..");} 
 else { System.out.println("file daemon_search does not exist!");} 
        long test = f.length(); 
 
 FileInputStream in = new FileInputStream(f);   
  
 int size_before = in.available(); 
 
 byte[] buffer = new byte[size_before]; 
  
      in.read(buffer); 
 String tempString = new  String(); 
  
 String record = new String(buffer); 
 in.close(); 
  
 if (size_before > 0) { 
 
     System.out.println("daemon is running."); 
 
     // write to file to stop daemon... 
      




 else {  
     System.out.println("daemon is not running."); 
     result = false; 
 } 
  
    } 
    catch (Exception e) { 
  System.out.println("Exception Throw is_daemon_running: " +e); 
    } 
 
    return (result); 





 Method: pause() – sleeps for a given number of seconds. 
  - Input:  
int – number of seconds. 
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     public void pause(int t) { 
 try { 
 
            long pauseTime = (long) (t*1000); 
     Thread.sleep(pauseTime); 
 } 
 catch (Exception etp) { 
       System.out.print("Run Error: " + etp); 
 } 
    } 
 
/******************************************************************* 
 Method: stop_tcpdump() – terminates tcpdump process. 
- Input: void 
  - Output: void 
*******************************************************************/ 
 
 public void stop_tcpdump() { 
 
     boolean notDone = true; 
 
     while (notDone) { 
 
 try { 
      System.out.println("in stop tcp_dump"); 
         String[] s = new String[3]; 
       s[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
       s[1] = new String("-c"); 
       s[2] = new String("ps -ax | grep tcpdump | grep -v grep | 
grep -v /bin/sh"); 
      p = rt.exec(s); 
       
       p.waitFor(); 
       
       in = p.getInputStream(); 
       System.out.println("performed rt."); 
 
  } 
  catch (Exception e) { 
       System.out.println("Exception thrown in stop_tcp_dump"+e); 
   
  } 
 
 
 String line = null; 
 
 try { 
       
     BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(in));      
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     line = br.readLine(); 
      
     if (line != null) { 
 
  System.out.println("tcpdump found running... process output 
#: "+line); 
    
  pause(3); 
   
  String s = new String(line);     
      
  StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(s); 
      
  String kill_value = st.nextToken(); 
    
  String[] s3 = new String[3]; 
  s3[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s3[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s3[2] = new String("kill " + kill_value); 
       
  rt.exec(s3).waitFor(); 
     
  System.out.println("Killing the following process: 
"+kill_value); 
 
     } 
     else { 
  System.out.println("tcpdump is not running"); 
  notDone = false; 
     } 
 } 
 catch (Exception e){ 
     System.out.println("Error thrown while trying to read tcpdump 
kill process id"); 
     notDone = false; 
 } 




Method: read_file() – reads in data from the input file. 
  - Input:  
String – file name. 
  - Output:  





    public String read_file(String file_name) { 
 
 String s = new String(); 
 int file_size =0; 
 byte[] buffer; 
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 try { 
 
     File f = new File(file_name); 
 
         FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
      
     file_size = fis.available(); 
 
     buffer = new byte[file_size]; 
  
     fis.read(buffer); 
      
     s = new String(buffer);     
  
     System.out.println("String read: /n <"+s+">"); 
  
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
     System.out.println("Error reading from file: " + file_name + 




 return (s); 





Method: tear_down_connections() – tears down existing 
security association (SA) connections between peers. 
- Input: none. 




public void tear_down_connection () { 
 
    System.out.println("Tear_Down_Connection"); 
    calc_connection(); 
    read_connection_index_file(); 
    try { 
 
 // assumption made that for every SA there are a pair 
 int counter_temp = connection_count/2; 
 
 if (connection_count == 0) { 
 
     System.out.println("No current SAs exist"); 
 
 } 
 else { 
     for (int count = 1; count <=counter_temp; count++) { 
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  write_to_fifo(); 
  if (count != counter_temp) { 
      connection_index++; 
  } 
  //write_to_fifo(); 
     } 
      
 } 
  
 File f = new File("/var/run/isakmpd.pid"); 
 
 if (f.exists()) { 
    
      FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
 
  byte[] buffer = new byte[fis.available()]; 
  
  fis.read(buffer); 
      
  fis.close(); 
 
  String tempString = new  String(); 
  
  String kill_value = new String(buffer);     
      
  String[] s3 = new String[3]; 
  s3[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
  s3[1] = new String("-c"); 
  s3[2] = new String("kill -HUP " + kill_value); 
       
  rt.exec(s3).waitFor(); 
     
  } 
  
    } 
 
    catch (Exception e) { 
 System.out.println("Error in SPI count."); 
 System.out.println("Exception thrown in tear_down_connection e: 
"+e); 
    } 
 







Method: write_to_fifo()– uses the current connection index 
to write teardown instructions to the IPsec mechanism in 
/var/run/isakmpd.fifo file.  
- Input: none. 






public void write_to_fifo() { 
 
    try { 
 
 System.out.println("writing to fifo"); 
 
 File f = new File("/var/run/isakmpd.fifo"); 
  
 FileOutputStream fout = new FileOutputStream(f); 
        
 PrintStream out = new PrintStream(fout); 
        
        out.println("t Connection-"+connection_index); 
  
        out.flush(); 
        
        out.close(); 





   
  catch (Exception e) {System.out.println("Exception thrown in 






Method: synchronized copy_kern_ipsec() – copies the file 
/kern/ipsec (file containing the current security 
associations) to /root/demo/tempipsec (file used to parse 
security associations). This method is synchronized to 
avoid a deadlock when various threads, created by the demo, 
compete for this function. 
- Input: none. 






public synchronized void copy_kern_ipsec() { 
 
 try { 
           
      pause(1); 
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    String[] s = new String[3]; 
    s[0]= new String("/bin/sh"); 
    s[1] = new String("-c"); 
    s[2] = new String("cp /kern/ipsec /root/demo/tempipsec"); 
    rt.exec(s).waitFor(); 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
     System.out.println("in demo-support Exception thrown in 
copying file e: "+e); 
        } 





Method: calc_connection()– calculates the number of 
existing security associations (SA) by reading 
/root/demo/tempipsec and parsing the information to count 
existing SAs. 
- Input: none. 






public void calc_connection() { 
 
    connection_count=0; 
 
try { 
    copy_kern_ipsec();  
    File f = new File("/root/demo/tempipsec");  
 
    pause(1); 
  
    if (f.exists()) { 
  
     FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
 
     byte[] buffer = new byte[fis.available()]; 
  
          fis.read(buffer); 
     String tempString = new  String(); 
 
     String record = new String(buffer); 
 
     StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
     while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
   
  tempString =st.nextToken(); 
 
  if  (tempString.equals("SPI")) { 
264 
      // advance connection_counter 
      connection_count++; 
  } 
   
     }//   
  
     fis.close(); 
 } 
 
 else {   
      
      System.out.println("/kern/ipsec File does not exist..."); 
 } 
    } 
    catch (Exception e) { System.out.println("In Calc_Connections 
Exception Thrown: "+e);} 










Class: SPFK.java - The goal of this class is to translate 
KeyNote’s complex assertion format into an easy to 












public class SPFK { 
    private JFrame frame; 
    private JTextArea textArea; 
    private demo_support_functions dsf; 
    private JButton exitButton; 
    private JPanel contentPane, toolbar; 




Method: SPFK() – this method initializes the JFrame and 
reads in the security policy data from a file. 
- Input: none. 





   public SPFK() { 
         
 dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 
 
      textArea = new JTextArea(15, 40); 
      JScrollPane scrollPane = new JScrollPane(textArea); 
      contentPane = new JPanel(new BorderLayout()); 
      toolbar = new JPanel(); 
 toolbar.setSize(100,75); 
       





exitButton = new JButton("Exit"); 
 exitButton.addActionListener(new ActionListener() { 
 public void actionPerformed (ActionEvent e) { 
   
  frame.dispose(); 
     } 
  }); 
 
 toolbar.add(exitButton); 
 contentPane.add(scrollPane, BorderLayout.NORTH); 
 contentPane.add(toolbar,BorderLayout.SOUTH); 
      frame.getContentPane().add(contentPane); 
      frame.pack(); 
 frame.setVisible(true); 
  
 String bigString = new String(); 
  
bigString = dsf.read_file("/etc/isakmpd/keynotednffinal.policy"); 
  
      try { 
            StringTokenizer policyST = new StringTokenizer(bigString, 
"|"); 
            while (policyST.hasMoreTokens()) { 
                String policy = policyST.nextToken(); 
                showPolicy(policy); 
            } 
        } catch (NoSuchElementException e) { 
            System.out.println("SPFK.Error: " + e); 
        } 
 




Method: showPolicy(String policy) – takes input string 
(security proposal ), parses it into security attributes 
and dynamic parameters, and appends to the scrollable text 
area. 
- Input: 
   - String – security proposal to be parsed. 




    private void showPolicy(String policy) throws 
NoSuchElementException { 
 
        String app_domain = null; 
        String esp_auth_alg = null; 
        String esp_enc_alg = null; 
        String esp_present = null; 
   String ah_auth_alg = null; 
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        String ah_present = null; 
        String local_filter_port = null; 
        String network_mode = null; 
        String remote_filter_port = null; 
        String security_level = null; 
 
        StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(policy); 
        // note that the string tokenizer cannot use hasMoreTokens() 
        // because the token delimiter changes during parsing. 
 
 System.out.println("POlicy passed: "+policy); 
 
        while (st.countTokens() != 1) { 
            String key = st.nextToken("\"() &\r\n"); 
            String equal = st.nextToken("\""); 
            String value = st.nextToken("\""); 
 
            if (key.equals("app_domain"))               app_domain = 
value; 
            if (key.equals("esp_auth_alg"))             esp_auth_alg = 
value; 
            else if (key.equals("esp_enc_alg"))         esp_enc_alg = 
value; 
            else if (key.equals("esp_present"))         esp_present = 
value; 
            else if (key.equals("app_domain"))          app_domain = 
value; 
            else if (key.equals("local_filter_port"))   
local_filter_port = value; 
            else if (key.equals("network_mode"))        network_mode = 
value; 
            else if (key.equals("remote_filter_port"))  
remote_filter_port = value; 
            else if (key.equals("security_level"))      security_level 
= value; 
            else if (key.equals("ah_present"))      ah_present = value; 
            else if (key.equals("ah_auth_alg"))      ah_auth_alg = 
value; 
             
     else System.out.println("SPFK.Unrecognized  key: " + key); 
        } 
 
      textArea.append("----------------------------------------------
\n"); 
 addText("\n network_mode: ", network_mode); 
 addText("\n security_level: ", security_level); 
      addText("\n esp_present: ", esp_present); 
 addText("\n ah_present: ", ah_present); 
 
 addText("\n esp_enc_alg: ", esp_enc_alg); 
      addText("\n esp_auth_alg: ", esp_auth_alg); 
 addText("\n ah_auth_alg: ", ah_auth_alg); 
  
      addText("\n local_filter_port: ", local_filter_port); 
  
      addText("\n remote_filter_port: ", remote_filter_port); 
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      textArea.append("\n\n"); 




Method: addText((String, String) – takes input strings and 
appends them to the scrollable text area. 
- Input: 
   - String – tag. 
   - String – tag value. 






    private void addText(String description, String value) { 
        if (value != null) { 
            textArea.append(description + value); 
        } 
















Class: dp_console.java - The dynamic parameter console 
provides the user with a selection mechanism for network 













public class dp_console extends JFrame { 
 
    private JFrame actionframe; 
 
    private JButton submit, exit; 
    private ButtonGroup networkmode, securitylevel; 
    private JRadioButton nm_normal, nm_crisis, nm_impact, sl_high, 
sl_medium, sl_low; 
    private JPanel panel,p,pdpbuttons, 
p2,ptitle,pcomments,pactionbuttons;  
    private JLabel sl_title, nm_title, comment, blank1, blank2, blank3; 
 
    String current_network_mode, current_security_level; 
    private static Runtime rt; 





Method: dp_console() constructor – initializes the dynamic 





public dp_console() { 
 
 





  new WindowAdapter() { 
   public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) 
   { 
    //if (input != null) 
    // closeFile(); 
 
    dispose(); 
   } 





 p = new JPanel(); 
 p2 = new JPanel();  
 ptitle = new JPanel(); 
 pcomments = new JPanel(); 
 pdpbuttons = new JPanel(); 
 pactionbuttons = new JPanel(); 
 p.setLayout(new FlowLayout()); 
 ptitle.setLayout(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
 pcomments.setLayout(new GridLayout(0,1)); 
 pdpbuttons.setLayout(new GridLayout(4,2)); 
 actionframe = new JFrame(); 
 pactionbuttons.setLayout(new FlowLayout()); 
      setContentPane(p); 
  
 current_network_mode = null; 
 current_security_level = null; 
  
 comment = new JLabel("                                    "); 
 
 blank1 = new JLabel(); 
 blank2 = new JLabel(); 
 blank3 = new JLabel(); 
  
  sl_low = new JRadioButton ("Low", false); 
  sl_medium = new JRadioButton ("Medium", false); 
  sl_high = new JRadioButton ("High", false); 
 
  nm_normal = new JRadioButton ("Normal", false); 
  nm_crisis = new JRadioButton ("Crisis", false); 
  nm_impact = new JRadioButton ("Impacted", false); 
  
 
 nm_title = new JLabel("Network Modes Selection"); 
 sl_title = new JLabel("Security Levels Selection");  
 
  
 networkmode = new ButtonGroup(); 
 securitylevel = new ButtonGroup(); 
  
 submit = new JButton("Submit"); 











 NMRadioButtonHandler nm_handler = new NMRadioButtonHandler(); 
 SLRadioButtonHandler sl_handler = new SLRadioButtonHandler(); 
 SubmitButtonHandler sb_handler = new SubmitButtonHandler(); 








































 setSize(350, 150); 
      setResizable(true); 
 setVisible (false); 
 
 dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 







Method: start_dp_console() – makes the dp_console visible. 
  - Input: none. 





public void start_dp_console() { 
 
 
 setVisible (true); 
 




Method: reset_error_panel() – clears error message panel. 
  - Input: none. 














Method: set_dynamic_parameters() – stores the value of the 
dynamic parameters in a file. 
  - Input: none. 





public void set_dynamic_parameters() { 
 
  delete_file(); 








Method: write_dynamic_parameters_file – writes the global 
current value of the dynamic parameters to 
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters.     
  - Input: none. 






public void write_dynamic_parameters_file() { 
 
 try { 
     File f = new 
File("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters");     
      
     FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
      
     PrintStream out = new PrintStream(fos); 
  
     out.println("network_mode = " + current_network_mode+ "\n"); 
     out.println("security_level = " + current_security_level + 
"\n"); 
   
     fos.close(); 
     out.close(); 
 
      
 } 
 
 catch (Exception e) { 
 
  System.out.println("Execption Thrown in Write_DP e: " +e); 
 } 






Method: print_dynamic_parameters_file() – displays the 
current value of network mode and security level to the 
system console for trouble shooting purposes. 
- Input: none. 






public void print_dynamic_parameters_file() { 
 
 
    try { 
  File f = new File("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters"); 
     
  FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
      
  int size_before = fis.available(); 
      
  System.out.println("file size: " + size_before); 
  
  byte[] buffer = new byte[fis.available()]; 
  
       fis.read(buffer); 
      
  String tempString = new  String(); 
  
  String record = new String(buffer); 
   
  System.out.println("File : " + record); 
 
  fis.close(); 
   
    }    
    catch (Exception e) { 






Method: read_dynamic_parameters_file() –  reads in the 
value of network mode and security level from file:  
/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters and stores them in 
the class global variables respectively.  
- Input: none. 




public void read_dynamic_parameters_file() { 
 
    System.out.println("Reading dynamic parameters"); 
 
    try { 
  
 File f = new File("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters"); 
 
 if (f.exists()) { 
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     System.out.println("dynamic_parameters File exists..."); 
      
     FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
 
     byte[] buffer = new byte[fis.available()]; 
  
          fis.read(buffer); 
      
     String tempString = new  String(); 
  
     String record = new String(buffer); 
      
     StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
      
     while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
          
  tempString =st.nextToken(); 
 
  if  (tempString.equals("network_mode")) { 
 
      // skip equals sign 
      st.nextToken(); 
 
      current_network_mode = st.nextToken(); 
  } 
 
 
  else if  (tempString.equals("security_level")) { 
 
       // skip equals sign 
      st.nextToken(); 
 
      current_security_level = st.nextToken(); 
  } 
     } 
     fis.close(); 
 } 
 
 else {   
      
      System.out.println("dynamic parameters File does not 
exist..."); 
 } 
    } 
    catch (Exception e) { System.out.println("Exception Thrown reading 






Method: delete_file() – deletes existing dynamic parameter file. 
  - Input: none. 





public void delete_file() { 
 
 try { 
      
      
     File f = new 
File("/usr/src/sbin/isakmpd/dynamic_parameters"); 
     f.delete(); 
     System.out.println("deleting dynamic_parameters file."); 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
     System.out.println("Exception thrown while trying to delete 
dynamic_parameters file. exception: "+e);} 
 





Class: SLRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener – 





private class SLRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener { 
 
 public void itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) 
 { 
 
     reset_error_panel(); 
 
     if (current_security_level == null) { 
 
  current_security_level = new String(); 
     } 
      
     System.out.println("in SL Radio Button item listener"); 
     if (e.getSource() == sl_high) { 
      
  System.out.println("Security Level High selected."); 
  current_security_level = "high"; 
    
     } 
      
   
     else if (e.getSource() == sl_medium) { 
       
  System.out.println("Security Level medium selected."); 
  current_security_level= "medium"; 
                        
     } 
 
     else if (e.getSource() == sl_low) { 
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  System.out.println("Security Level low selected."); 
  current_security_level = "low"; 
                        
     } 
      
 } 
} 
     




Class: SubmitButtonHandler implements ActionListener – 
submit button action handler. 
 
******************************************************************/ 
     
private class SubmitButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     try { 
  reset_error_panel(); 
     System.out.println("Submit Button selected"); 
   
     if 
((current_network_mode==null)&&(current_security_level==null)){ 
         
  comment.setText("You must select a network mode and 
security level"); 
     }    
 
     else if (current_network_mode == null){ 
 
   comment.setText("You must select a network mode"); 
     } 
     else if (current_security_level== null) { 
   
  comment.setText("You must select a security level."); 
     } 
     else { 
 
         comment.setText("                                      
"); 
 
  set_dynamic_parameters(); 
  print_dynamic_parameters_file(); 
      
  if (dsf.daemon_running()) { 
 
      System.out.println("daemon is running."); 
       
      dsf.copy_kern_ipsec(); 
      dsf.tear_down_connection(); 
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      dsf.flush_ipsec(); 
      dsf.load_spd(); 
   }   
   else { // daemon not running.... 
       
      comment.setText("Please start IPsec mechanism from 
Qoss menu");     
   } 
   
     } 
     } 
     catch (Exception e2) { 
   
  System.out.println("Exception Thrown in Submit Button 
Handler."); 
  System.out.println("Exception: "+e2); 
     } 
 } 
} 





Class: ExitButtonHandler implements ActionListener – Exit 




private class ExitButtonHandler implements ActionListener { 
 
 public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
  
  System.out.println("Close Button Selected"); 
 
      dispose(); 









Class: NMRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener – 
network mode radio button action handler  
 
******************************************************************/ 
     
private class NMRadioButtonHandler implements ItemListener { 
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 public void itemStateChanged(ItemEvent e) 
 { 
     reset_error_panel(); 
     if (current_network_mode == null) { 
   
  current_network_mode = new String(); 
     } 
 
     if (e.getSource() == nm_normal){ 
 
      
  System.out.println("Network Mode Normal selected."); 
  current_network_mode = "normal"; 
                    
     } 
      
     else if (e.getSource() == nm_crisis){ 
 
       
  System.out.println("Network Mode Crisis selected."); 
  current_network_mode = "crisis"; 
                      
     } 
 
     else if (e.getSource() == nm_impact){ 
      
  System.out.println("Network Mode Impacted selected."); 
  current_network_mode = "impacted"; 
                    
     } 
 } 
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Class: ipsecinfo.java - provides a display mechanism for 











public class ipsecinfo extends Thread { 
    File f2 =  new File("/root/demo/tempipsec"); 
    private static Runtime  rt; 
    private JFrame j; 
    private JTextField[] connected_label, unconnected_label ; 
    public JTextField[] destination, source, protocol, enc_alg, 
enc_auth, auth_alg; 
    private JTextField[] title, dest_label, src_label, protocol_label, 
enc_alg_label, enc_auth_label, auth_alg_label,status, blank1, blank2; 
    private JTextField blank_field; 
 //private Container c; 
    private ObjectInputStream input; 
    private BorderLayout layout; 
    private GridLayout gl; 
    private JPanel[] jp1, jp2, jp3, jp4, jp5, jp6, jp7, blank; 
    private JPanel p; 
    private String spi[]; 
    private JPanel toolbar; 
    private JPanel[] pvec; 
    private JButton exit; 
    private int SA_number =0; 
    private JPanel contentPane; 
    boolean first_time = true; 
    boolean test_catch = false; 
    demo_support_functions dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 









public ipsecinfo() { 
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    System.out.println("Test1.."); 
 
    rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
 
    j = new JFrame("OpenBSD IPsec Status Window"); 
  
 j.addWindowListener( 
  new WindowAdapter() { 
   public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) 
   { 
    j.dispose(); 
    kill_thread = true; 
   } 
  } 
 ); 
 
 toolbar = new JPanel(); 
 exit = new JButton("Exit"); 
 exit.addActionListener(new ActionListener() { 
     public void actionPerformed (ActionEvent e) { 
   
  j.dispose(); 
  kill_thread = true; 
   
     } 
 } 
      ); 
 toolbar.add(exit); 
 p = new JPanel(); 
 p.setLayout(new GridLayout(0, 1)); 
 JPanel contentPane = new JPanel(); 
      contentPane.setLayout(new BorderLayout()); 
 contentPane.add(p, BorderLayout.NORTH); 
  contentPane.add(toolbar, BorderLayout.SOUTH); 




 JPanel emptyPanel = new JPanel(); 
 
 JTextField emptyText = new JTextField("No current security 
association (SA) established"); 











- Method: frame_initialization() – initializes the JFrame 
to repaint new SAs. 
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  - Input: none. 





    public void frame_initialization() { 
 
 int number = 10; 
 // JFrame Initiization 
  
  
 pvec = new JPanel[number]; 
 jp1 = new JPanel[number]; 
 jp2 = new JPanel[number];  
 jp3 = new JPanel[number];  
 jp4 = new JPanel[number];  
 jp5 = new JPanel[number];  
 jp6 = new JPanel[number];  
 jp7 = new JPanel[number];  
 blank = new JPanel[number]; 
 spi = new String[number]; 
 
 dest_label = new JTextField[number]; 
 src_label= new JTextField[number]; 
 protocol_label = new JTextField[number]; 
 enc_alg_label = new JTextField[number]; 
 enc_auth_label = new JTextField[number]; 
 auth_alg_label = new JTextField[number];  
 status = new JTextField[number]; 
 connected_label= new JTextField[number]; 
 unconnected_label = new JTextField[number];   
  
 destination = new JTextField[number]; 
 source = new JTextField[number]; 
 protocol = new JTextField[number]; 
 enc_alg = new JTextField[number]; 
 enc_auth = new JTextField[number]; 
 auth_alg = new JTextField[number]; 
 blank1 = new JTextField[number]; 






 p.setLayout(new GridLayout(0, 1)); 
 
 




Method: prelimanary_test(StringTokenizer st) – compares the 
current SA’s in the JFrame with the SA’s from the new file. 
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This is performed to avoid unnecessary painting and 
maintain good display resolution. 
  - Input:  
- StringTokenizer st – contents of the file to be 
verified. 
   - Output: 





    boolean prelimanary_test(StringTokenizer st) { 
 
  
 boolean found_match = false; 
 boolean repaint = false; 
 String tempString = new String(); 
 StringTokenizer s = st; 
 int spi_count =0; 
 
 while (s.hasMoreTokens()) { 
      
     tempString = s.nextToken(); 
     if  (tempString.equals("SPI"))  
  spi_count++; 
 } 
 if (spi_count != SA_number) { 
     repaint = true; 
 } 
 else { 
  
 
     while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
     
  tempString = st.nextToken(); 
  if  (tempString.equals("SPI")) { 
      found_match = false; 
     
      // advance token passed assignment  
      tempString = st.nextToken(); 
      tempString = st.nextToken(); 
      for (int c=0; c<SA_number; c++) { 
 
 
   if (spi[c].equals(tempString)) { 
       found_match = true; 
          
       break; 
 
   } 
      } 
      // if match not found after searching array...repaint 
needed. 
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      if (!found_match) { 
   return(true); 
      } 
       
    
  } 




 return (repaint); 
  




Method: String wait_for_full_copy(String record)– verifies 
that all the required tags exist in the string prior to 
parsing. If not, file is reread and the string is verified 
until all the tags are found. 
  - Input:  
- String record – contents of the file to be 
verified. 
  - Output: 




    public String wait_for_full_copy(String record) { 
 
 StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
 String tempString = new String(); 
 boolean redo = false; 
 boolean keep_looking = true; 
      boolean not_found = true; 
      boolean check1 = false; 
      boolean check2 = false; 
      boolean check3 = false; 
 FileInputStream in2; 
 byte[] buffer; 
 int length; 
     
 try { 
 
 while (st.hasMoreTokens() && keep_looking) { 
          
  tempString =st.nextToken(); 
   
  if  (tempString.equals("SPI")) { 
 
      not_found = true; 
      check1 = false; 
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                check2 = false; 
                check3 = false; 
 
      while (st.hasMoreTokens() && not_found) { 
   tempString = st.nextToken(); 
   if  (tempString.equals("Destination")) { 
       check1 = true; 
   } 
   else if  (tempString.equals("Source")){ 
  
       check2 = true; 
   } 
 
   else if  (tempString.equals("xform")) { 
       check3 = true; 
   } 
 
   if (check1 && check2 && check3) 
       not_found = false; 
   if  (tempString.equals("SPI")){ 
       not_found = false; 
       redo = true; 
   } 
 
      } 
  } 
 
 
  if (redo) { 
      try { 
 
       long pauseTime = (long) (1*1000); 
       Thread.sleep(pauseTime); 
   } 
      catch (Exception etp) { 
       System.out.print("Run Error: " + etp); 
      } 
       
      System.out.println("in wait..."); 
      dsf.copy_kern_ipsec(); 
  
     try { 
    
    in2 = new FileInputStream(f2); 
    buffer = new byte[in2.available()]; 
    in2.read(buffer,0,buffer.length); 
    record = new String(buffer); 
    st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
     
    in2.close(); 
       
    
      } 
        
      catch (Exception e) { 
   System.out.print("in ipsecinfo wait for full copy Run 
Error: " + e); 
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      } 
      redo = false; 
   





 catch (Exception e) { 
   System.out.print("Run Error: " + e); 
           
 } 
 return (record); 






Method: parse(String record) – parses the string into SA’s 
to be displayed on the JFrame.  
- Input:  
- String record – contains the file to be parsed. 





public void parse(String record)  
{ 
    String tempString = new  String(); 
    
    boolean esp = false; 
    boolean ah = false; 
    boolean prelim_test = false; 
    int count = -1; 
    int file_contents_check = 0; 
    
    try { 
 
 boolean no_SA_flag = true; 
  
 record = wait_for_full_copy(record); 
 StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
 StringTokenizer temp_st = new StringTokenizer(record); 
      
 // if prelimanary test passed.... continue parsing... 
 
 if (prelimanary_test(temp_st)) { 
 
     frame_initialization(); 
     test_catch= true; 
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     while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
          
  tempString =st.nextToken(); 
  
  if  (tempString.equals("SPI")) { 
   //skip = 
   st.nextToken(); 
   no_SA_flag=false;    
   
   if (count != -1) { 
        
    //setup blank line 
    blank[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
    blank1[count] = new JTextField(" "); 
    blank2[count] = new JTextField(" "); 
    blank1[count].setEditable(false); 
    blank2[count].setEditable(false); 
    blank[count].add(blank1[count]); 
    blank[count].add(blank2[count]);  
    blank[count].setVisible(true); 
 
    p.add(blank[count]); 
   } 
 
   count = count + 1; 
    
   spi[count]= (String)st.nextToken(); 
    
   esp = false; 
   ah = false;  
  } 
   
  
  else if  (tempString.equals("Destination")) { 
    
      st.nextToken(); 
    
   // setup Destination panel 
   jp1[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
    
   dest_label[count] = new JTextField ("Destination: "); 
   destination[count] = new JTextField(); 
   dest_label[count].setEditable(false); 
   destination[count].setEditable(false); 
   jp1[count].add(dest_label[count]); 
   jp1[count].add(destination[count]); 
   destination[count].setText((String) st.nextToken()); 
   jp1[count].setVisible(true); 
   p.add(jp1[count]); 
   
  } 
  
  else if  (tempString.equals("Source")) { 
    
   st.nextToken(); 
    
   // setup source panel 
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   jp2[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
   src_label[count]= new JTextField ("Source: "); 
   source[count] = new JTextField(); 
   src_label[count].setEditable(false); 
   source[count].setEditable(false);   
   jp2[count].add(src_label[count]); 
   jp2[count].add(source[count]); 
    
   source[count].setText((String) st.nextToken()); 
   jp2[count].setVisible(true); 
   p.add(jp2[count]); 
 
   //setup status panel 
   jp3[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
   status[count] = new JTextField  ("Connection Status: 
"); 
   connected_label[count] = new JTextField  ("IPsec 
connection established");   
   status[count].setEditable(false);  
   connected_label[count].setEditable(false);  
   jp3[count].add(status[count]); 
   jp3[count].add(connected_label[count]); 
   jp3[count].setVisible(true); 
   p.add(jp3[count]); 
    
  } 
  
  else if  (tempString.equals("xform")) { 
   st.nextToken(); 
   tempString =(((String) st.nextToken()) + " " + 
((String) st.nextToken())); 
 
   //setup Protocolpanel 
   jp4[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
   protocol_label[count] = new JTextField  ("Protocol: 
"); 
   protocol[count] = new JTextField(); 
   protocol_label[count].setEditable(false);  
   protocol[count].setEditable(false); 
   jp4[count].add(protocol_label[count]); 
   jp4[count].add(protocol[count]);  
    
   protocol[count].setText(tempString); 
   jp4[count].setVisible(true); 
   p.add(jp4[count]); 
 
   if (tempString.equals("<IPsec ESP>")) { 
    esp = true; 
   } 
   else { System.out.println("Protocol: "+tempString);} 
   if (tempString.equals("<IPsec AH>")) { 
    System.out.println("IPsec AH...."); 
    ah = true; 
   } 
    
  } 
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  else if  (tempString.equals("Encryption")) { 
    
   st.nextToken(); 
   tempString = st.nextToken(); 
    
//setup encryption algo panel 
   jp5[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
   enc_alg_label[count] = new JTextField  ("Encryption 
Algorithm: "); 
   enc_alg[count] = new JTextField(); 
   enc_alg_label[count].setEditable(false);  
   enc_alg[count].setEditable(false); 
   jp5[count].add(enc_alg_label[count]); 
   jp5[count].add(enc_alg[count]);  
    
   enc_alg[count].setText(tempString); 
   jp5[count].setVisible(true); 
   p.add(jp5[count]); 
    
  }   
 
  else if  (tempString.equals("Authentication")) { 
    
   st.nextToken(); 
   tempString = st.nextToken(); 
 
   if (esp) { 
    //setup esp authentication panel 
    jp6[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
    enc_auth_label[count] = new JTextField  
("Encryption Authentication Algorithm: "); 
    enc_auth[count] = new JTextField(); 
    enc_auth_label[count].setEditable(false);  
    enc_auth[count].setEditable(false); 
    jp6[count].add(enc_auth_label[count]); 
    jp6[count].add(enc_auth[count]);  
 
    enc_auth[count].setText(tempString); 
    jp6[count].setVisible(true); 
    p.add(jp6[count]); 
    //esp = false; 
     
   } 
   else if (ah) { 
     
    //setup ah authentication panel 
    jp7[count] = new JPanel(new GridLayout(1,2)); 
    auth_alg_label[count] = new JTextField 
("Authentication Algorithm: "); 
    auth_alg[count] = new JTextField(); 
    auth_alg_label[count].setEditable(false);  
    auth_alg[count].setEditable(false); 
    jp7[count].add(auth_alg_label[count]); 
    jp7[count].add(auth_alg[count]);  
    auth_alg[count].setText(tempString); 
    jp7[count].setVisible(true); 
    p.add(jp7[count]); 
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    //ah = false; 
     
   } 
    
    
  }   
  
   
 
     } 
  
     //Check for no SA's 
      
     if (no_SA_flag) { 
  JPanel emptyPanel = new JPanel(); 
  JTextField emptyText = new JTextField("No current security 
association (SA) established"); 
  emptyText.setEditable(false);  
  emptyPanel.add(emptyText); 
  p.add(emptyPanel); 
  j.pack(); 
     } 
     else { 
  // increment by 1 from array adjustment 
  count = count +1; 
  // setup JFrame size 
  if (count < 2) j.setSize(300, 300); 
  else if (count < 3) j.setSize(400,300); 
  else if (count < 4) j.setSize(400,400); 
  else if (count < 5) j.setSize(400,500); 
  else j.setSize(600,600); 
     } 
 
     test_catch = true; 
     SA_number = count; 
      
 } 
 else { 




    } 
 










- Method: run() – continually checks files date-time-stamp and if file is 
updated copies file and reads data into a string. 
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   - Input: none. 




public void run() 
{ 
 
 int current_file_size=0; 
 int new_file_size= 0; 
 long old_date_time_stamp = 0; 
 long new_date_time_stamp = 0; 
 int file_size=0; 
 
 FileInputStream in1,in2; 
 byte[] buffer; 
 byte[] buffertemp; 
 String record; 
 File f1; //,f2; 
 try { 
     f1 = new File("/kern/ipsec");  
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { System.out.println("Error: "+e);} 
 
 while (!kill_thread) { 
 
     try { 
 
           long pauseTime = (long) (1*1000); 
             Thread.sleep(pauseTime); 
   } 
     catch (Exception etp) { 
             System.out.print("Run Error: " + etp); 
     } 
      
  try { 
 
      if (f1.exists()) { 
    
   in1 = new FileInputStream(f1); 
   new_file_size = in1.available(); 
    
   new_date_time_stamp = f1.lastModified(); 
 
   if (new_date_time_stamp != old_date_time_stamp) { 
 
       in2 = new FileInputStream(f2); 
    //copy file 
       dsf.copy_kern_ipsec(); 
       file_size = in2.available(); 
 
       buffer = new byte[in2.available()]; 
       buffertemp = new byte[in2.available()]; 
                    
    in2.read(buffer,0,buffer.length); 
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       old_date_time_stamp = new_date_time_stamp; 
       record = new String(buffer); 
       in2.close(); 
       parse(record); 
   } 
   in1.close(); 
    
      } 
    
        } 
        
  catch (Exception e) { 
  System.out.print("Run Error: " + e); 
           
  } 
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 Class: tcpdump.java - provide the user with graphical 












public class tcpdump extends Thread { 
    
    private static Runtime  rt; 
    private JFrame j; 
    private JScrollPane jsp;  
    private JLabel jl2; 
    private JTextArea jta; 
    private JPanel toolbar; 
    private JPanel contentPane; 
    private ObjectInputStream input; 
    private BorderLayout layout; 
    private GridLayout gl; 
    private JButton exit; 
    private demo_support_functions dsf; 
    InputStream in; 
    Process p; 









public tcpdump() { 
    dsf = new demo_support_functions(); 
 
    System.out.println("in constructo"); 
 
    rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
    
    jl2 = new JLabel(); 
    jta = new JTextArea(10,70); 
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    jta.setLineWrap(true); 
    jta.setRows(10); 
    contentPane = new JPanel(); 
    toolbar = new JPanel(); 
     
    exit = new JButton("Exit"); 
    exit.addActionListener(new ActionListener() { 
     public void actionPerformed (ActionEvent e) { 
  stop = true; 
  dsf.stop_tcpdump(); 
  j.dispose(); 
     } 
 } 
      ); 
 
    j = new JFrame("OpenBSD IPsec TCPDUMP View Window"); 
   
 j.addWindowListener( 
  new WindowAdapter() { 
   public void windowClosing(WindowEvent e) 
   { 
       stop = true; 
       dsf.stop_tcpdump(); 
       j.dispose(); 
   } 




 jsp = new JScrollPane(jta); 
 jsp.setVerticalScrollBarPolicy(JScrollPane.VERTICAL_SCROLLBAR_AS_
NEEDED); 
  contentPane.setLayout(new BorderLayout()); 
  //contentPane.setPreferredSize(new Dimension(600,250)); 
  contentPane.add(jsp, BorderLayout.NORTH); 
  contentPane.add(toolbar, BorderLayout.SOUTH); 
  toolbar.setSize(600,50); 
  j.setContentPane(contentPane); 
  j.pack(); 
  j.setVisible(true); 
} 
    
/******************************************************************* 
 
Method:  start_tcpdump()  - executes tcpdump and creates a 
pipe to capture packet information. 
- Input: none. 








  try { 
      System.out.println("in try for rt..."); 
       String[] s = new String[3]; 
       s[0]= new String("/bin/csh"); 
       s[1] = new String("-c"); 
       s[2] = new String("tcpdump -N -v"); 
      p=rt.exec(s); 
       in = p.getInputStream(); 
       System.out.println("performed rt."); 
  } 
  catch (Exception e) { 
       System.out.println("Exception thrown in tcpdump"+e); 
   
  } 




Method: repaint_frame() – this method generates the output 
from the piped stream and displays to the scrollable text 
area. 
 -  Input: none. 





    public void  repaint_frame() { 
 
 String line; 
 
 try { 
      System.out.println("in repaint_frame"); 
      BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(in));  
 
      jta.setText("TCPDUMP Output...."); 
 
     while (stop == false) { 
  try { 
       
      line = br.readLine(); 
    
      StringTokenizer token = new StringTokenizer(line, "> 
:.\n\r"); 
      boolean found = false; 
      while (token.hasMoreTokens()) { 
   String tok = token.nextToken(); 
   if (tok.equals("athina") || tok.equals("mshn3")) { 
       found = true; 
   } 
      } 
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      if (found) { 
   System.out.println("here: "+line); 
   jta.append("..ok..\n"); 
   jta.append(line); 
      } 
  } 
  catch (Exception e2) { 
      System.out.println("Exception thrown try to buffer read 
for tcpdump: "+e2);} 
 
     } 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) { 
    System.out.println("Error reading tcpdump file: "+e); 
        } 
 








public void run() 
{ 
 start_tcpdump(); 











APPENDIX J.  ISAKMPD.CONF FILE  
The following is the isakmpd.conf file used in the testing phase. 
Note: only fields required after modifications to IPsec/IKE/ISAKMPD mechanism were 
those related to network connections (IP Addresses and Net masks), ISAKMP Phase I 
and certificates. All ISAKMP Phase II was derived from isakmpd.policy/KeyNote. 
 




Listen-on=  131.120.8.91 
Shared-SADB=  Defined 




#set-up to work specifically with athina with new configuration style 
131.120.8.95=  Peer-131.120.8.95/131.120.8.91 
 
#set-up to work specifically with athina with new configuration style 
[Peer-131.120.8.95/131.120.8.91] 
Phase=   1 
Address=  131.120.8.95 
Local-address=  131.120.8.91 
Transport=  udp 
Configuration=  Default-main-mode 
Authentication= mekmitasdigoat 
 
#Must stay - by CDA 
[Default-main-mode] 
DOI=   IPSEC 
EXCHANGE_TYPE=  ID_PROT 
Transforms=  3DES-SHA 
 
# Certificates stored in PEM format 
[X509-certificates] 
CA-directory=  /etc/isakmpd/ca/ 
Cert-directory= /etc/isakmpd/certs/ 
#Accept-self-signed= defined 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
301 
APPENDIX K.  ISAKMPD.POLICY FILE  
The following is the isakmpd.policy file used in the testing phase. 
Note: Refer to Appendix M Table M.1 for summary of security proposals. 
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Comment: Policy file for Network Modes and Security Levels 
Authorizer: "POLICY" 
Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" 
Conditions: ( (app_domain == "IPsec policy") && 
              ( 
                ( (network_mode == "normal") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "cast") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
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                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "impacted") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
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                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "crisis") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "aes") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
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(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "default") && 
                  (security_level == "default") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                      ( (local_filter_port == "23") || 
(remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                      (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                      (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                      ( (local_filter_port == "79") || 
(remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                      (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
              ) 
            ) 
       -> "true"; 
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APPENDIX L.  KEYNOTEDNFFINAL.POLICY FILE  
The following file is the keynotednffinal.policy file used in the testing phase. The file is 
generated by the DNF module which converts the condition assertion found 
inisakmpd.policy into a DNF form. 
 
Note: Refer to Appendix M Table M.1 for summary of security proposals. 
 
 
((((((((((((((local_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-
sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "high")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && 
(app_domain == "IPsec policy")) || (((((((remote_filter_port == "23") 
&& (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy"))) || 
(((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy")) || 
((((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy")))) || 
(((((((((local_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "cast")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level 
== "medium")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec 
policy")) || (((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == 
"hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "cast")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "medium")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && 
(app_domain == "IPsec policy"))) || (((((((local_filter_port == "79") 
&& (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "medium")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && 
(app_domain == "IPsec policy")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "79") && 
(ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "medium")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && 
(app_domain == "IPsec policy"))))) || (((((((((local_filter_port == 
"23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (esp_enc_alg == "des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy")) || 
(((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "des")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level 
== "low")) && (network_mode == "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec 
policy"))) || (((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == 
"hmac-md5")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && 
(network_mode == "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy")) || 
((((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "normal")) && (app_domain == "IPsec policy"))))) || 
(((((((local_filter_port == "23") && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "des")) && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
((network_mode == "default") && (security_level == "default"))) || 
(((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "des")) && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
((network_mode == "default") && (security_level == "default")))) || 
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(((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_present == "yes")) && 
(ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && ((network_mode == "default") && 
(security_level == "default"))) || ((((remote_filter_port == "79") && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
((network_mode == "default") && (security_level == "default")))))) || 
((((((((((local_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) 
&& (esp_enc_alg == "blowfish")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "high")) && (network_mode == "impacted")) || 
((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
(esp_enc_alg == "blowfish")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "high")) && (network_mode == "impacted"))) || 
((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "impacted")) || (((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == 
"hmac-md5")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) 
&& (network_mode == "impacted")))) || ((((((((local_filter_port == 
"23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (esp_enc_alg == "cast")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
(network_mode == "impacted")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && 
(esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (esp_enc_alg == "cast")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
(network_mode == "impacted"))) || ((((((local_filter_port == "79") && 
(ah_auth_alg == "hmac-ripemd")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "medium")) && (network_mode == "impacted")) || 
(((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-ripemd")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
(network_mode == "impacted"))))) || ((((((((local_filter_port == "23") 
&& (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5")) && (esp_enc_alg == "des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "impacted")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg 
== "hmac-md5")) && (esp_enc_alg == "des")) && (esp_present == "yes")) 
&& (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode == "impacted"))) || 
((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-ripemd")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "impacted")) || (((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == 
"hmac-ripemd")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) 
&& (network_mode == "impacted")))))) || ((((((((((local_filter_port == 
"23") && (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "aes")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "crisis")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == 
"hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "aes")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "high")) && (network_mode == "crisis"))) || 
((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) && (network_mode 
== "crisis")) || (((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == 
"hmac-sha")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "high")) 
&& (network_mode == "crisis")))) || ((((((((local_filter_port == "23") 
&& (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
(network_mode == "crisis")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && 
(esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
(network_mode == "crisis"))) || ((((((local_filter_port == "79") && 
(ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "medium")) && (network_mode == "crisis")) || 
(((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "medium")) && 
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(network_mode == "crisis"))))) || ((((((((local_filter_port == "23") && 
(esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && 
(esp_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "crisis")) || ((((((remote_filter_port == "23") && (esp_auth_alg == 
"hmac-sha")) && (esp_enc_alg == "3des")) && (esp_present == "yes")) && 
(security_level == "low")) && (network_mode == "crisis"))) || 
((((((local_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-ripemd")) && 
(ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) && (network_mode 
== "crisis")) || (((((remote_filter_port == "79") && (ah_auth_alg == 
"hmac-ripemd")) && (ah_present == "yes")) && (security_level == "low")) 
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APPENDIX M.  SECURITY PROPOSAL SUMMARY 
The following table is a summary of the security proposals found in 
isakmpd.policy (Appendix K) and keynotednf.policy (Appendix L). 
 
  
S E C U R I T Y    L E V E L  
 
 
Low Medium High 
                        Applications Encryption/Authentication Algorithm 
N  Normal Telnet DES MD5 CAST SHA 3DES SHA 
E M  Finger MD5 MD5 SHA 
T O Crisis Telnet 3DES SHA 3DES SHA AES SHA 
W D  Finger SHA SHA SHA 
O E Impact Telnet DES MD5 DES MD5 3DES MD5 




Telnet DES MD5  Default 
Setting Finger MD5 
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